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This report is an input to the scoping phase of the Climate and Resilience Framework Programme 
(CLARE) of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), in partnership with the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
Prepared by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) and Practical Action 
Consulting (PAC) (chapter 4), the report responds to DFID and IDRC’s request for a literature review 
focused on climate resilience in fragile and conflict-affected countries. In the terms of reference (ToR), 
it is noted that:  
conflict, fragility and environmental vulnerability are threatening the achievement 
of the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals], particularly SDG Goal 1 to End 
Poverty, and SDG Goal 2, to End Hunger. In 2017, 19 countries were classified as 
being in protracted crisis, characterised by conflict, weak governance, and a high 
prevalence of natural disasters. Countries with the greatest humanitarian need are 
also those where 59% of extremely poor people (442 million) live affected by 
fragility, environmental vulnerability or both. In 2010, a third of the world’s extreme 
poor lived in these countries. In 2018 this proportion has increased to one half and 
is expected to rise to two-thirds by 2030. 
The objectives of this report are to: 
• review available evidence and learning 
• map and outline the work that stakeholders are undertaking in these areas 
• develop recommendations on priority research areas and questions 
• provide inputs into a synthesis workshop to bring together and discuss the results of this and other 
analyses commissioned during the programme scoping stage to inform decisions by DFID and 
IDRC on the focus and design of the implementation phase of CLARE. 
 
This report has provided DFID, IDRC and the author team with the opportunity to interrogate the themes 
of relevance to CLARE. The themes were mutually agreed as climate risk (including future projected 
climate change and expected impacts), fragility, conflict, disaster risk reduction (DRR), environmental 
scarcity, and natural resource management issues. The report also seeks to identify the gaps in the 
evidence base, and/or lack of consensus in the literature, and where opportunities lie for investing in 
further research. 
In this paper, there is a strong focus on the human losses and impacts related to climate extremes and 
events and slow-onset climate change, whether through direct damage to people’s health, places of 
residence and work, and access to food and supplies, or through damage to the natural resource base on 
which people depend for fresh water, crops, fodder, fibre and other ecosystem services. Following a 
chapter on cross-cutting themes, we have organised the paper to begin with evidence on  ‘disasters’ 
(chapters 3 and 4), focusing more on fast-onset events and thereafter ‘natural resources’, focusing on 
slow-onset changes in the environment and their human impacts (chapter 5). This is then followed by 
an examination of the evidence on the impacts of climate change adaptation and mitigation on conflict 
and what is known about making such programmes more conflict sensitive (chapter 6).  
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2 Methodology and definitions 
This chapter provides a brief outline of the methodology employed, as well as the definitions adopted. 
 
2.1 Review of literature 
 
The research team drew on the library of articles collated through ODI’s climate change, conflict and 
security scans. The scans systematically identify and review a wide range of grey and academic 
literature, blogs and social media coverage over a four-month period. Three scans have been produced, 
reviewing more than 300 articles. This database of literature was drawn upon in the initial stages of this 
review, together with the pre-existing analysis of that available literature (as articulated in the scans).  
Thematic leads for each of the chapters of this report also reviewed additional topical literature not 
picked up on the ODI scans. This included articles that were published preceding or following the scan 
period (1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019), and topics shortlisted for inclusion by DFID/IDRC and 
ODI/PAC, which were not included in the scans. More than 250 articles were shortlisted and are cited 
in this report.  
As such, it must be noted that this is a retrospective review. Socioeconomic and political contexts, as 
well as the nature of hazards and natural resource use, are rapidly evolving in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts (FCAC). Some evidence lines will have evolved or be outdated. This places some 
limitations on programming recommendations. 
 
2.2 Key informant interviews  
 
Key informant interviews were conducted in November and December 2019, to help supplement and 
verify the findings from the secondary literature search. Specific attention was paid to individuals with 
expertise on climate change adaptation and mitigation finance – the areas where there was the least 
published material. Interviews were also used to bolster the literature exercise mapping current 
initiatives – where available information online was lacking. Thus, the key informant interviews were 
centred on the themes covered in chapter 6, as this is a particularly fast-moving area and targeted 
investigation was required through primary research. Interviewees were identified through snowball 
sampling. Interviews were conducted using semi-structured questions designed to reflect interviewees’ 
core competencies.  
Interviews were also conducted between November 2019 and February 2020 with agencies and 
networks, including the Climate Security Working Group, the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), TMP Systems, the 
Environmental Law Institute, the Disaster Displacement Task Team, the Environmental Peacebuilding 
Association, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), as well as a number of 







The articles reviewed use a diversity of definitions and concepts to understand, describe and analyse 
terms related to climate change and weather/climate-related hazards, natural hazards, disasters, conflict 
and resilience. We have drawn these definitions from the authoritative sources – namely the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, UNDRR and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – most widely referenced by the articles we 
reviewed. Where relevant, commentary has been provided on the use of different terms and definitions. 
In complement, to provide a degree of continuity, the authorship team utilised the following definitions 
to guide the review. 
Fragility: Based on the team’s initial scan of the literature, we adopted the definition of fragility and its 
relation to violence as given in the OECD report, States of fragility 2016: understanding violence 
(OECD, 2016: 21–23). However, we also note that our review may occasionally take us into bodies of 
literature slightly outside the fragile states listed there. For example, for countries such as Colombia and 
Mexico, there may be germane literature on the nexus of climate change and climate risks, natural 
resource bases and conflict, even though these countries do not fall within the OECD definition of fragile 
and conflict-affected states. Please note that in this report, we have used the acronym ‘FCAC’ for 
‘fragile and conflict-affected contexts’ because it is a more widely used acronym. However, we do look 
at what may be better termed ‘fragile and conflict-affected areas’ (meaning that we include conflict-
affected areas outside the OECD definition where the literature leads us to interesting and  
useful material). 
Violence: For the purposes of this review, we adopted the definition of violence given in the OECD 
report, which incorporates both ‘political violence’ and ‘social violence’, referring to ‘a broader 
manifestation of grievances, criminal behaviours and interpersonal violence in society’  
(OECD, 2016: 20). 
Conflict: We filtered specifically for instances of violent conflict in the literature review and adhered 
to the definition used in DFID’s 2010 report, Building peaceful states and societies: a DFID practice 
paper and its 2007 policy paper, Preventing violent conflict. Thus: ‘non-violent conflict is normal and 
healthy in a pluralistic society. But without mechanisms to resolve conflict, it can easily lead to violence’ 
(DFID, 2010: 15). In addition:  
Conflict is the pursuit of contrary or seemingly incompatible interests – whether 
between individuals, groups or countries ... In states with good governance, strong 
civil society and robust political and social systems where human rights are 
protected, conflicting interests are managed, and ways found for groups to pursue 
their goals peacefully. Where there is poor governance, however, grievances, 
disillusionment, competition for resources and disputes are more likely to become 
violent. (DFID, 2007: 6–7) 
Geographic scope: The above working definitions also allow us to go beyond a country-level approach 
in the review and incorporate sub-national contexts. Sub-national literature and case studies are 
important because they give us key insights into climate and conflict dynamics, which may not always 
stand out in a country-level view. Sub-national case studies may also provide evidence that can inform 
efforts to scale up resilience measures. 
Climate: Climate, in a narrow sense, is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as 
the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities (e.g. precipitation, 
minimum temperatures, etc.) over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of 
years. The classical period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the World 
Meteorological Organization (adapted from IPCC, 2019a: 807).  
Climate variability: In our review, this term shall refer to the variations in the means and other statistics 
(such as extremes, standard deviations, etc.) of the climate on all spatial and temporal timescales beyond 
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those of individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the 
climate system (internal variability) like El Niño, or influenced by anthropogenic climate change and/or 
natural external forces, such as shifts in solar cycles (adapted from IPCC, 2019a: 809). 
Climate change: Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. 
by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists 
for an extended period, typically decades or longer. The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: ‘a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity … [and] ... is in addition to natural climate variability 
observed over comparable time periods’ (IPCC, 2019a: 808). 
Extreme weather event: Extreme weather events and their relation to conflict, fragility and resilience 
figure prominently in this review. These are defined as an event that is statistically rare, as rare or rarer 
than the 10th or 90th percentile of the probability distribution estimated from observations. Persistence 
of an extreme weather event over a season or more may be called an extreme climate event (definition 
adapted from IPCC, 2014: 1765).  
However, as will be discussed in the third chapter, climate analysis is not necessarily robust in many 
conflict–climate studies and climate statistics not often appropriately applied. Therefore, a more relaxed 
definition is necessary when interpreting studies mentioned in the review. An event that causes 
significant damage may not be considered statistically extreme by climate science standards; this is a 
good indication that vulnerability, exposure and capacity contexts are more responsible for the negative 
impacts than the event itself. As such, where such an event leads to outcomes that are considered to be 
disasters, it shall be considered an ‘extreme event’ even if it does not meet climate statistics definitions. 
Furthermore, given the dearth of robust climate analysis in many studies, it is difficult to assess the 
attribution of climate change to an extreme event, or whether such a particular event is within the bounds 
of natural variability. Many of the studies assessed automatically assumed that every extreme was 
‘caused’ by climate change. Even less attention was paid to how shifts in seasons and overall regional 
climate means over the next few decades will interact with local socioeconomic, cultural, political and 
environmental contexts – as will be discussed in the parallel CLARE scoping report, Enabling 
climate science use to better support resilience and adaptation practice: rapid evidence assessment for 
the CLARE programme.  
Disaster: We have used the commonly employed UNDRR (2017) definition of disaster as: 
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due 
to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and 
capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and 
environmental losses and impacts. Annotations: The effect of the disaster can be 
immediate and localized, but is often widespread and could last for a long period of 
time. The effect may test or exceed the capacity of a community or society to cope 
using its own resources, and therefore may require assistance from external 
sources, which could include neighbouring jurisdictions, or those at the national or 
international levels.  
There are some parallel definitional and methodological challenges to weather/climate-related hazards 
(including extreme events) with how disasters are defined, quantified or qualified in various studies or 
by various actors. While many of the articles we reviewed make reference to definitions used by the 
IPCC or UNDRR, the actual definitions used to guide analysis and frame findings was found to diverge 
significantly in practice. 
Simonovic (2016: 85) notes that most definitions of disaster are related to the negative impacts of  
a hazard:  
‘Disaster risk’ and ‘disaster losses’ are essentially our interpretations of the 
negative economic and social consequences of natural events. Human judgment is 
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subject to value systems that different groups of people may have and therefore these 
terms may be subject to different definitions.  
Records of ‘losses and damages’ data are not consistent among governments, aid agencies or insurers, 
for example (OECD, 2018). DRR and climate adaptation economics researchers will use different 
quantitative methods for estimating direct and indirect costs that are not necessarily comparable to more 
qualitative methods for examining ‘serious disruption’; not all losses and damages are quantifiable (e.g. 
cultural disruption, knock-on impacts on mental health and wellbeing, and so on) and it may not be 
ethical to try to quantify them (see Mechler et al., 2019 for an overview of the discourses). While it 
might not be desirable for complete standardisation of definitions of ‘disaster’ in various studies, 
nonetheless, this can make it challenging to compare studies examining the links between disasters 
triggered by natural hazards and/or environmental degradation and violent conflict. 
The caveats on/around definitions, and how they are framed and measured by different stakeholders – 
e.g. researchers from different disciplines such as DRR or climate change adaptation, social or physical 
scientists, conflict and security, and so on – have implications for how these groups make links between 
conflict, ‘natural’ disasters (including those influenced by climate change) and environmental 
degradation. Narratives and discourses matter, as the value judgements of various actors will influence 
what types of programmes are put forward and how they are operated. The ethics and values components 
of the links between conflict, natural hazard (including climate-related) -natural resource management 
links do need to be kept strongly in mind when reading the evidence, gaps and recommendations 








3 Cross-cutting issues  
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter highlights some of the cross-cutting issues and the historical and current evidence base 
underpinning the relationships between conflict, natural resource management and climate variability 
and change in fragile contexts, as well as the complex interactions between the three that hinge upon 
socioeconomic and political contexts. 
It is broken down into four sections, which: 
• give a brief history of research examining the linkages between disasters and conflict 
• highlight how societal structural inequalities and intersecting vulnerability, capacity and exposure 
factors are driving impacts and generating disaster and conflict risks (further explored in chapters 4 
and 5), and the need to take an intersectional approach in policy and programming 
• explore the place for climate attribution and sensitivity analysis 
• recognise the need for a more multiple disciplinary approach to DRR, climate change adaptation 
and conflict and humanitarian action in research and programming. 
 
Environmental degradation caused by humans (including climate change), coupled with major societal 
changes such as urbanisation, continues to place pressure on natural resources needed for people to 
access food, water, energy and livelihoods. This chapter highlights the growing need for knowledge 
about how shocks and stressors may influence conflict risks in fragile areas, and the need to develop 
risk-informed strategies for dealing with them. It also stresses the need to take an intersectional approach 
through a risk-based lens to help generate knowledge on these linked risk drivers and to develop resilient 
and sustainable programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas. 
 
3.2 Cross-cutting issues: from historical to recent perspectives and 
back again 
 
Violent conflict is a complex phenomenon driven by multiple factors. The linking of environmental 
pressures with conflict, particularly over natural resources and environmental degradation, emerged as 
a scientific and policy concern some 30 years ago (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Westing, 1986). Even before 
then, the natural hazards and disasters community began exploring the links between various types of 
conflict, from community-level to civil war, and ‘natural’ disasters (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1971). As 
awareness of climate change continues to grow, there have been questions about its role in relation to 
conflict and security – not only through shifts in extreme weather/climate events, but also in overall 
seasons, with some areas ‘tipping’ into entirely new climates. 
Early researchers, such as Dynes and Quarantelli (1971) and Stallings (1988), noted that evidence is 
mixed as to where violent conflict is likely to occur as a response during one or more of the three stages 
of a ‘natural’ disaster – immediate emergency following a hazard event, and post-emergency medium 
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to long term. Stallings (1988: 570) describes how ‘aspects of social structure and human agency rather 
than “nature” alone influence the probability, severity, and consequences of natural disasters’, including 
the likelihood of conflict. And where conflict has occurred, it has tended to be in the post-emergency 
periods in contexts where socioeconomic inequality is high, institutions are weak, and conflict and 
power struggles between ‘official and unofficial decision makers’ and other non-state actors already 
existed prior to the hazard event – including in ability to have political dissent and for collective action 
(Stallings, 1988; Nel and Righarts, 2008). 
Some studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s lost sight of the earlier work and attempted to directly 
attribute every weather and climate extreme to climate change and directly link these events with 
increases in conflict (Detges, 2017; McCullough et al., 2019). Yet the failure of such studies to 
concretely demonstrate a direct link, as well as a growing evidence base, has led to a return to some of 
the earlier insights that climate variability and change, and environmental degradation, act as 
intermediary sources of conflict risk and threat multipliers, but not as direct causes. 
The evidence base underpinning the relationships between violent conflict, natural resource 
management, and climate variability and change in fragile contexts at sub-national to transboundary 
scales points to complex interactions between the three that hinge upon socioeconomic and political 
contexts. Trying to directly link violent conflict, climate variability and change, and natural resource 
pressures ignores the antecedent conditions that allow particular risks to become reality (see chapters 4 
and 5) and is influencing political discourses and programming to address risks (see remaining 
chapters). In particular, those discourses that are securitising climate change in conflict areas are running 
the risk of criminalising certain populations (discussed in chapter 4; McCullough et al., 2019;  
Peters et al., 2020). 
 
3.3 Intersectional vulnerabilities, exposures and capacities: 
systemic inequalities contribute to disaster and conflict risks 
 
As noted in the definition of ‘disaster’ in chapter 2, the risk of disaster, disasters themselves and all their 
subsequent cascading risks result from the interaction of the hazard – be that a drought, earthquake or 
typhoon – with the underlying vulnerability, exposure and capacity contexts of various groups of people 
and the infrastructure, services and ecosystems on which they rely (see Figure 1). As we outline here 
and discuss further throughout the report, it is the intersection of multiple factors that enable the 
outcomes of a climate-related or other natural hazard to become a disaster and/or that lead to conditions 
where conflict might arise.  
Researchers have furthered explorations of the role of structural societal inequalities in conflict and in 
leading to disaster outcomes. Crenshaw (1989; 1991) introduced the concept of intersectionality, 
recognising that people can experience ‘simultaneous’ or ‘interlocking’ oppressions – for instance, 
racism and sexism – and that failing to look at different intersecting factors neglects people’s different 
realities, needs, interests and capacities; and the fact that these will change over time (Chaplin et al., 
2019). Taking an intersectional approach to reducing vulnerability and building resilience to natural 
hazards, extreme and slow-onset climate events (including those influenced by climate change), conflict 
and fragility helps challenge the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. It is a way of capturing the interaction 
between categories of social difference (such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, caste, 
disability, sexual orientation and geography (among others)) and how these affect ‘individuals, social 
practices, cultures, institutions and power relationships in different contexts’ (Lovell et al., 2019: 10). 
There remain wide discrepancies in how different groups of people experience hazards and conflict. 
Marginalised groups – including people with disabilities, women, children, older persons, minority and 
indigenous groups (among others) – tend to be disproportionately affected by natural hazards, including 
climate-related hazards, conflict and fragility. This is due to structural inequalities in society, and the 
different social, economic, cultural, political and environmental contexts in which people live (Lovell 
et al., 2019). These are the same factors that intersect to create the exclusions and inequalities that shape 
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vulnerabilities and differentiated exposure to hazards and conflict, and influence people’s capacity to 
prepare for, cope with and respond to all types of shocks and stresses (Chaplin et al., 2019). Experiences 
will also vary depending on whether people have pre-existing vulnerabilities, or whether vulnerabilities 
have been caused or exacerbated by the shock or stress through secondary impact chains.  
 
Figure 1 The relationships between hazards (climate-related), vulnerability and 
exposure that give rise to climate risk 
 
 Source: IPCC, 2012: 2.  
 
Rapidly changing development contexts in various fragile states – including demographics, 
urbanisation, shifting economies, access to technologies and digital divides (including access to 
information and the growing influence of social media) – also strongly shape how existing 
socioeconomic and political inequalities evolve in various conflict and fragile contexts. In some areas, 
fragility might be decreasing through some of these factors, while in others it might be increasing. For 
instance, as people move to cities and/or gain access to different ideas through social media, gender and 
disability norms are being challenged and cultural framings on DRR are evolving (Cannon, 2015; 
Gaillard et al., 2015). Nevertheless, there is a lack of clarity about how rapid social change processes 
are shaping vulnerabilities and capacities (there is more on exposure), including along gender, age and 
disability lines, and social conditions are often treated as somewhat static in climate impacts research.  
Exposure – literally the presence of people, livelihoods and the assets and systems on which they depend 
in places that experience hazards or conflict (adapted from IPCC, 2019a: 813) – is as differentiated as 
vulnerability and capacities. ‘Place inequalities - such as the level of urbanisation, growth rates and 
economic vitality’ (Cutter et al., 2003: 243) vary among groups of people. For instance, it has long been 
noted that poorer populations are often forced to live in informal, often temporary settlements within 
urban settings in unsafe housing, which does not comply with building regulations (increasing exposure 
to geohazards) (Schofield et al., 2019); many of these settlements are situated in floodplains (flood 
exposure), and often have inadequate ventilation and sanitation (e.g. exposure to extreme heat and 
disease outbreaks) (see, for example, Otto-Zimmerman, 2010). Women and girls, elderly people and 
those with chronic illness or disability face differentiated exposures to non-disabled males, and often 
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have limited access to critical services and systems that they need to promote their well-being and 
longer-term development outcomes, influencing their capacity to manage shocks and stresses  
(Diwakar et al., 2019). 
It is these differentiated vulnerabilities, capacities and exposures related to systematic inequalities that 
give rise to variable lived impacts during and post-hazard (including whether the hazard will lead to 
disaster) or conflict event (see also chapter 4). Disasters and conflict can affect people both directly 
(through the effects on household poverty trajectories and individual deprivation, injury and death), and 
indirectly (through the effects on services and systems central to a person’s well-being and long-term 
development, including health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education, mental 
health and domestic violence) (Diwakar et al., 2019; Pfefferbaum et al., 2014). Moreover, the secondary 
impacts and the coping strategies people adopt after a disaster or in times of fragility or conflict have a 
profound effect on a person’s well-being and ability to recover and respond to different shocks and 
stresses in future. For instance, there are often elevated levels of interpersonal violence, human 
trafficking, child marriage, civil unrest, and increased burden of work for women and others looking 
after their household and dependants.  
Empirical evidence bases are weak, however. Small sample sizes and limited time periods, as well as 
poor observational datasets (e.g. differing definitions of conflict, disasters and reporting standards; 
climate and natural resource observations; tracking of human mobility, etc.) have hampered the 
statistical robustness of attribution and sensitivity models (Nel and Righarts, 2008; Detges, 2017). This 
limits our ability to measure the outcomes of programmes designed to address one or more of these 
interlinked factors to determine how they have enabled (or not) resilience, and for whom – as discussed 
in subsequent chapters.  
There is a need to champion systematic and longitudinal data collection, disaggregated by sex, age, 
economic status, ethnicity, caste and disability, and to build methodologies and tools to better capture 
the complexities of intersecting inequalities and poverty dynamics (and how these shape vulnerability, 
capacity and exposure), which can be used to inform decision-making and implementation. Moreover, 
an inclusive and human rights-based approach is needed in the design and delivery of all policies and 
programmes, to help address structural inequalities and intersecting vulnerability, capacity and exposure 
factors, and to help enhance protection and development outcomes for the most marginalised people.  
There is also a need for better understanding of how various populations participate in socio-cultural 
change, how their vulnerabilities, capacities and exposure are shaped by aspects of social change, and 
how resilience can be promoted as divides widen. These considerations need to be included through a 
risk-informed approach to tackle chronic poverty, to stop people falling into poverty and to sustain 
poverty escapes (Shepherd et al., 2014; Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019). Nevertheless, there is a tension in 
policy and programming between approaches that subscribe to the ethos of ‘inclusion for all’ and the 
need to target specific disadvantaged groups (Chaplin et al., 2019).  
 
3.4 Climate and environmental analysis, including attribution and 
sensitivity analysis 
 
Much recent research on climate and conflict has tended to attribute climate change as the cause of 
every single climate-related hazard in areas of conflict (Detges, 2017; McCullough et al., 2019), even 
though the individual hazard event might be due to natural variability alone. Proper climate analysis, 
including attribution and sensitivity analysis, continues to be lacking in many climate-conflict studies, 
as highlighted in some of the case study boxes throughout the chapters (see, for example, chapter 5) and 
in the evidence gap reviews. Improper climate analysis and/or failure to conduct climate attribution 
analysis potentially undermines the validity of findings purporting specific relationships between 
weather/climate-related events and trends (including as influenced by climate change), conflict, 
disasters and natural resource management. 
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This is not to say, however, that climate change is not altering climate-related natural hazards. Many 
historical and current climate-related events were/are still within the range of natural climate variability. 
However, climate change is already observably influencing the duration, frequency, intensity and spatial 
extent of primary natural hazards like severe storms or heatwaves, and contributing to flooding and 
various types of drought (secondary hazards); it will also shift seasons and weather patterns, as 
highlighted in multiple IPCC reports and scientific studies. The severity and extent of climate risks are 
differentiated at scales ranging from the individual to the international, and are continually evolving as 
the pace and extent of climate change shifts, as do socioeconomic and political conditions (as  
previously highlighted).  
Climate services need to be included in programmes seeking to support development, DRR and climate 
adaptation and mitigation in FCAC. The required elements for such climate services include: 
• Embedding climate scientists within multidisciplinary teams to conduct robust, yet project-
appropriate climate analysis in support of project research-to-action aims. A science-driven 
evidence agenda will not be helpful; any climate services provided must be user-driven and  
science-informed.  
This requires that: 
• Climate scientists must have experience in various social science techniques (e.g. surveys, 
interviews, focus groups, etc.) and be able to collaborate with social scientists to scope and 
continuously assess: 
• the perceived needs of various project stakeholders for specific types of weather and climate 
analysis and information based on goals and balance this against: 
• actual capacities to use the information 
• actual needs as iteratively and adaptively reflected in programming research and activities 
• availability of climate data. 
• Climate scientists must be able to translate the information and analysis to fit project aims. 
Furthermore, they must be able to clearly articulate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
weather/climate information and say how it should not be used. Inappropriate use of the information 
may lead to invalid research findings and/or create or exacerbate negative outcomes from 
programme actions (i.e. unintended consequences) that end up reducing people’s resilience. 
All these activities should be conducted through continuous engagement and communication with 
various project stakeholders. 
Finally, there needs to be better coordination and integration of environmental scientists within studies 
examining the links between natural resource management, conflict and disasters. There is a need to 
draw from existing biology, biogeochemistry, hydrology and marine biology studies through an 
environmental services element similar to the required climate services, in which biologists and/or 
environmental scientists work within multidisciplinary teams. Monitoring of environmental conditions, 
such as soil erosion or water supplies, is necessary for tracking where human use patterns are creating 
undue strain on local ecosystems that could have serious livelihood and well-being repercussions, and 
that reduce the capacity of the ecosystem to buffer certain natural hazard impacts. This service should 
also enhance understanding of the potential links and feedback between environmental degradation, 
natural resource management, shifting climates and shifting social structures – and how these could 






3.5 Improving usability and relevance of predictive and decision 
support models 
 
There are a number of existing predictive and decision support models for climate change and conflict, 
including a mapping of current technologies, methods and innovation. Where possible, we have 
indicated the limitations of these models to predict climate-related conflicts or supporting decisions; 
however, it must be noted that several of these models are still under development and that the literature 
does not usually report examples of or learning from failures compared to successes. Thus, more 
examination would be required to understand the pros and cons of each model. 
While there are a number of models, their credibility and salience for decision-makers designing 
programming is not guaranteed. One interviewee expressed scepticism towards quantitative predictive, 
early warning and risk assessment systems as these tend not to evaluate second, third or fourth order 
effects, and often do not include limitations or discuss uncertainties of the analyses produced. Many 
models also fail to capture qualitative social and cultural dynamics. Moreover, the interviewee argued 
that integrated climate and security risk assessments should consider carefully integrating situated on-
the-ground knowledge, to be able to lead to concrete decisions and make a difference on the ground. 
Nonetheless, some existing toolsets, frameworks and datasets are emerging as attempts to begin 
addressing some of the evidence gaps identified throughout this report. 
• Programming approach: The new joint programme by United Nations Environment  (UNEP) and 
adelphi, Strengthening Resilience to Climate-Fragility Risks, will, by design, address the nexus of 
sustainable livelihoods, climate, security and peace-building (UNEP, 2019). 
• Risk assessment: The Complex Emergencies and Political Stability in Asia programme at the 
University of Texas, Austin, has developed a Complex Emergencies Dashboard to map climate 
security vulnerability in South and Southeast Asia. It adopts an approach where the internal datasets 
on climate exposure, population density, household resilience and governance can be overlaid with 
external datasets, such as terrorist events, to create climate security hotspots. While useful, caution 
must be used in determining direct causality between the datasets (Smith et al., 2018). Similarly, in 
Spain, the Basque Centre for Climate Change has developed maps that represent climate, conflict 
and socioeconomic characteristics across Africa (Cappelli et al., 2018). 
• Recovery and reconstruction: Highlighting the opportunities offered by post-crisis recovery to 
minimise environmental impacts and build resilience to disasters, climate impacts and conflict, 
UNEP (2018a) has developed a step-by-step practical guide to undertaking integrated Strategic 
Environmental Assessments. Part of the approach is to create ‘opportunity maps’ for collective 
decision-making. These have been developed and used in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province following 
33 years of conflict; they have led to collective decision-making, reduced land and resource use 
conflicts, and, ultimately, the declaration of new protected areas. 
• Cities: The Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands has developed a Climate Security Resilience 
Monitor, which draws data from the UN-Habitat City Prosperity Index and 100 Resilient Cities’ 
City Resilience Index to quantify resilience within urban areas in fragile contexts (Rademaker et 
al., 2018). Focusing on cultural capital reconstruction, the World Bank and UNESCO have 
developed the Culture in City Reconstruction and Recovery (CURE) framework to focus on both 
physical infrastructure and social capital reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict and natural 
hazard-related disasters. Both institutions are planning to use the framework to rebuild Mosul in 
Iraq (World Bank, 2018a).  
• Local level: Ojha et al. (2019) have developed the Adaptive Learning and Deliberation approach 
and applied it in Nepal to mitigate conflict (due to poorly defined resource tenure, poor governance 
and increasing climate impacts) and foster cooperation among local communities over forest and 
water resources. The approach entails fostering reflective attitudes towards ongoing conflicts 
between community leadership and marginal groups, to better understand the causes and 
consequences of the conflict and promote equitable distribution arrangements. The dialogues have 
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been promoted at different levels of resource governance, with high degrees of reported success. 
The authors, however, caution that the approach may not work or may need to be adopted in highly 
sensitive areas, where open discussion and critical enquiry are not part of the political context. 
• Early warning systems: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) has utilised climate science forecasts to enable triggers for the release funding so that food, 
water and hygiene kits can be distributed ahead of impact (Friends of Europe, 2018). The IFRC is 
also working with the UN, the World Bank, Google, Microsoft and Amazon to develop the Famine 
Action Mechanism (FAM), which aims to unlock relief funding more quickly (Holley, 2018). FAM 
is an algorithm powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect early signs of food 
shortages, such as crop failures, droughts, natural hazards and conflicts. It has many similarities to 
the existing Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET, 2019); see Box 1. 
 
3.6 Transdisciplinarity and cross-sectoral working  
 
That disastrous outcomes are occurring post climate-related hazard and, in some contexts, contributing 
to further incidences of violent conflict, again points to structural inequalities and intersecting 
vulnerability, capacity and exposure factors as driving impacts and generating disaster and conflict risks. 
As human-caused environmental degradation (including climate change), coupled with massive societal 
change such as urbanisation, continues to place pressures on the natural resources needed for livelihoods 
Box 1  WPS Global Early Warning Tool 
 
The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership has recently launched the Global Early Warning 
Tool – a predictive system that will allow global, national and local decision-makers and 
stakeholders to intervene and help defuse conflicts before blood is shed. The tool analyses patterns 
of violent conflict using machine learning in combination with more than 80 environmental, 
economic and social variables going back 20 years, and then compares those patterns to current 
conditions in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia to pinpoint potential hotspots. 
It is able to predict conflict (defined as organised violence resulting in at least 10 fatalities over a 
12-month period) up to a year in advance using a random forest model. 
The developers of the tool are transparent and clear about the limitations and uncertainties of the 
underlying predictive model. In fact, they state that, ‘Overall, the model captures 86% of future 
conflicts, successfully forecasting over 9 out of every 10 ongoing conflicts and 6 out of 10 emerging 
conflicts. The trade-off for this high recall is low precision for emerging conflicts. Around 80% of 
all emerging conflict forecasts represent false positives, that is, instances where conflict was forecast 
but did not actually occur. Note: on-going conflicts have both high recall and high precision (<1% 
were false positives). Like an initial medical screening, our model is optimised to flag all concerning 
cases for further analysis. In other words, we would rather wrongly forecast the presence of conflict 
than incorrectly forecast its absence (i.e. “peace”, in the strictly negative sense). For this reason, we 
prioritise recall over the other metrics. The downside to this decision is that our model is likely to 
overestimate conflict.’ 
So the tool has a high percentage of ‘mistakes’ in predicting new conflicts, but its creators explain 
that results should be considered as a ‘first screening’ using a large ‘net’, which will require further 
analysis to make decisions on the individual conflict case identified. 
Source: WPS, 2019. 
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and food-energy-water security, there is a growing need for knowledge about how increasing shocks 
and stressors may influence conflict risks in fragile areas, and to develop risk-informed strategies for 
dealing with them.  
A programme of action is required which looks at multiple hazards in the context of rapidly evolving 
socioeconomic contexts and how these influence conflict risks in fragile areas and can interact with 
development programmes and policies. Clearly, how development is conducted is critical to managing 
risks to people, livelihoods and assets, as well as the infrastructure and ecosystems on which they 
depend. Development cannot be made resilient or sustainable without considering a broader range of 
threats – beyond just natural hazards – and how these threats together pose complex risks to and 
opportunities for development. Development activities might tackle, ignore or amplify intersectional 
trade-offs and differentiated opportunities and risks (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2020). 
This could include the risks of exacerbating conflict or marginalising particular groups, as described in 
section 6.2, ‘Evidence of DRR, climate change adaptation and mitigation programming and policies 
exacerbating conflict’.  
Using an intersectional approach through a risk-informed development lens is particularly important 
in generating knowledge on these linked risk drivers and for developing resilient and sustainable 
programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas. This lens advocates that socioeconomic 
development, as a decision process, should ideally have three aims (see also Figure ): 
1. Avoid creating complex risks through poor development choices. 
2. Reduce complex risks by using development to reduce gender, age, ability, and ethnic group 
differentiated vulnerability and exposure through increased resilience. 
3. Promote constant and iterative learning to monitor changing conditions and build foresight 
capacities to anticipate and manage novel threats and risks, and take advantage of new opportunities. 
 
Figure 2  Risk-informed development aims 
 
 
Source: Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019. 
 
There has been a demonstrable shift from reactive response efforts towards a more integrated and risk-
informed approach to development, with clearly some gap between ideation and action. Similarly, there 
has been a move towards more decentralised governance in many countries, where local governments 
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are expected to have a better understanding of the local context and appropriate local development 
solutions. Nevertheless, challenges remain around capacity, coordination and resources for delivering 
policies and programmes that aim to build resilience to natural hazards and climate change, peace-
building and conflict prevention/management at scale (Lovell et al., 2019).  
The first step is for national policy-makers and international donors, investors and businesses to openly 
acknowledge that these trade-offs exist. Making the choices these trade-offs demand means comparing 
and prioritising risks and impacts (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019). But what is considered a risk or 
opportunity, to whom, and how it should be appraised and treated is a value judgement. An individual’s 
culture, life experiences, background and education all influence what they consider risky, and their 
ability to tolerate, reduce or transfer perceived risks. Decision-makers, businesses and individuals accept 
a certain degree of risk on the assumption that the decision will bring significant benefits (such as 
approving urban development in a flood-prone area because of the perceived economic benefits, or an 
individual choosing to move in search of work). Risks may not be systematically assessed or understood, 
or they may be ignored. 
Deciding what constitutes an ‘acceptable’ level of risk involves not only scientific and technological 
assessments of potential impacts that will be unequally distributed, but also cost–benefit analyses and 
ethical and political considerations, and acceptability to the public. This is a challenging ask; politics 
can be partisan and public opinion can be easily swayed. Risk perception and risk tolerance are 
subjective and value-laden, and this influences what is considered a risk and the amount of uncertainty 
involved in that judgement (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019). 
There is a need to ensure better data-sharing, lesson-sharing, coherence and coordination between 
sectoral ministries working on these areas (often in silos) and key stakeholders (formal and informal), 
and for more effective integration across levels of governance from national, sub-national and local 
levels to scale up action around the transdisciplinary approaches needed to deliver sustainable solutions 
(Lovell et al., 2019). The case studies in chapter 6 ‘Climate finance for adaptation in fragile and conflict 
contexts’, highlight shifts in research and programmatic thinking. 
This review examines evidence gaps in addition to what is known, from multiple disciplinary 
perspectives, including DRR, climate adaptation and conflict and humanitarian research and 
programmes. The subsequent chapters take a people-centred and intersectional approach to vulnerability 
reduction and resilience-building in the context of climate change, natural resource management and 
natural hazards. We will review tools and approaches used to support climate adaptation and DRR in 
FCAC and sub-national contexts, including experience of conflict-sensitive climate adaptation and DRR 
programming. This will draw on lessons from humanitarian and development agencies working on 
mainstreaming conflict sensitivity through the DFID Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (CSC).1 We aim 
to cross-fertilise these ideas with insights from the natural resource management field, to suggest 
promising research and programme frontiers.  
Where possible throughout the different chapters the authors will provide evidence of how existing 
literature explores: 
• different factors of exclusion, inequality, vulnerability and capacity in the context of people’s ability 
to manage and respond to natural hazards, including those related to climate variability and 
influenced by climate change, conflict and fragility; 
• the secondary impacts of conflict, climate variability and change, natural resource management and 
natural hazards on inter-personal violence and on the coping strategies used by households to help 
them deal with these events; 
 
1 DFID’s Conflict Sensitivity Consortium is a global network of organisations and individuals that brings together ‘actors in the fields of 
development, humanitarian, peacebuilding, security, research and business using conflict sensitivity at policy, organizational and programmatic 




• what methodologies and strategies are being used to understand exposure, vulnerability, inequality 
and poverty dynamics in the context of climate variability and change, natural resource management 
and under conditions of conflict and fragility;  
• case studies/best practice where governments or organisations have attempted to take an integrated, 
inclusive and equitable approach to building resilience to climate change, natural hazards, natural 
resource management, conflict and fragility in policy and practice, and what we can learn  
from these.  
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4 Hazard- and climate-related 
disasters and conflict  
This chapter reviews and summarises the available information, evidence and gaps on what types of 
disaster risk management actions are viable and appropriate in FCAC to address climate-related and 
hazard-related disasters. It considers how communities living in such contexts experience and manage 
climate and disaster risk, and how policy and practice for DRR has responded to date.  
Here, the term ‘climate-related’ encompasses a spectrum of weather/climate events from rapid-onset, 
short duration extremes to slow-onset, long-duration events (e.g. droughts and sea-level rise), whether 
these are entirely within natural variability or where claimed as being attributed to climate change – 
even if proper attribution analysis is lacking. 
 
4.1 State of the evidence: do climate-related disasters lead to 
conflict? 
 
Since the 1990s and more extensively throughout the 2000s, various scientific communities have 
explored whether, how, and to what extent disasters instigate or escalate violent conflict. Earlier studies 
on the nexus of climate, security and fragility predominantly focused on quantitative analysis seeking 
to establish a direct causal link between climate change or weather/climate extremes and conflicts 
(Busby, 2018; Koubi, 2018). This literature produced ambiguous and often contradictory results. 
Research has since shifted from attribution to understanding the dynamics between climate-related 
hazards and the political and socioeconomic drivers of conflict. 
Literature suggesting that climate-related disasters do increase violent conflict outcomes are routinely 
cited in policy papers and dialogues, including in national security strategies and at the UN Security 
Council. Much of this literature attributes climate change in particular extreme events, such as droughts. 
Problematically, however, it does not always undertake robust climate analysis nor explore shifts in 
disaster event severity through time as a function of climate or socioeconomic and political change – an 
area thus warranting further research (see section 4.1.2 on climate security).  
Other bodies of literature indicate that disasters do not universally lead to conflict; some articles find 
that disasters do contribute to conflict, while others find that disasters lend toward cooperation. In a 
review of current literature, Xu et al. (2016, in Peters et al., 2019b: 9) find that ‘disasters do not directly 
lead to social conflict, but can do so indirectly through their adverse impacts on society and by 
increasing social risk’. It is worth noting that what does not feature prominently in the literature is the 
‘potentially mitigating role of DRR’ nor linked climate change adaptation action in reducing or 
exacerbating conflict risk (more on this later). 
A substantial number of articles assess whether disasters lead to conflict or increase its intensity, and 
many such as Nel and Righarts (2008) find that ‘disasters have been found to increase the risk of civil 
conflict in the short and medium term in low- and middle income countries’. Other studies find that 
even where cooperation and collaboration ensue in the immediate post-disaster context – while 
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emergency activities are underway – later on, social conflict can increase (Carroll et al., 2006, and Dynes 
and Quarentelli, 1975, in Peters et al., 2019b).  
In more extreme cases of social change, there are empirical examples of disaster events providing 
political impetus and space in which political movements can accelerate their agenda. This relationship 
between disasters and political legitimacy is complex, and time- and place-specific. Examples of this 
interesting dynamic include the increased support for the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua following 
the 1972 earthquake, which resulted in the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship. In other cases, 
statistical studies find that higher numbers of disaster survivors can lead to increased risk of conflict 
owing to higher numbers of people with grievances – and that this is more likely in developing countries 
than democratic countries (Bhavnani, 2006). Other studies find that ‘rapid-onset climate-related 
disasters, such as storms and floods, appear to have a small impact on civil unrest on average, but closer 
analysis … reveals that they have a highly variable effect on violent civil unrest through generating both 
cooperative and conflictual behaviours’ (Nardulli et al., 2015, in Peters et al., 2019b: 10). Note that by 
climate science standards, floods and storms have timescales that lend them to be described more as 
weather-related hazards, but this distinction is lost in many studies such as in Nardulli et al. Further 
evidence is provided in Box 2. 
Studies are providing an initial characterisation of the different effects of climate-related extremes (e.g. 
shocks like typhoons) and trends (e.g. stresses such as seasonal temperature increases) on individual 
and collective propensity for violence and conflict (see Box 3). Koubi et al. (2018) ‘strongly and 
robustly’ find that people displaced by environmental stresses are more prone to conflict compared to 
those displaced by shocks, as over time people become aware of their state of deprivation and low 
adaptive capacity in relation to better-off people. Brzoska’s (2018) findings align with the literature that 
disasters do not themselves create conflict. Their research also suggests that disaster events may lead to 
an escalation or prolongation of armed conflict where it is already occurring, but they may also 
encourage cooperation and de-escalation of conflict in limited areas for reconstruction purposes. Linke 
et al. (2018) reach similar conclusions in their study in Kenya, where violence or ‘violent attitudes’ only 
moderately increase due to droughts. Miles-Novelo and Anderson (2019) summarise a few 
Box 2  The multifaceted relationship between disasters and conflict 
 
‘Other studies investigate the variable impacts of disasters on conflict and political stability relative 
to the political and social systems in place. Rapid-onset disasters are statistically correlated with the 
onset of political instability, particularly in transitional states with weak institutions and limited 
capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully (Omelicheva, 2011); climate-related disasters, such as 
heatwaves and droughts, are correlated with armed conflict in highly ethnically fractionalised 
countries (Schleussner et al., 2016). In a study of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, Marcelin (2011) 
linked the re-emergence of gangs in the Cité Soleil shanty town with political, social and economic 
exclusion and the inability of a weak government to address increasing violence in the area. In Chile 
after the 2010 earthquake, Carlin et al. (2014) found that the disaster eroded a relatively new 
democracy, and the post-earthquake crisis period led to violent political and social conflicts along 
with other undesirable effects, but also strengthened social networks. 
There is also evidence that some political regimes may become more repressive following disasters. 
Wood and Wright (2016) find that disasters can increase regime repression, particularly in areas 
most affected by disaster, because disasters can provide an opportunity to express grievances, both 
around the disaster itself, and more generally. This in turn can prompt a more assertive government 
response to suppress threats and maintain control.’  
Source: Peters et al., 2019b: 10. 
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psychological pathways through which climate-related hazards (they attribute these to climate change) 
influence individual violence. 
The importance of natural climate variability and change on hazard profiles has been elucidated in 
numerous scientific reports. Of particular note was the IPCC Special report on managing the risks of 
extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation (known as SREX) (IPCC, 2012), 
and accompanying regional and thematic summaries from the Climate and Development Knowledge 
Network (CDKN) (available online at cdkn.org/srex). The SREX was significant, making clear the 
inherent links between action on climate change adaptation and disaster risk management as inherent 
components of broader development processes, both of which can act to reduce exposure and 
vulnerability and increase resilience ‘to the potential adverse impacts of climate extremes’  
(IPCC, 2012: 2). 
Conditions of conflict have been shown to increase exposure and vulnerability to climate-related 
disasters because capacities and capabilities to cope with current impacts and anticipated risks are 
typically lower in conflict settings (Harris et al., 2013) (see Figure 3). The way in which these manifest 
vary significantly depending on the context. Because disaster risk is, in part, a social construction (see 
Figure 1, Figure 2 and chapter 3), risk factors are themselves political. Individuals and families living 
in locations highly exposed to flooding or landslide may have settled there because that land is cheaper 
and they had few alternatives. In the case of Mocoa in Colombia, women and children displaced by 
armed groups settled on the only affordable land, an area that in 2017 was hit by a landslide, killing 
hundreds and leaving many more homeless (Siddiqi et al., 2019). Exposure to violent conflict can alter 
and hinder access to livelihood opportunities, such as limiting access to water and grazing land in the 
context of sub-Saharan Africa. It can displace communities from their livelihoods entirely, as in the case 
of the Rohingya who fled Myanmar into Bangladesh, or Venezuelans who fled into Colombia, 
Box 3 Case study: Climate change as a threat multiplier in Lake Chad 
 
The Lake Chad Risk Assessment highlights the role of climate change in the current crisis. 
Lake Chad is caught in a conflict trap. It is experiencing one of the world’s worst humanitarian 
emergencies, with an estimated 10.7 million people in need of assistance. A G7 mandated report 
from adelphi demonstrates, for the first time, how climate change is interacting with the conflict and 
compounds the crisis, and sets out how these challenges might be overcome. 
The report, Shoring up stability, shows that climate change and conflict dynamics create a feedback 
loop where climate change impacts seed additional pressures while conflict undermines 
communities’ abilities to cope. It concludes that the impacts of climate change have to be tackled as 
part of peace-building efforts as well as humanitarian aid and development cooperation if the region 
is to break free of the conflict trap. In doing so, the Lake Chad basin can once again become an 
engine for sustainable livelihoods and stability in the region. 
This independent report is the first of its kind on the Lake Chad region and a pioneer of climate-
fragility risk assessments globally. Supported by the German and Dutch governments, it is the 
product of an intensive two-year period of interdisciplinary research across Cameroon, Chad, Niger 
and Nigeria. It combines long-term hydrological data from the Lake Chad basin as well as brand 
new analysis of 20 years of satellite observations. It also builds on more than 200 interviews with 
community members, including past and present members of armed groups, as well as experts  
and officials.  
Source: Vivekananda et al. (2019). 
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throughout 2018–2019. Such displacements can put communities at higher risk of experiencing natural 
and climate-related disasters, or other forms of violence (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019). 
Figure 3 The role of violence, conflict and fragility in the construction of  
disaster risk 
 
 Source: Peters, 2019a: 16. 
 
The biennial Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) has routinely included 
considerations of climate change in relation to changing hazard and exposure profiles, but also in 
relation to the potential value of coherence across the post-2015 agendas. The language of ‘climate 
emergency’ is used to stress that ‘non-linear change in hazard intensity and frequency is already a 
reality. Affecting the intensive and extensive nature of risk, climate change can generate more powerful 
storms, exacerbate coastal flooding, and bring higher temperatures and longer droughts’ (UNDRR, 
2019). The GAR19 calls for local to national DRR plans – as articulated in Target E of the Sendai 
Framework – to ‘integrate near-term climate change scenarios’ (UNDRR, 2019). This is complemented 
by a chapter (chapter 13) on ‘integration between disaster risk reduction and national climate adaptation 
strategies and plans’. In practice policy coherence – horizontal, vertical, spatial and temporal – has been 
mixed with significant progress in just a few regions, namely Asia and the Pacific (United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), 2018c).  
Despite the empirical examples pointing to the operational realities and severity of the challenge, what 
does not yet exist is a clear picture of the types of risk management actions that are viable and 
appropriate for different conflict settings. Piecemeal efforts have been moving in this direction – such 
as the recent ‘when disasters and conflict collide’ research project by ODI – but this is marginal in 
comparison to the scale of the challenge. The World Economic Forum (WEF) (2019), for example, has 
pointed to the consequences of inaction on linked climate, disaster and conflict risk, including an 
escalation of compound and complex risk, with warnings of increased poverty and crisis. One such 
consequence is the potential for conflict and security risks to be triggered or exacerbated by climate-
related disasters, which is explored further in this chapter. 
4.1.1 Geographical focus of evidence gaps on DRR, climate and conflict  
Mapping of recent literature on the nexus of climate-related factors and conflict, informed by ODI’s 
Climate Change, Conflict and Security scans (Peters and Mayhew, 2019), reveals that current attention 
to climate security problems has tended to focus on the Sahel and East Africa region due to the political 
significance that these places have for international donors (Price, 2019). Although certainly not 
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exhaustive, the reviewed literature has highlighted gaps in knowledge and actions in a number of 
countries and regions: 
• The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region: there has been little effort to develop a regional 
approach to climate security risks despite the transboundary nature of climate-related impacts on 
water, food, energy and livelihoods. For instance, settling water allocation problems between Israel 
and Palestine would greatly contribute to mitigating conflict risks (EcoPeace Middle East, 2019), 
and could increase the climate resilience of both in the long term. In Iraq, present policies pay 
limited attention to the climate security problem despite increasing challenges posed by climate 
change for water, security and development (von Lossow, 2018). 
• Pakistan and Sri Lanka: necessitate more joint risk analysis and scenarios, joint early warning and 
response, and building capacity of local actors, despite increased efforts in each country respectively 
to feature climate security within training and increase resources to disaster response (Ghazi and 
Fleishman, 2018). 
• Africa: needs better climate risk assessment and management strategies and stronger shared 
institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution among national and regional groups (Amani 
Africa, 2018). Specifically, there is an increasing trend of violence associated with natural resource 
and livelihood security in North-Eastern Nigeria in the Lake Chad region. The Government of Mali 
and the UN have been called on to invest in adequate risk assessment and management strategies 
by UN Security Council Resolution 2423, focused on the Mopti region in the Inner Niger Delta, 
where poor resource management has exacerbated conflict over access to natural resources  
(Ursu, 2018). 
• Afghanistan: is a country where climate and security links are poorly understood (Price, 2019). 
4.1.2 Climate-related disasters and security risks, and evidence gaps 
This section briefly summarises the literature and action seeking to tackle security risks that could arise 
during or after climate-related disasters. This topic is important as it reflects the way the climate–
security–disaster nexus is being portrayed in high-level policy debates, such as the UN Security Council. 
The focus is on the Sahel, the region on which much of the current literature is centred. 
Debates regarding the real and potential security implications of climate-related impacts (including 
those influenced by climate change), and the securitisation of climate change as a result of those debates, 
have proliferated significantly since the inclusion of climate change on the UN Security Council agenda 
in 2007. Much analysis focuses on whether or not climate change has been securitised (Trombetta, 2008; 
Youngs, 2014; Peters and Mayhew, 2016; Warner and Boas, 2017). In an analysis of the inclusion of 
climate change in the UN Security Council debates and in UK security policy, Peters (2018: 196) finds 
that climate change has been partially securitised, if securitisation is understood to refer to a ‘gradual 
process wherein political choices are made to frame certain issues in particular ways. Climate change 
has been reframed from a purely developmental and environmental concern to one that impels foreign 
policy and security domains.’ 
Less explored are the ways in which ‘disasters’ – namely climate-related disasters – are used as part of 
that political discourse in political debates on climate change and conflict and security, from the mid-
2010s, in UN and member state interventions at the UN Security Council and General Assembly. 
Analysis by Peters (2018) finds that the act of citing high-impact disasters was an important discursive 
instrument in international debates on climate change and linked security risks, and featured heavily in 
UN Security Council debates. Examples of the narratives include ‘extreme weather events’ leading to 
‘dangerous security vacuums’ (UN Secretary-General, 2011), of ‘climate-change driven migration’s 
potential to incite conflict’ (UN Secretary-General (UNSG), 2007), and drought and flooding leading 
to the ‘destabilisation of whole societies’ (UN Security Council (UNSC), 2007). It should be noted, 
however, that actual empirical evidence to support such discourses is limited – particularly robust 
climate change attribution analysis; and notwithstanding the growing body of evidence that direct 
linkages are not likely to be found, as discussed further in this chapter. 
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Another common argument used to link climate and conflict is that climate change indirectly lowers the 
opportunity cost for violence or recruitment by armed groups, leading to more conflict. Koubi (2018) 
theorises that climate-driven economic downturns can increase perceived inequality and lead to conflict. 
However, identifying common patterns between disasters, conflict and peace outcomes is problematic, 
as Peters et al. (2019b: 10) argue:  
Various authors (e.g. Uzoechina, 2009; Walch, 2018) have suggested that disaster 
risk and conflict tend to be mutually reinforcing. However, the interplay between 
the two, as well as additional social, economic, political and environmental factors, 
makes interactions complex and difficult to disentangle. Where conflicts and 
disasters are long-term, embedded processes, the relationship is even more complex 
and intertwined, and isolating dependent and independent factors becomes 
problematic. 
Chapter 5 also further explores conflict, natural resource management and climate-related factor 
evidence from a security lens. The OECD’s States of fragility report (2016) (see Figure 4) shows that 
homicide and battle deaths are largely the same in contexts with moderate and high environmental 
fragility, and that there is no distinct relationship between differing levels of environmental fragility and 
interpersonal violence. However, armed conflict and terrorism are more prevalent in moderate and 
highly environmentally fragile contexts. 
Figure 4  Environmental dimensions contributing to different types of fragility  




 Source: OECD, 2016. 
 
OECD (2016) concludes that ‘the relationship between environmental risks and fragility related to 
violence can be complicated’ and that research studies have been contradictory. OECD cites one meta-
analysis of more than 60 studies on the link between climate change and conflict, which finds that ‘the 
magnitude of climate change’s influence on conflict is substantial and statistically significant at many 
levels of geographical aggregation. According to this study, one standard deviation increase in 
temperature or extreme rainfall increases the frequency of interpersonal violence by 4% and increases 
inter-group conflict by 14% (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 2013). But other studies question this research, 
underlining the mixed and inconclusive results from scientific research on climate change and conflict 
(Buhaug et al., 2014).’ 
Ide and Scheffran (2014: 265) analyse some two-dozen large sample size studies on the links between 
climate change and conflict, choosing those which cover more than one country and appear in the peer-
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reviewed literature. They find that ‘statistical investigations on the link between adverse environmental 
changes and violent conflict are similarly inconclusive’. Similarly, inconclusive results appear for the 
body of available individual country/territorial case studies.  
Owain and Maslin (2018) compare social, economic and climate data and violence in East Africa over 
several decades and investigate whether any underlying drivers are more highly correlated with 
population displacement. They conclude that, in terms of ‘total numbers of displaced people’ (ibid: 1), 
contextual factors – economic performance, population growth and political stability – play a far more 
important role than climatic factors. A correlation is found between increased population movement and 
periods of drought.  
Research examining the relationship between climate change, weather/climate-related hazards, and 
conflict, stability and violence has burgeoned since the early 2010s. In some respects, the nature of the 
topic has forced an interdisciplinary approach, but at the same time created a new silo of specialist 
climate security research (see Box 4). With all of these examples, however, there is a lack of robust 
climate analysis using appropriate statistical techniques to evaluate trends in extreme events and/or the 
detection and attribution of a climate change signal. 
The CNA Cooperation Military Advisory Board (2007) language of a ‘threat multiplier’ is often used 
to imply that climate change will create impacts beyond government capacities, exacerbating pre-
existing and instigating new government and stability challenges in already ‘volatile’ regions. Since the 
mid-2000s, the use of such language and linking of climate-related disasters to potential conflict 
exacerbation has continued. The prominent G7-commissioned report (Rüttinger et al., 2015: 34), A new 
climate for peace, argued: ‘Extreme weather events and disasters will exacerbate fragility challenges 
and can increase people’s vulnerability and grievances, especially in conflict affected situations. The 
relationship between disasters and fragility is often mutually reinforcing; disasters put additional stress 
on stretched governance systems, decrease economic opportunities, reduce resources, and displace 
people.’ Similar sentiments were echoed by the Global risks report 2019 (WEF, 2019), which refers to 
flood and coastal storm impacts, including security risks, migration and displacement.  
Critiques have been levied on the disjointedness of the literature – namely that evidence and analysis of 
the security impacts of disasters and of climate change (including climate-related disasters that might 
have been influenced by climate change) remain disconnected (Peters et al., 2019b). Moreover,  
looking ahead: 
While some are doubling down on fine-tuning quantitative models and 
methodological approaches, Vivekananda et al. (2014) point out that establishing 
causality between climate change and conflict is of little use either to governments 
or to actors involved in peacebuilding work. Instead, they argue that more emphasis 
should be placed on understanding, enabling and promoting ‘pathways between 
climatic changes and peace in fragile and conflict-affected societies’ (Vivekananda 
et al., 2014: 488). They also suggest that, while there may be a connection between 
climate change, vulnerability and conflict, there may also be a virtuous cycle 
between climate change, resilience and peace. This can be achieved through ‘peace-
positive’ climate change adaptation efforts and ‘climate proof’ peacebuilding and 
development. Within the disaster risk reduction community, Stein and Walch (2017) 
have offered related arguments on how the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction can be used for conflict prevention and sustaining peace … Others 
suggest that research should probe more deeply into causal pathways; Sakaguchi 
et al. (2017: 624), for example, argue that ‘a more disaggregated understanding of 
the causal pathway is necessary to inform interventions that may reduce the 
incidence of violent conflict’. Research on vulnerabilities and the social contract 
lends itself more to actionable inroads for interventions and provides more insights 
into breaking disaster–conflict pathways and bolstering disaster–peace pathways. 




Box 4  Overview of the climate-security literature 
 
The climate-security literature tends to focus particularly on the Levant, the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa. While analysis draws from multiple disciplines, the insights and analysis of climate scientists 
is a frequently missing contribution to such literature, leading to critiques of the conclusions drawn. 
For example, Kelley et al. (2015) examine anthropogenic climate change-influenced drought as a 
primary driver of the Syrian conflict – though this has been disputed through more robust analysis 
by Selby et al., 2017. Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) conclude that extreme rainfall anomalies in either 
direction (i.e. drought or too much rainfall) were accompanied by increased communal violence in 
East Africa (1997–2009) – though the rainfall analysis was not over a statistically long enough 
period to adequately establish departures from the long-term mean or of the correct spatial scale to 
conflict data. One global meta-analysis (Burke et al., 2015) found that deviations from mean 
temperature and precipitation patterns increase interpersonal and intergroup conflict risk – though 
they take a very broad definition of interpersonal (domestic violence, road rage, assault, murder and 
rape) and intergroup (riots, ethnic violence, land invasions, gang violence, civil war, coups and other 
forms of political instability) conflict.  
Climate change has also been cited as having the potential to increase the risk of civil conflict through 
its multiplying effects on other mitigating factors (Bergholt and Lujala, 2012; Koubi et al., 2012). 
This argument echoes suggestions in the literature on disasters and conflict that disasters may 
exacerbate conflict factors already present within a society (e.g. Harris et al., 2013; Omelicheva, 
2011). This overlap is perhaps unsurprising given that these studies often use climate-related disasters 
(rapid- and/or slow-onset) as a proxy for climate change, even if actual climate change attribution 
analysis is lacking. 
With all of these studies, it is worth pointing out that the robustness and quality of climate analysis is 
highly variable, potentially impacting the reliability of conclusions drawn. And even where the 
climate analysis may seem robust, spatial and temporal aggregation of climate variables can affect 
analysis and findings.  
This is particularly evident in the frequently cited Kelley et al. (2015) study attributing anthropogenic 
climate change as a significant influence in the Syrian drought, claiming this contributed to the 
conflict. However, their analysis is an area-average of whole Fertile Crescent mean temperatures and 
winter precipitation between 1931 and 2008, not Syria-specific climate analysis, as pointed out by 
Selby et al. (2017). Nor are Kelley et al. consistent in their definition of the drought’s duration, using 
three different time periods. As Selby et al. point out, these two discrepancies make it difficult to 
validate Kelley et al.’s claims. Additionally, Selby et al. found that not all places in Syria experienced 
rainfall deficits from 2006/07 to 2008/09, and there is not a uniform drying trend (applying 
appropriate statistical methods) across the Fertile Crescent. Yet, Kelley et al.’s study continues to be 
cited as providing conclusive evidence of the role of climate change in the Syrian drought and conflict. 
Similarly, Burke et al. (2015) use an extremely broad definition of climate as encompassing events 
lasting only a ‘few hours’, climatic indices such as a Palmer Drought Severity Index, to water 
variability in order to accommodate a greater number of studies in their meta-review. This makes 
cross-comparison of studies through meta-analysis problematic, as does their broad definition of 
conflict. It also ignores the very real differences in timescales and statistical techniques needed for 
handling extreme events versus seasonal to decadal climate shifts. Uncertainties and errors in the 
original study’s ‘climate analysis’ will propagate into the Burke et al. (2015) study. 
Source: adapted from Peters et al., 2019b: 14, with additional discussion by Opitz-Stapleton. 
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The potential for DRR, including risk reduction to climate-related disasters, to contribute towards peace 
is underexplored. In policy commitments, such as the African regional strategies on DRR, links are 
made between climate change adaptation, DRR and conflict prevention (African Union Commission, 
2016) and yet progress through implementation has been slow to materialise due to lack of financial and 
technical support. Links also feature in think tank reports, such as A new climate for peace (Rüttinger 
et al., 2015: ix), which suggests that: ‘Disaster risk reduction and effective disaster management efforts 
can … provide opportunities to improve resilience to climate-fragility risks and build peace’, and the 
OECD States of fragility 2018 report, which suggests that ‘Disaster risk reduction and disaster 
management initiatives offer opportunities, if done properly, to address climate-related fragility risks 
and build peace’ (Vivekananda, 2018: 62). In high-level security discussions, Japan is often among the 
few governments to explicitly mention the Sendai Framework as an existing policy agreement that offers 
opportunities for action on reducing climate-related disaster risks. The US Working Group on Climate, 
Nuclear, and Security Affairs (Parthemore and Nolan, 2018) argues that climate and nuclear hazards 
have separate multilateral regimes, yet security challenges encompassing both are concentrated in 
certain countries such as India, Iran and Pakistan. They call for climate and nuclear security risk 
assessments to be included in the US National Climate Assessment and the IPCC reports. But on the 
whole, the potential to utilise DRR proactively as part of a broader preventive agenda to avert the 
potential conflict and security risks of climate-related disasters is largely underexplored. In the case of 
Chad, for example, this argument has been made recently (see Peters et al., 2019a).  
Linking to the broader debate on the benefits of securitising the climate, the literature highlights 
different interpretations of climate security, and some concerns and operational consequences arising 
from them. Cons (2018) finds that international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in 
the Bangladesh delta are following an idea of ‘emplacement’ – i.e. mitigating climate out-migrations to 
richer countries, which does not reflect the needs of the local population that are focused on livelihood 
security. Krampe and Mobjörk (2018) share these findings and show that regional security context and 
vulnerabilities to climate change determine how climate-security risks are framed. While Asian and 
African INGOs tend to identify livelihood and development risks, western INGOs have a more 
traditional understanding of climate security as state or military security, encompassing issues of 
migration, displacement and violent conflicts. Interesting in this respect is the framing that the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes to addressing fragility. USAID promotes 
a self-reliance approach on the part of affected states, which is measured in their ‘commitment and 
capacity’ to both liberal democracy and inclusive development. Ingram and Papoulidis (2018a; 2018b) 
have criticised this approach as the priority for governments attempting to exit fragility should not be to 
develop a western model of statehood, but to increase the ability to withstand shocks and stresses. 
Though limited in empirical evidence, nascent literature suggests that there is potential for DRR 
approaches to contribute towards conflict prevention and peace-building (Stein and Walch, 2017; Peters 
et al., 2019e; Mena et al., 2019). Such ideas stem from empirical evidence that disasters and violence 
conflicts that occur in the same location can result from similar vulnerabilities (Wisner, 2009; Harris et 
al., 2013), that ‘disasters are threat multipliers for fragility’ (OECD, 2018: 61), and that there can be 
conflict implications from disaster events. Thus, logic flows that DRR could contribute to some aspects 
of conflict prevention, through the reduction of disaster risk and impacts in conflict contexts, and linked 
disaster and conflict reduction interventions. This is the case in Afghanistan, for example, where 
reforestation projects are utilising conflict resolution and management committees to achieve joint 
disaster reduction and peace outcomes (Mena et al., 2019). As stated in much of the new literature in 
this field (such as Peters et al., 2019e), empirical testing is required, not least because many of the 
grounded examples of NGO interventions in conflict contexts have not been independently verified.  
Finally, there are examples of disaster vulnerability being used as a tool in warfare, from a seven-year 
cloud seeding campaign by the United States in Cambodia and Vietnam in an effort to increase rainfall 
and subsequent landslides in order to disrupt supply lines (Marktanner et al., 2015), through to political 




4.1.3 The impact of conflict on climate- and hazard-related intersectional disaster 
vulnerabilities and exposure, and vice versa 
There is a body of literature exploring the way in which inequality and marginalisation – based on race, 
ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, and religion, among others – can make some groups more 
vulnerable to disasters than others, as we touched on in the first chapter. Such intersectional dimensions 
are as relevant for developing as for developed contexts. For example, long-term public 
underinvestment in social services has been noted as a driver of vulnerability for communities affected 
by Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 (Quinn, 2006). In contexts experiencing weak or 
ineffective disaster risk governance, linked to issues of violent or armed conflict, the protections 
provided to citizens by the state in the aftermath of a disaster may be limited and insufficient. 
For the first time, in 2019 the GAR sought to include explicit recognition of the additional challenges 
of reducing climate and disaster risk in ‘fragile and complex risk contexts’ (UNDRR, 2019: chapter 15). 
Explicit recognition is also given to vulnerable persons and groups in contexts of compound disaster 
and conflict risk, where ‘Disaster and conflict often lead to a higher rate of GBV [gender-based 
violence], putting women, girls and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intergender communities at 
heightened risk in these contexts’ (ibid: 414). A number of empirical cases are cited, including conflict-
displaced populations such as Rohingya displaced to shelters highly exposed to landslide and flooding 
(ibid: 414–415). The chapter was informed by a call for papers. However, the limited robust empirical 
evidence garnered through the call for paper process suggests that there is little documented 
understanding of how to adapt linked climate change adaptation and DRR strategies to conflict contexts 
or of integrating consequences of conflict, including displacement. Yet, while this shift has advanced 
the status of knowledge and enabled better-informed decision-making, the evidence on climate change 
as a threat multiplier itself warrants more research.  
Abuses on an individual level are evident in disasters in conflict contexts. This includes sexual and 
gender-based violence, which often increases in disaster situations (see Brody et al., 2008; UNDP, 2011; 
IFRC, 2016, in Peters et al., 2019b). Evidence of pre-existing gender-based violence increasing in the 
aftermath of major events is rife – including after Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua and Honduras in 1998, 
in Kashmir following the 2005 earthquake (see Peters et al., 2019b), and in tsunamis in Bangladesh, 
Myanmar and Samoa (IFRC, 2016). In the example of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Fisher (2010) 
found that pre-existing gender-based violence owing to conflict and displacement increased in the post-
tsunami chaos and insecurity.  
There is limited evidence of the impact of climate-related disasters on patterns of sexual and gender-
based violence, or of the potential effectiveness of preventive measures. Evidence that does exist 
suggests that sexual and gender-based violence is increasing with climate-related disasters in some 
contexts. Focusing on the Pacific, UN Women found a 300% increase in new domestic violence 
following two tropical cyclones in Tafe Province in Vanuatu in 2011. This is a societal problem: ‘In 
addition to violating human rights, violence impedes development gains, as it undermines physical and 
mental health, prevents women from assuming leadership and decision-making roles, and impacts the 
economy through increased health expenditure and reduced productivity. This threatens achievement of 
sustainable development’ (UN Women, n.d.). 
Nguyen (2019) finds that violence against women in Eastern Visayas (Philippines) was not elevated 
because of the typhoon-related disaster, but was in large part due to pre-existing socially constructed 
gender inequalities and vulnerabilities. A report from World Vision (2018) points to the lack of 
safeguards for displaced women and girls in 10 case study sites across East Africa as a problem when 
disasters or conflicts compound the vulnerability of women and girls. In a review of secondary literature, 
Lee (2018) finds that few global sources provide statistics for gender-based violence in pre- and post-
disaster situations, which may suggest a corresponding neglect of gender-based violence considerations 
in disaster management. The European Commission et al. (2018) has called for understanding the 
specific recovery needs (going beyond physical reconstruction) to be conflict-sensitive, to include 
institutional failings, drivers of conflict and cultural heritage (which are often targeted during conflict). 
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The negative impact of climate change on patterns of sexual and gender-based violence is not limited 
to sudden-onset disasters. UN Women argues that climate change is a ‘serious aggravator’ of gender-
based violence in a range of contexts, owing in part to its multiple spatial and temporal impacts on the 
agricultural sector and the resulting loss of income, as well as increased stress and psychological and 
social pressure (UNFCCC, 2019). Moreover, evidence in Chad from the Building Resilience and 
Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme reveals how more than 35% of 
women have been victims of physical, psychological and/or sexual violence at the hands of their partners 
… Violence against women and girls is not necessarily perpetrated in times of conflict and by 
combatants only. The most reported forms of violence (child marriages, physical and sexual assault by 
known perpetrators, polygamy, and the denial of resources and opportunities) all have adverse impacts 
on survivors’ reproductive health and on their ability to secure their livelihoods (Le Masson et al., 2018). 
Further research is required in a greater diversity of conflict settings to better understand patterns of 
interpersonal violence and changing climate conditions. 
4.1.4 A history of DRR and its links to climate action  
Disaster studies have, since the 1970s, emphasised that disasters are ‘unnatural’, resulting from the 
interaction of a hazard with exposure and vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004). Over the past half a 
century, understanding of and action on DRR have advanced significantly – namely, through deeper 
scientific understanding of hazards and exposure, vulnerability and capacities. Prior to the 1990s, 
emphasis remained on delivering humanitarian response in the aftermath of natural hazard-related 
disasters – and in the absence of effective DRR, this continues today, particularly in FCAC.  
The 1990s marked the International Decade for Disaster Reduction (UN Resolution 42/169), and the 
initiation of an international process to begin developing a framework for DRR. The 2000s began with 
the endorsement of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN Resolution 54/219), and a 
general recognition of the need to go beyond a focus on disaster response to a more proactive approach 
that encapsulated prevention, risk reduction and preparedness. Continued evidence of high-impact 
events, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, kept DRR high on the political agenda, and in 2005 the 
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 began (UNISDR, 2005). The Hyogo Framework, and 
accompanying institutional and convening arrangements to help track progress on the commitments – 
such as the Global Platform on Disaster Reduction, and UNISDR (now UNDRR) – shifted attention 
towards  risk reduction efforts at local and national levels by establishing the necessary institutional 
arrangements, enhancing early warning and preparedness, and building a culture of safety. 
The established and maturing links between weather/climate-related hazards and climate change 
prompted inclusion of text in the Hyogo Framework to encourage integration of climate knowledge into 
understanding of hazards, linked action on risk reduction and climate adaptation, and use of climate risk 
information by disaster planners (UNISDR, 2005: 11, 15). Despite over a decade of implementation, 
progress against the Hyogo Framework ‘priorities for action’ was mixed (for a review, see Wilkinson 
et al., 2017). In short, while a significant volume of DRR-related activities was undertaken throughout 
the framework’s implementation period, more progress was still required. Efforts to ensure that 
development trajectories are risk-informed, that a systematic approach to risk reduction is adopted 
through all sectoral investment, planning and implementation decisions and processes, and that long-
term strategies for institutional change are in place, backed by adequate financing (ibid.) contributed to 
a second DRR framework, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 
2015). This was the first of a suite of international agreements to be negotiated that year as part of 
Agenda 2030. The Sendai Framework marked an evolution of understanding and action on disasters. 
Together with a set of seven quantitative targets, the framework takes a more cross-sectoral, multi-
hazard and all-of-society approach, with the ambition to deliver not just a reduction of disaster risk and 
losses, but to enable and strengthen disaster resilience. The scope of hazards is expanded beyond natural 
hazards, to include biological, environmental, geological and geophysical, hydrometeorological and 
technological hazards. Moreover, there is explicit recognition that ‘Several hazards are socionatural, in 
that they are associated with a combination of natural and anthropogenic factors, including 
environmental degradation and climate change’ (UNDRR, 2017). Throughout the framework, numerous 
references are made to climate change as exacerbating the frequency and intensity of hazards 
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contributing to disasters, thus acting as an underlying risk driver (UNISDR, 2015: 10). Emphasis is 
placed on the potential value of coordination and collaboration between parties engaged in delivering 
the Sendai Framework and those engaged in the UNFCCC (noting that the Sendai negotiations preceded 
the Paris Agreement). 
Of the cross-cutting issues identified for this paper, it is worth noting that the Sendai Framework 
includes reference to the linked ambitions of sustainable ecosystem management and environmental and 
natural resource management and DRR (UNISDR, 2015: 20). Moreover, given the transboundary nature 
of disaster risk and impacts, states are encouraged to engage in regional and sub-regional strategies and 
mechanisms for risk reduction across national borders (ibid: 18). Special reference is made to 
transboundary cooperation in relation to ecosystem-based approaches, and in dealing with epidemics 
and displacement risk (ibid.). 
Disaster studies and action on DRR – in part owing grounding in social sciences – have traditionally 
paid significant attention to intersectional vulnerability and impacts from hazards. The Sendai 
Framework makes this explicit, with one of the core implementing principles as follows (guiding 
principle d): ‘Disaster risk reduction requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership. It also 
requires empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation, paying special 
attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest. A gender, age, 
disability and cultural perspective should be integrated in all policies and practices, and women and 
youth leadership should be promoted. In this context, special attention should be paid to the 
improvement of organized voluntary work of citizens’ (UNISDR, 2015: 13). 
Progress towards the Hyogo Framework lagged in FCAC, as with the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) at large, and preliminary evidence suggests that FCAC are also lagging 
behind in their contribution to the attainment of the Sendai Framework targets (Peters, 2019a). Further 
analysis is required to explicitly understand the barriers and constraints to advancing DRR in FCAC, 
and to identify realistic timeframes and priorities for action to accelerate progress prior to 2030. Part of 
the challenge is that explicit inclusion of issues of violence, conflict and fragility in DRR efforts have 
long been neglected, and at times actively excluded and highly politicised. 
Hesitancy to explicitly include issues of violence, conflict and fragility in international disaster 
frameworks stems in part from the separation of UN agencies and government departmental mandates 
and responsibilities, wherein international negotiations are confined to issues of natural hazards, and are 
seen to be stepping outside their mandate if they go beyond this. Government representation in regional 
and international DRR forums is typically through the national disaster management agency, which 
focuses on disaster response and, increasingly, preparedness and risk reduction – certainly not issues of 
conflict, socioeconomic development or the politics associated with social, violent or armed conflict. In 
the negotiations, advocates for text that explicitly recognises conflict and violence as underlying drivers 
of vulnerability to disaster risk were vocal. However, during the Sendai negotiations, this tension came 
to the fore (see Peters, 2019b, episode 1), wherein states were concerned that inclusion of language 
associated with conflict could undermine sovereignty by opening the door to legitimising international 
interference in domestic affairs. Peters (2017) outlines further reasons why, including: DRR being 
dominated by physical sciences and relatively apolitical study of hazards; prioritisation of peace and 
security over risk reduction in FCAC and thus lack of funding for DRR in these contexts; the state-
centric nature of conventional approaches to DRR; and the ability and willingness of governments in 
FCAC to engage in issues of DRR.  
Since the negotiations, progress on enhancing disaster risk governance capacities in FCAC has lagged, 
prompting renewed interest and ambition to better support governments and agencies to build disaster 
resilience in challenging operating contexts. In practice, this has included calls for greater recognition 
of risk management – to natural hazards, including those that are climate-related – spanning 
humanitarian and development action, and the need for linked programme and investment decisions. 
DFID’s Risk-informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) programme and accompanying investment 
provide an opportunity for advancements in this area, though specific attention is still required to address 
the evidence and practice gaps on climate-related disasters in FCAC.  
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4.2 Evolving policy landscape for DRR 
 
Establishing local to national DRR strategies has been a global policy priority (McElroy, 2017), 
articulated in Target (e) of the Sendai Framework, the soonest with a deadline of 2020. But little 
attention has been paid to how issues of fragility and conflict could or should be reflected in the design 
and articulation of DRR strategies. A review of DRR frameworks at the global, regional and national 
levels finds significant variations (Peters et al., 2019d). While reference to issues of violence, conflict 
and fragility are sparse in the Hyogo and Sendai frameworks, inclusions of such terms in regional and 
national disaster frameworks varies. This ranges from no reference to any terms related to conflict within 
the Colombian DRR legal frameworks and implementation plans – despite being a country that has long 
been contending with violent conflict (Siddiqi et al., 2019) – through to the Africa Regional Strategy 
for Disaster Risk Reduction chaperoned by the African Union declaring that one objective of their 
programme of action is to: ‘Strengthen coherence and integration between disaster risk reduction, 
climate change adaptation and mitigation, ecosystem management, conflict and fragility, and other 
development imperatives’ (African Union Commission, 2016: 7).  
Though several guidance documents exist to support governments in the design of DRR strategies – 
namely by UNDRR – none include specific guidance on how to consider and adapt DRR strategies for 
fragile and conflict-affected areas. Nor are there adapted monitoring frameworks capable of tracking 
linked improvements and regressions in disaster risk and conflict dynamics. There are some initiatives 
trying to encourage a more holistic approach to understanding and acting on risk. One is the international 
monitoring mechanism for the Sendai Framework and linked Agenda 2030, the Global Risk Assessment 
Framework (GRAF). The GRAF ‘aims to improve the understanding and management of current and 
future risks, at all scales, to better manage uncertainties and mobilise people, innovation and finance by: 
• fostering interdisciplinary systems thinking, with shared metrics and shared understanding; 
• enabling the identification of anomalies and precursor signals, as well as the correlations and 
dependencies of risks and actors to enable decision makers to act.’ (GRAF, n.d.) 
A major challenge in advancing the climate security agenda, as characterised by the Hague declaration 
on Planetary Security, is that the siloed approaches adopted by many organisations lead to limited 
cooperation across sectors in development programmes, and within national and local governments 
(Wolfmaier and Vivekananda, 2019). An area of practice where this problem is receiving attention is at 
the intersection of DRR and humanitarianism, where the increased complexity created by the interaction 
of disasters and conflicts requires new ways of thinking and doing. Ingram and Papoulidis (2018a) 
identify this shift in thinking happening among humanitarians (working in stabilisation and conflict 
prevention) and less so among those working in traditional sectors associated with resilience and DRR.  
Field (2018) provides an example of this, by illustrating the case of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines 
in 2013. Agencies involved in disaster response adopted the notion of a ‘pure humanitarian crisis’ for 
the typhoon – and thus considered it a ‘good project’ – and pulled resources and moved away from 
conflict-affected areas in other parts of the country.  
Peters et al. (2019c) share this assessment, as it has been hard for climate action to address the climate 
change–conflict nexus in practice. The authors argue that humanitarians are well-placed to support 
populations in areas of disasters and conflict, and calls on them to (re-)assess their mission and mandate 
‘alongside a practical and grounded assessment of what adaptation and resilience mean in terms of 
operational practice in these highly challenging contexts’ (ibid: 13). Some evidence of the benefits of 
better understanding the conflict contexts in which DRR operates is provided by Walch (2018a; 2018b). 
By studying Mali and the Philippines, Walch shows that: (i) DRR and adaptation is viable in places 
where rebel groups control territory and enjoy good relations with communities; (ii) they are not viable 
or will not have good impacts where rebel groups do not have territorial control and where informal 
institutions are weak; and (iii) in places where rebel groups do not have territorial control but robust 
informal institutions exist, these offer entry points even during wartime. 
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4.2.1 Conversely, can a disaster event provide opportunities to enhance peace? 
Here, the literature tends to focus on individual disaster events, and to explore changing socio-political 
outcomes in the post-disaster space. While some empirical cases find increased social, political and even 
armed conflict (see above) in the post-disaster space, others find opportunities for peace (see Box 5). 
There is no robust analysis of the extent to which disaster events can provide opportunities to enhance 
peace. Nor has there been a critical analysis of the methodologies employed in academic articles on this 
topic, and thus the ability for lessons or findings to be readily applicable elsewhere. As Box 5 reveals, 
the findings are mixed. 
A number of studies have shown that in the aftermath of a disaster, public perceptions are just as 
important as what actually happened during disaster response, in order to understand the impact that 
disaster events can have on state–society relations. This is particularly the case where civil society 
expectations of what a government could or should provide differ from actual support received. In a 
number of sub-national cases, including in India following the 2014 floods, public anger over inadequate 
state response to flooding resulted in the ruling parties losing subsequent elections. 
A body of literature stemming from the Kelman and Koukis (2000) essay on ‘disaster diplomacy’ 
explores whether and how the post-disaster space could offer opportunities for instigating or 
accelerating cooperative or diplomatic processes. Many of the cases explored are international in scale, 
and focus on ‘formal and public interstate diplomatic interactions after a major natural disaster, and how 
these interactions can ameliorate international conflict or tension’ (Kelman and Koukis, 2000, in Peters 
et al., 2019b: 12). Cases cited include: Greek–Turkish relations following the 1999 earthquake; India 
and Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake; Eritrea and Ethiopia following the 1999–2002 droughts; 
and Sri Lanka and Aceh following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Common across the examples is the 
finding that the post-disaster space can, in some cases, support diplomacy through empathy, building 
foundations for trust and cooperation, and shared experiences of loss. But where ‘conflict structures 
survive the disaster’, limited or no notable progress in peace may result. 
What requires further exploration are the ways in which disasters may affect relations beyond formal 
diplomatic interactions – to better understand changing public perceptions of opposing groups, changes 
Box 5  Can disasters lead to increased political legitimacy, cooperation or peace? 
 
‘One econometric study of floods and storms between 1980 and 2007 showed that these 
hydrometeorological disasters did not lead to an increased risk of armed civil conflict, but they did 
have a significant negative impact on economic growth (Bergholt and Lujala, 2012). Noting that 
weather/climate-related disasters, such as storms, floods, droughts, extreme temperatures, wildfires 
and landslides, have become more frequent in recent decades, Slettebak (2012) conducted a global 
study to see if such disasters led to an increase in the risk of civil war from 1950 to 2012. Using 
multivariate methods, the study found that disasters, particularly drought, actually decreased the risk 
of civil war by unifying the population and giving governments an opportunity to display 
competence. In a study of post-earthquake El Salvador, some political leaders emerged from disaster 
stronger, due to public perceptions of traits such as capability, competence and compassion (Olson 
and Gawronski, 2010). In other instances, disasters can serve as ‘coordinating devices’ for anti-
government protests by creating concentrations of displaced people and enabling organisation and 
coordination, which can in turn threaten a political leader’s hold on power (Flores and Smith, 2013: 
843).’ 
Source: Peters et al., 2019d: 11. 
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in armed group behaviour before and after disaster events, and the impact of changing resource 
availability for recruitment to armed groups. Currently, the literature seems to have settled on the idea 
that ‘disasters and related activities do not create or resolve conflicts, especially over the long term, and 
that the foundations for peace must already be present for disaster diplomacy to have any significant 
short-term impact’ (Kelman et al., 2018, in Peters et al., 2019b: 13). Given the prevalence and likely 
increase in weather/climate-related disasters in FCAC, the ideas associated with utilising opportunities 
for peace in the post-disaster space require further research.  
Beyond diplomacy, an evidence base is needed which can better understand the potential role of DRR 
and climate change adaptation efforts in supporting conditions for peace. There is increasing demand 
at the regional level in Africa and Asia where inter-governmental dialogues have recently hosted 
discussions on the potential for utilising the Sendai Framework to enhance conflict prevention. 
Moreover, there are interesting examples emerging of utilising natural hazard-related risks as entry 
points for joint UN missions in politically sensitive contexts, such as the 2018 joint UN mission to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
Almost a decade ago, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, Disaster-conflict 
interface: comparative experiences, sought to raise visibility for the co-location of natural hazards and 
violent conflict, but analysis of empirical examples remains limited and those that exist ‘come from 
different unconnected disciplines’ (UNDP, 2011: 7). This remains the case today. Moreover, attempts 
to try and understand the relative contribution of action on DRR and conflict prevention – such as Peters 
et al. (2019e) – are stifled by lack of robust empirical evidence, even though anecdotal evidence suggests 
there are opportunities for linked action (see OECD, 2018; UNDRR, 2019; Peters, 2019a).  
 
4.3 The reproduction of systemic risk through post-disaster 
processes 
 
This section seeks to convey how attempts to ‘build back better’ in the aftermath of a disaster event can 
reproduce pre-existing inequalities and marginalisation, unintentionally and intentionally. It also 
touches on ideas associated with ‘disaster capitalism’, together with intersectional considerations related 
to evidence on interpersonal violence in post-disaster contexts. Finally, we also point to emerging 
evidence suggesting that sexual and gender-based violence may be increasing as a consequence of 
additional stresses on lives and livelihoods resulting from changes in the climate.  
This sub-theme is pertinent as it directly links to emerging programmatic and policy discussions on the 
need to scale up DRR action in protracted crisis settings, as part of the ambition to improve work across 
the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. Cyclical shocks which create and maintain crisis settings 
are routinely provided with emergency response, but growing concerns that needs will continue to rise 
in light of climate variability, extremes and change, have prompted renewed conversations about the 
possibility of embedding risk reduction measures more proactively into responses to protracted crisis 
settings. This is a new line of enquiry being taken up by UNDRR throughout 2020.  
For example, despite the rhetoric of ‘building back better’ – the idea that the post-disaster space offers 
opportunities to rebalance citizens’ rights to protection and safety from disaster risk – there is evidence 
that systemic risk can actually be reproduced through post-disaster reconstruction processes. Following 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, for example, coastal land has been redeveloped, increasing the 
economic vulnerability of those who previously depended on the sea for their livelihoods; land had, in 
some cases, been classified as part of a buffer zone but later used for commercial purposes, including 
hotels (Kennedy et al., 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2018, in Peters et al., 2019b). Some academics have 
argued that there needs to be a reimagining of the concept of ‘build back better’ to one of ‘build back 
safer’, to overcome the challenge that ‘better’ has multiple interpretations and has been used to advance 
economic development at the cost of poorer communities’ livelihoods and homes. 
41 
 
The observation and critique that governments may use crises to their political advantage – be they the 
result of natural hazards or conflict – has been the focus of Klein’s influential 2007 book, The shock 
doctrine. Using a range of empirical cases, Klein revealed how crises have been used to push through 
unpopular political and economic changes, particularly neoliberal economic policies: ‘Governments – 
as well as international lenders and investors – take advantage of collective disorientation and treat 
disasters as “exciting market opportunities”’ (Klein, 2007: 6). Dubbed ‘disaster capitalism’, examples 
from Haiti, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Indonesia repeatedly reveal that crisis situations triggered by 
natural hazards such as tsunamis, earthquakes and typhoons provide the space through which land is 
appropriated – particularly from poor communities – and used for private businesses, including tourism.  
 
4.4 Gaps in the evidence base 
 
A recent review of more than 300 articles on natural hazards, disasters and conflict (Peters et al., 2019b) 
reveals a substantial number of gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence base, which warrant attention 
(see Box 6). Relative to other topics, the volume of evidence on the disaster–conflict interface is limited, 
and even less so on the additional complexity of climate variability and change. Thus, there is ‘… 
relatively limited understanding of how disasters interact with, and unfold in, conflict-affected areas’ 
(Siddiqi, 2018: S161), and even less for climate-related disaster risks. As the review by Peters et al. 
(2019b: 29) finds: ‘Grey literature has numerous examples of community based and non-government 
actors engaging in DRR in conflict contexts, but this has not been recorded, verified or shared in ways 
that advance DRR practice. Despite decades of quantitative and qualitative research focused on 
attribution, we still understand very little about the relationship between disaster and conflict, and there 
is very little guidance on how to confront and seek to alter this relationship with a view to accelerating 
disaster resilience.’ 
In part because of the complexities of each and every disaster and conflict situation, finding replicable 
lessons is extremely challenging. Moreover, evidence has thus far been primarily post-disaster-event 
specific, neglecting much-needed longitudinal studies that trace long-term changes in vulnerability and 
exposure to a range of threats and hazards – including climate-related and climate change-influenced, 
natural hazard and conflict. Furthermore, there are a plethora of ‘theoretical studies debating whether 
disasters exacerbate or mitigate existing conflicts, or cause or prevent new ones. Little scholarship exists 
on how DRR can effectively be implemented in fragile or conflict-affected contexts (and even less on 
lessons learned, or what was tried and failed)’ (Peters et al., 2019b: 29). Recommendations for bolstering 
the evidence base include the need to undertake the following actions: 
• Harness operational learning to deepen understanding of the benefits and limitations of DRR 
in FCAC: There is an urgent need to conduct a ‘… systematic review of evidence … to catalogue 
and synthesise practical examples of DRR interventions by “type” (hazard focus, point in the 
disaster management cycle, scale, etc.) alongside a typology of conflict. This would help deepen 
understanding of what has been tried and what has been learnt, and to use that understanding to 
inform investment decisions and operational design and delivery in other contexts experiencing 
similar challenges’ (Peters, 2019a: 47). Given that funding for DRR interventions is negligible, 
extending this recommendation to include climate and disaster resilience would likely harvest a 
greater result. Important here is to ensure that the review is conducted by an independent research 
agency, to offer more robust conclusions than are available at present – which largely stem from 
implementing NGOs’ own experiences reported through grey literature.  
• Learn from affected people’s experiences and coping capacities and how they deal with linked 
climate, disaster and conflict risk: There is a significant lack of evidence on affected populations’ 
perceptions of risk, the various factors that affect their decision-making, the trade-offs associated 
with prioritising some threats and hazards over others, and risk tolerance (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 
2019). Longitudinal studies and life histories would be useful methodologies here, to help deepen 
our understanding of changing experiences over an individual’s life course. Where such approaches 
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have been adopted to combine local climatology, disaster impacts, poverty dynamics and well-being 
– as in Diwakar et al. (2019) in India and Kenya – novel findings are revealed about how it may be 
possible to curb impoverishment, and to build adaptive capacity and sustain escape from poverty.  
Research conducted on these themes would go some way towards broadening the concentration of 
existing evidence, which is centred on post-disaster situations of high-impact events, and those which 
are primarily rural in nature. Further ideas for plugging the evidence gap can be found in Box 6. 
 
Box 6  Evidence and practice gaps on the climate–disasters–conflict interface 
 
Building on normative approaches: continuing on the same path 
• ‘There is a need for a systematic review of evidence that organises practical examples of 
interventions by DRR ‘type’ (hazard type, intervention, etc.) alongside a typology of conflict 
to better understand what’s been tried and learned, and what can be tailored to support 
application in other contexts experiencing similar challenges. There is an equal need to 
articulate the extent to which the replication of lessons to other contexts and projects is 
feasible, given the context specificity of disaster-conflict situations. 
• A more action-oriented research agenda will require further work to expand the breadth of 
examples and depth of analysis of the role of conflict in undermining conventional 
approaches to DRR – positioning these across the continuum from working ‘in’ to working 
‘on’ conflict. This may also help inform a deeper understanding of the range of alternative 
entry points to DRR in conflict contexts, with a view to developing a more thorough 
understanding of what’s been tried already. 
• A substantial proportion of grey literature derives from NGO projects that aim to build 
community resilience to intersecting disaster and conflict risk. What has not been undertaken 
is a thorough analysis of the design, delivery and sustainability of nongovernmental DRR 
actions in relation to formal DRR structures. The assumption is that non-governmental 
actors are stepping in to complement or backfill state actions on DRR, but better 
understanding is required of how those interventions affect citizens’ perceptions of the state, 
and their viability and sustainability. An independent review is required, including returning 
to the site of community-based DRR project-based interventions, to better understand what 
works and what doesn’t in non-state interventions designed to support communities to be 
disaster-resilient in conflict-affected contexts. Assessments of whether interventions were 
‘successful’ should reflect the expectations and ambitions of affected communities. 
Sidestepping normative approaches to DRR: encouraging a different perspective 
• There remains much we don’t know about people’s lived experiences of the intersection of 
disasters and conflict. Starting with the active and participatory role of individuals and 
communities in situations of disasters and violent conflict (Molenaar, 2011) may enable a 
greater understanding of what people actually do in such situations. Independent research, 
including longitudinal studies, could unpack those experiences, with an emphasis on the 
choices and trade-offs of the actions that people take, and why they take them. This could 
provide a more grounded starting point from which to design interventions complementary 







Box 6 (cont.)  Evidence and practice gaps on the climate–disasters–conflict interface 
 
• Little work has been done to connect people’s lived experiences, individual agency-led 
interventions, sub-national or national structures for DRR and national and international policy 
commitments. As such, there is a need to link the ambition to build disaster resilience across 
scales, from individual to international. Such an analysis needs to be deeply intertwined with 
analysis of conflict dynamics across scales to understand where there are viable entry points, 
barriers or points of contention. Such an analysis may lead to alternative approaches to those 
we have at present – including drawing on ideas of hybrid governance or institutional bricolage 
(Cleaver, 2012). The literature makes reference to poorly designed DRR strategies having 
negative impacts on conflict dynamics, but this has not been robustly investigated. Agency-
related reputational risks aside, there could be value in reviewing monitoring and evaluation 
project documents to identify cases where this can be either substantiated or rebutted, with a 
view to providing lessons to inform future design. Conversely, more emphasis on examples 
where effective DRR has improved perceptions of government (Walch, 2018). 
• By extension, based on the continuum described above, a deeper understanding of the potential 
for DRR to contribute to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution is required. 
A collaborative research process utilising ‘conflict’ and ‘disaster’ specialists would help in 
cross-fertilising knowledge and ensuring that any claims of the contribution of DRR to 
ambitions for peace are valid and substantiated. DRR could be implemented as a 
process/transition from minimum or community-based DRR to more institutionalised, national 
and sustainable DRR adapting to conflict dynamics, post-conflict conditions and fragility. 
• The current evidence base is concentrated on disaster events as the entry point for analysis, with 
a focus on local-scale disaster impacts. A longer-term historical perspective (akin to Artur, 
2018), which includes emphasis on the evolution of national policy architectures for DRR, 
would help in producing recommendations for policy and practice that reset expectations of 
what can be achieved over what particular timescale; in the Philippines, for example, it took 
more than 25 years for the government to move from reactive emergency response to proactive 
disaster risk management policy and practice.  
Pushing the boundaries of what we know 
• DRR in conflict contexts could consider taking a more explicitly political stance and building 
on social movements to explore the transformative potential of holding those in positions of 
power to account and utilising DRR as an entry point for reworking power relationships to 
reduce risks. 
• Many communities experiencing the ‘double vulnerability’ of disaster and conflict risk are ‘off 
the radar’: we know little about them, and they may have vastly different ideas about what 
disaster resilience does or could look like. This may include experiences of disasters and DRR 
in areas under the control of non-state armed groups. There has been little research exploring 
the role of alternative governance mechanisms and parallel governance structures specifically 
in contexts of violence and armed conflict, and the implications for understanding and acting 
on disasters, and subsequently for the opportunities for and limitations of DRR. 
• There is also a gap in our understanding of what happens at the sub-national scale, and 
specifically the provincial level, on the disaster–conflict nexus (what Mena et al. (2019) refers 









4.5 Collaboration and coherence of action on peace and security, 
emergency relief and long-term sustainability 
 
There is a substantial disconnect between evidence and action on natural hazard-related disasters, 
disaster more broadly (encompassing the breadth of hazards listed under the Sendai Framework, 
including biological, environmental, geological and geophysical, hydrometeorological and 
technological hazards), climate variability and change, and issues of violence, conflict and fragility. 
Given the evidence that intersecting vulnerabilities amplify risks that arise from how those 
vulnerabilities interact with these hazards, the disconnect is unhelpful, particularly given current and 
future trends that point towards an amplification of compound and complex risk in FCAC. 
Operationally, a number of recommendations have been posited that warrant attention (Peters, 2019a: 
46–47). These include the need to establish a Community of Practice, and develop an integrated cadre 
of experts. We explore both these ideas briefly below.  
Formalise a community of practice and establish an annual conference on climate and disaster 
risk in conflict contexts: Given the significant evidence gaps in this area, as an extension of the 
‘learning journey’ currently being undertaken by DFID, there is a need to provide space to undertake 
research and technical advisory work specifically on climate-related disasters in conflict. An informal 
network is already in existence – convened by a collaboration of think tanks, NGOs, government 
representatives and UN agencies – but is unfunded. With funding, there could be more systematic and 
inclusive discussions on the intersection of linked risks, together with a formal space for convening 
humanitarian, peace, development and climate experts. Given that the evidence base requires 
significantly more investment, convening an annual conference on this intersection, together with 
specialised academic journals to increase the quality of research in this area, would be of great benefit. 
This conference could be linked to the UK’s hosting of the COP26, and subsequently linked to the 
convening cycle of the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction. Organised by a secretariat, an 
online presence is required, and other means of information sharing such as a newsletter, podcasts, and 
in-person convening spaces.  
Develop an integrated cadre of climate, DRR and conflict specialists supported by training: As 
part of the intended deliverables of the Community of Practice, it could develop an integrated cadre of 
experts. This would involve bringing together expertise in disasters, climate, conflict and peace, and 
upskilling across the board on related competencies, and updating of guidance and practice notes used 
by programme managers and technical advisors. Development of e-learning and training courses would 
be beneficial as well as the extension of current ‘learning journeys’ to encompass a broader array of 
Box 6 (cont.)  Evidence and practice gaps on the climate–disasters–conflict interface 
 
• Finally, a welcome contribution would be evidence that provides non-Western perspectives and 
norms that do not comply with the traditional idea of a social contract. Examples include social 
contracts between groups and tribal leaders, rather than between individuals and the national 
government. Other elements of culture, including time orientation, masculinity/ femininity, 
power distance, collectivism/ individualism and uncertainty avoidance, may also shed light on 
why some interventions, strategies and concepts may be applicable in some places but  
not others.’ 
 










linked threats and hazards. Only with upskilled managers and advisors will it be possible to begin 
exploring means to design programmes with linked climate, disaster and peace outcomes. For example, 
integrating disaster and climate risk into post-conflict reconstruction programmes as in Syria. 
Furthermore, other ‘… opportunities include using an integrated cadre of DRR and conflict specialists 
for early action and preparedness programmes around disaster and conflict risk in contexts such as Haiti, 
Myanmar and the Horn of Africa. Over time, disaster and conflict expertise should be made mandatory 
in all stages of intervention design and delivery in contexts where hazard and conflict risks are high’ 
(Peters, 2019a: 45). 
COP26 should be utilised as a space to showcase the beginnings of such an endeavour, presenting a 
proactive rebuttal to the negative focus of much of the climate security work to date, which tends to 
centre on the likelihood of increased violent conflict and displacement. A more integrated approach to 
this topic would begin to action the ‘innovative approaches’ articulated in a recent set of 
recommendations (see Source: ), which responds to calls for better linking of the development, 
humanitarian and peace divide – the ‘triple nexus’ – by the OECD, WEF, UN and others. 
If there is appetite to ‘trial unorthodox approaches’ (see Figure 5), then learning from affected people’s 
experiences and coping capacities would be greatly advanced by new research exploring how disasters, 
including climate-related disasters, are experienced in contexts controlled by non-state armed groups. 
This includes areas such as Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Mindanao in the Philippines, and border 
areas of Myanmar. Moreover, ‘… there is a gap in our understanding of what happens at the subnational 
scale, i.e. the provincial level, on the disaster–conflict nexus. For example, small commander, warlords, 
mid-range authorities: these actors operate in relation to slow- and fast onset disaster risk’ (Peters, 
2019a: 47).  
Integrating conflict considerations into DRR and climate change adaptation (and mitigation) 
strategies and implementation plans – and vice versa: Governments and agencies wishing to better 
address issues of violence, conflict and fragility in disaster and climate strategies and plans, are, at 
present, unsupported. A set of worked examples, guidance notes and best practices are required that can 
demonstrate the process and changed outputs which result from integrating conflict considerations into 
such plans. Where measures to work in armed and violent conflict contexts have been integrated into 
plans – such as in Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Philippines – research is required that can explore how 
this changes implementation practice and disaster resilience outcomes. Where learning processes are 
ongoing, such as in Guinea Bissau and Cameroon, an accompaniment process would be useful to enable 
lessons to be learned that can be shared with other governments.  
Priority should be given to national and regional actors who have already written linked climate, disaster 
and conflict prevention action into their priorities for action. This includes, for example, the African 
Union. Translating ambition into action would be a remarkable step forward in breaking down current 
policy and practice silos. Doing so would require a range of support mechanisms such as a technical 
advisory group and call-down capacity. Other entry points include utilising existing disaster risk 
networks such as the Making Cities Resilient network, to ensure a focus on urban risk profiles. Finally, 
including aspects of conflict into the Sendai Framework monitoring process would help to 
institutionalise the tracking of linked disaster and conflict dynamics.  
Investing in DRR and climate change adaptation in FCAC: To complement the recommendations 
listed in the climate finance section of this report, several actions could help mature action on climate 
and disaster risk in FCAC. This includes donors reviewing their investment portfolio to systematically 
understand and identify means to accelerate climate and disaster resilience. At its simplest, this means 
increasing investment into such contexts: ‘Reviews should aim to provide donors with recommendations 
for enhancing investment opportunities in DRR, as well as new or additional safeguards for ensuring 
that investments do not exacerbate societal tensions; for donors who already systematically consider 
conflict dynamics in DRR investments this may be minimal work, but for others it may require a 




Figure 5  The continuum of options for action 
 
 
Source: Peters, 2019a: 43. 
 
To mature project and programme design, guidelines and systems are required which ensure that conflict 
analysis is systematically integrated into climate and disaster portfolios, and vice versa – issues of 
natural hazards, hazards more broadly, and climate-related hazards inclusive of the growing influence 
of climate change, need to be visibly integrated into humanitarian, conflict and peace portfolios. More 
adventurous ideas include the recommendation to have a ‘multi-donor pooled fund for disasters and 
peace … provid[ing] financial and technical advisory support to governments on policy design, build 
the capacity of national disaster management agencies, implement projects with improved monitoring 
processes that link tracking of changes in disaster and conflict risk and pursue independent research to 





5 Climate-related conflicts over 
natural resources  
This chapter reviews and summarises the available information, evidence and gaps on the underlying 
drivers, causes and dynamics of conflicts over natural resources (land, water) and systems (e.g. grazing 
land/pasture, landscapes, forests) linked to climate-related hazards and climate change in FCAC.  
It discusses:  
• the potential enablers for ecosystem-based climate resilience, adaptation and mitigation 
investments, which can drive improved governance, local people’s well-being and climate outcomes  
• the opportunities for cooperation among non-state, state and multilateral actors to strengthen rights, 
accountability, peace-building, and climate resilience, adaptation and mitigation in these contexts  
• how resilience can be strengthened at the local, national, transboundary, regional and international 
levels in a way that enables collaborative pro-poor approaches.  
 
5.1 State of the evidence: high-level overview 
 
Academic and grey literature, and many global and regional policy fora in the past two decades, have 
asked the question: To what extent does the climate and its impacts on natural resources (land, water, 
species, ecosystems) contribute to conflict? Here, the ‘climate lens’ has been used to assess the role of 
both climate-related hazards and, where attributed, climate change. Efforts to answer this question have 
led to many studies that focus on natural resource scarcity and try to establish causal chains among 
resource scarcity, climate change and conflict. For example, researchers have investigated: Does 
climate-related resource scarcity drive conflict? Does resource scarcity (in one place) spur migration, 
which sparks conflict in the migrants’ destination? Understanding these relationships better can inform 
how we work to halt, manage, mitigate or even reverse resource scarcity along with other, compounding 
drivers of conflict and fragility in resource-poor contexts.  
An equally important but rather separate body of literature, policy and practice asks: How does fragility 
and poor governance in natural resource-abundant contexts spur resource extraction, and associated 
environmental degradation and conflict? And what are the implications for climate change, 
development (and biodiversity)? Understanding these relationships better can inform how we work to 
halt natural resource-related conflict and the misery it creates, while supporting environmental 
protection that strengthens climate change adaptation and mitigation, and human development. 
The state of the evidence on links among natural resources, climate and conflict may be summarised 
as follows: 
• Climatic factors affect the condition of ecosystems and affect ‘nature’s contributions to 
people’ but climate (and climate change specifically) is one of many drivers of ecosystem 
degradation. 
• In this context, climatic factors are understood as a contributor to ecosystem degradation. In 
multiple instances in the academic and grey literature, climatic factors are referred to as a 





There is strong evidence in the literature for a correlation between ecosystem degradation and decreased 
human well-being on a global scale (see, for instance, IPBES, 2019). Furthermore, locally, people may 
manage ecosystems (especially in the short term) to improve one or more dimensions of their well-
being, but often at the expense of other social and ecological benefits. At these smaller scales, ‘it is now 
clear that trade-offs are more likely than win-wins within and between poverty reduction and 
environmental management’ (see Schreckenberg et al., 2018, summarising evidence from the 
Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation (ESPA) programme).  
Endeavours to link increasing natural resource scarcity and consequent poverty with increases in social 
and political conflict have tended to yield inconclusive or contradictory results. The foremost reason 
why increases in resource scarcity and depressed means of livelihood and well-being may not 
necessarily lead to conflict and violence is that other factors can mitigate (or exacerbate) the risks of 
violence. Factors cited in the literature include: the presence or absence of mediating community 
institutions; economic development; historic ethnic or inter-group tensions; infrastructure and/or 
security personnel to allow safe passage for displaced persons, migrants or seasonal workers, etc. 
Studies have been inconsistent in their treatment of conflict and violence when investigating the 
climate–natural resource–poverty–conflict nexus (e.g. variously looking at interpersonal, inter-group, 
inter-ethnic violence, terrorism, membership of insurgent groups, etc.). In the past 5–10 years, the issue 
of different metrics of conflict has become better recognised; however, there is a need to apply more 
consistent, comparable metrics across in-depth, case-based research. 
Case studies have tended to focus on the contribution of climate-related extremes to the nexus of 
resource scarcity, poverty and conflict, not climate change as scientifically defined (see section 2.3). In 
a majority of studies, the contribution of ‘climate change’ is not measured as scientifically defined by 
the anthropogenic climate signal in a meteorological event or as evidenced in slow-onset phenomena 
such as sea level rise and its impacts.  
On climate change, specifically, the IPCC (2019b) finds with only low confidence that climate change 
and its interaction with land degradation will be a source of conflict in the decades to come (due to weak 
evidence and weak scientific agreement).  
We reach the same conclusion as Scheffran and Battaglini (2011: S28), namely: ‘Contrary to the 
increasing attention, the research literature does not provide sufficient evidence to support a clear causal 
relationship between climate impacts, security and conflict. The issue is complex and covers highly 
uncertain future developments.’  
Lucrative (commercially valuable) carbon-rich natural resources can be the cause of competition that 
often turns violent in fragile contexts where the rule of law is poorly established and corruption and 
rent-seeking are rife. In these cases (e.g. parts of the Amazon region, central Africa, Southeast Asia), 
fragility and conflict go hand-in-hand with deforestation and natural resource degradation. 
Degradation of carbon-rich environments drives up greenhouse gas emissions and undermines the 
potential for climate change adaptation and resilience, as well as numerous other development goals 
(Chaturvedi et al., 2019). Illegal extraction and trade in lucrative timber is particularly relevant; although 
land use changes associated with other forms of resource extraction such as illegal mining may also be 
significant in climate terms. Such environments pose significant risks for researchers wishing to 
investigate and expose the dynamics, as well as for development actors who wish to invest in solutions 
to ecosystem degradation and its associated conflicts. 
There is increasing evidence that poorly designed climate change adaptation and mitigation 
interventions can exacerbate inequalities in societies, decrease the well-being of some groups of people 
and – sometimes – contribute to conflict. But in highly natural resource-dependent contexts, well-
designed climate change adaptation and mitigation actions could be the answer. Interventions to help 
people cope with climate change (and, where appropriate, to reduce land-based emissions) will be 




that learns from and avoids these mistakes, which instead takes into account people’s intersecting 
vulnerabilities and development needs, and is also conflict-sensitive. (See chapters 4 and 6). 
The linkages between migration and climate change, natural resources and conflict are as contested and 
inconclusive as the other research on the climate–natural resources–conflict nexus reviewed here. In the 
grey literature, media and blogosphere, analysts frequently speculate that there is a causal chain, 
whereby climatic factors drive natural resource scarcity, which drives in-situ conflict, followed by out-
migration or migration from resource-poor conditions, followed by conflict in the migrants’ destination. 
The empirical evidence in the academic literature does not clearly and conclusively support causal 
chains of this type. Indeed, there is evidence that migration in its many forms (cyclical/seasonal vs 
permanent, domestic vs international) can be a coping mechanism where climate-related resource 
scarcity exists. It is valid to ask: does climate-related resource scarcity compel people to migrate and 
does the migration exacerbate conflict, and if so, where, among whom, and why? But it is also important 
to ask, as many scholars do: Does climate-related resource scarcity compel people to migrate and is that 
a form of climate change adaptation? Could it even be a ‘release valve’ for avoidance of conflict in 
resource-scarce, climate-affected environments? 
 
5.2 Literature on the interactions among climate change, 
ecosystems and people’s well-being: in more depth 
 
There is a strong interrelationship between climatic factors (extremes and trends influenced by both 
natural variability and change) and the condition of ecosystems: this is increasingly well understood and 
well evidenced. However, the impacts of climatic factors on ecosystems can be difficult to separate from 
other drivers of ecosystem degradation. The IPBES Global Assessment (2019) summarises the 
contribution of climate change to declines in nature as follows:  
The direct drivers of change in nature with the largest global impact have been 
(starting with those with most impact): changes in land and sea use; direct 
exploitation of organisms; climate change; pollution; and invasion of alien species. 
Those five direct drivers result from an array of underlying causes – the indirect 
drivers of change – which are in turn underpinned by societal values and behaviours 
that include production and consumption patterns, human population dynamics and 
trends, trade, technological innovations and local through global governance. 
(IPBES, 2019; see also Figure 6) 
 
There is strong evidence in the literature for a correlation between ecosystem degradation and decreased 
human well-being. This is especially the case in already low-income communities that are highly 
dependent on rainfed agriculture, where climate-related extremes such as drought and flooding, and/or 
slow-onset events such as salinisation of deltaic agricultural lands and groundwater may decrease 
agricultural productivity as well as drinking water availability. Such economic systems and related 
exposure and vulnerability are prevalent in many FCAC. 
The Global Environmental Outlook 6 concludes that current rates of environmental degradation are 
undermining global society’s ability to achieve the SDGs (UN Environment, 2019). With regard to 
biodiversity loss specifically, ‘land-use change, habitat fragmentation, overexploitation and illegal 
wildlife trade, invasive species, pollution and climate change is driving a mass extinction of species, 
including critical ecosystem service providers, such as pollinators. That mass extinction compromises 






Figure 6 Drivers of global declines of nature 
 
Source: IPBES, 2019. 
 
 
5.3 Resource scarcity literature: in more depth 
 
The ‘roots’ of the modern body of literature on resource scarcity and conflict are in Thomas Homer-
Dixon’s deeply influential research, which framed the narrative for a generation of scholars by linking 
resource scarcity to violent conflict in the present day (as scholars such as Diamond and Abernethy had 
done for colonial era history, previously). Homer-Dixon’s work (1991; 1994) laid intellectual 
foundations with empirical research, particularly from Chiapas, Mexico, and in sub-national areas of 
the Philippines, which charted resource scarcity (also referred to as environmental scarcity) driven by a 
combination of: 
• demographic change (including population growth and/or migration) 
• unequal access to resources (including ‘resource capture’ by elites) 
• environmental change. 
Homer-Dixon’s research project initially incorporated climate change in ‘environmental change’ but 
subsequently dropped climate as a focus on the grounds that ‘atmospheric changes such as global 
warming will probably not have a major effect for several decades, and then mainly by interacting with 
already existing scarcities’ (scarcities of cropland, water, forests, and fish caused by over-exploitation 
and other sources of direct environmental degradation). Homer-Dixon’s research went on to describe 
correlations between resource scarcity and violence, which were by no means inevitable – poverty does 
not lead to violence – but context-specific: 
Decreases in the quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, 
and unequal resource access act singly or in various combinations to increase the 
scarcity, for certain population groups, of cropland, water, forests, and fish. This 
can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the 




may migrate or be expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic 
conflicts when they move to new areas, while decreases in wealth can cause 
deprivation conflicts such as insurgency and rural rebellion. In developing 
countries, the migrations and productivity losses may eventually weaken the state 
which in turn decreases central control over ethnic rivalries and increases 
opportunities for insurgents and elites challenging state authority. (Homer-Dixon, 
1994: 31–32)  
The research concluded that environmental scarcity as a standalone factor is driving conflict: 
environmental scarcity can be an ‘important force’ that nudges powerful actors to concentrate their 
control over natural resources and increase inequities even more; ecosystem vulnerability – as an 
independent physical factor – contributes to environmental scarcity in addition to how those resources 
are governed (the work cites the shallow depth of soils in the upland Philippines and the vulnerability 
of Israel's aquifers to salt intrusion) and, in many parts of the world, environmental degradation ‘has 
crossed a threshold of irreversibility’. On these grounds, Homer-Dixon concludes that the ‘insidious 
and cumulative social impacts’ of environmental scarcity lead to persistent, sub-national  
violent conflict. 
Homer-Dixon’s ideas have had a profound influence on natural resource management, disaster and 
conflict research and discourses over the past few decades. We see these foundational themes and the 
multiple feedback loops among them interrogated in the academic and grey literature in the decades 
hence, with increasing effort by researchers to understand the role of climate variability and change – 
and their impact on the deterioration of ecosystems and their vulnerability – in contributing to natural 
resource scarcity. 
For instance, Theisen et al. (2013) investigate how changing and increasingly severe weather patterns 
exacerbate the risk of conflict in at least two ways. The first is by interrupting resource supplies and so 
leading to greater resource scarcity. The second by increasing natural disaster risk and its potential to 
trigger migration. Contexts with weak institutions, high levels of poverty and agricultural-based 
economies are particularly vulnerable to these conflict threat multipliers, although Thiesen et al. caution 
against jumping to conclusions about any causal link between climate and conflict. They suggest that 
economic development could be a mediating factor that reduces the likelihood of climate impacts from 
contributing to conflict risks, but its role should be further researched. 
As literature on this nexus of issues expanded, analysts increasingly pointed to the multiplicity of risk 
factors that drive conflict in resource-scarce environments, and the difficulty of isolating climatic factors 
(or indeed, anthropogenic climate change specifically) as a single aggravating cause. 
The literature consistently describes climate-related resource scarcity as a contributor to the conditions 
for conflict rather than as a standalone driver of conflict. A preferred term used in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) (2009) and in preceding papers by the US military and European 
Commission termed climate change a ‘threat multiplier’ (Scheffran and Battaglini, 2011; Peters and 
Vivekananda, 2014). 
Here, climate change is noted as ‘exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty, weak institutions 
for resource management and conflict resolution, fault lines and a history of mistrust between 
communities and nations, and inadequate access to information or resources’ (UNGA, 2009: 2). 
A background paper (Evans, 2010) for the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, 
security, and development looked at the historic interlinkages between resource scarcity and 
conflict/stability and analysed projected trends in resource scarcity and climate change. The analysis 
emphasised that problems of resource availability: 
… may be as much the result of poor governance as physical constraints, and that 
the risk posed by climate change or resource scarcity depends as much on the 
vulnerability of populations, ecosystems, economies and institutions as on the 




seen not as a stand-alone issue, but rather in the context of the overall political 
economy landscape. (Evans, 2010: 2) 
   
The OECD’s States of fragility 2016 reinforces this message, stating that:  
Climate change is an important factor for environmental fragility, however, as it is 
closely linked with an increased likelihood of natural environmental threats and 
hazards. Thus climate change should not be seen as a singular driver of conflict but 
rather a stressor that may lead to heightened risk of violence and conflict in an 
already fragile setting. The intersection of weak institutions and social fragility with 
climate change vulnerability is what is referred to as the climate-conflict nexus. 
(OECD, 2016: 91) 
  
Notwithstanding this wide recognition of complexity and multiple risk factors, Koubi (2018) 
nonetheless revisits the interweaving influences of resource scarcity, income and economic impacts, 
demographic and environmental change, and the contribution of climate conditions, poor governance 
and weak institutions in an effort to find causal chains of events. Koubi suggests that: first, climatic 
conditions can reduce economic and agricultural income, which can lead to conflict by decreasing the 
opportunity cost for rebellion; second, climate-driven economic downturns can exacerbate actual or 
perceived economic and political inequalities in turn, increasing the likelihood of conflict; third, 
climate-induced migration may lead to conflict in the receiving areas via increased competition over 
resources, ethnic tensions or distrust. Nevertheless, there is little or ambiguous evidence that climate 
migration causes conflict; the article points to assumptions that have not been tested and which call for 
further research. Finally, Koubi highlights the need to further contextualise results, finding it more likely 
that climatic conditions will increase the risk of violent conflict in agriculture-dependent regions, in 
combination with other socioeconomic and political factors.  
If you ask people in conflict-affected environments what they see as the drivers of conflict, natural 
resource scarcity is cited as one of several factors in combination (see World Bank, 2011: Overview). 
Figure 7 summarises the findings of Bøås et al. (2010) from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Gaza, the West Bank and Colombia.  
Figure 7 Citizens’ views on how significant resource scarcity is in driving conflict 
 





A 2016 occasional paper from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) on the climate-conflict nexus identified 20 countries that fall into this gap: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Haiti, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Bodanac et al., 2016). The paper describes a situation 
where ‘social unrest, intergroup grievances and gender-based violence can increase if a country or 
Government is unable to provide the resources needed to cope with a changing environment or 
destruction from extreme weather conditions, or if international climate change adaptation support is 
insufficient. This, in turn, may contribute to violent conflict’ (OECD, 2016: 5). A related body of 
literature looks particularly at the effect of climate-related factors on resource scarcity – and 
consequently on income and/or economic growth variables in heavily agricultural, natural resource-
based economies, and the correlation with conflict. However, the idea of a causal chain (climate-related 
factors cause resource scarcity cause economic hardship cause conflict) is weakly evidenced, contested, 
and in its early days of investigation.  
Earlier reviews often attempted to establish direct climate-natural resource-conflict linkages. Satyanath 
et al. (2004) state that: ‘the relationship between rainfall and income growth is strongly positive: current 
and lagged rainfall growth are both significantly related to income growth at over 95 percent confidence’ 
(735) and ‘Using rainfall shocks as instrumental variables for economic growth, we find that growth 
shocks have a dramatic causal impact on the likelihood of civil war’ (ibid: 746). They found that 
economic conditions are ‘the most critical determinants triggering civil conflict in Africa’ but also 
acknowledge well-supported research which identifies low income, weak state military capability to 
suppress insurgents, and poor road infrastructure as important factors contributing to the rise of inter-
group conflict. 
The authors conclude, by extension, that it may be possible to reduce the incidence of conflict by 
designing better income insurance/income support for unemployed young men during hard economic 
times, making it less attractive to become a rebel or insurgent. One way of doing this could be through 
public works projects that could be designed in ways that are environmentally friendly and climate 
resilient, as well as addressing broader socioeconomic vulnerabilities of the local population, such as 
transporting food, supporting irrigation and other water projects. The study suggests that ‘further micro-
empirical analysis and careful case studies are urgently needed to illuminate precise causal channels and 
to design more effective policy responses’ (ibid: 747). The World Bank (2011) reached a similar 
conclusion re the potential of public works programmes to generate meaningful income alternatives and 
discourage violent conflict. 
Boxes 7 and 8 provide specific studies where analysts have warned of the traps of simplistically blaming 









Box 7  The challenges of linking climate-related factors to conflict in heavily 
natural resource-dependent settings 
 
Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) go beyond instances of civil war to investigate ‘whether deviations 
from normal rainfall patterns affect the propensity for individuals and groups to engage in disruptive 
activities such as demonstrations, riots, strikes, communal conflict, and anti-government violence. In 
contrast to much of the environmental security literature, it uses a much broader definition of conflict 
that includes, but is not limited to, organized rebellion.’ Hendrix and Salehyan draw upon the Social 
Conflict in Africa Database, listing more than 6,000 instances of social conflict over 20 years. Their 
results show that rainfall variability has a significant effect on both large-scale and smaller-scale 
instances of political conflict. Rainfall correlates with civil war and insurgency, although wetter years 
are more likely to suffer from violent events. Extreme deviations in rainfall – particularly dry and 
wet years – are associated positively with all types of political conflict, though the relationship is 
strongest with respect to violent events, which are more responsive to abundant than scarce rainfall. 
 
However, the findings of Hendrix and Salehyan’s analysis might not be robust, as they are potentially 
undermined by the poor quality of their rainfall analysis. Rainfall does not follow a standard Gaussian 
distribution as used in their analysis, particularly over semi-arid and arid regions. Different statistical 
distributions, such as Gamma or Weibull, need to be explored to test departures from what is 
considered ‘normal’ rainfall in each of the countries they assessed. The standardisation approach the 
authors used to find ‘extreme deviations’ – particularly wet and dry years – was not appropriate; 
extremes rainfall requires special statistical analysis that the authors did not use.  
 
Second, each country has different climates compared to the others and there are often climate 
variations within-country. For instance, the Kenyan highlands receives far more rainfall than arid 
Turkana County in northwest Kenya. Grouping all the countries together in a rainfall ‘panel’ dataset 
ignores the real spatial and temporal (e.g. wet seasons versus dry seasons) variations in rainfall for 
each country. Thus, deviations from the norm and the extent of the deviation for a particular zone 
could be ‘averaged-out’. 
 
Because the rainfall analysis was not robust, the study’s findings may not be accurate. The study 
would ideally be repeated both spatially and temporally for each country separately, and appropriate 
extremes analysis conducted to characterise rainfall departures, such as the Standardised 
Precipitation Indices (see Guenang and Kamga, 2014, for example). 







5.4 Impacts of climate factors on agricultural systems and relation 
to conflict: in more depth 
 
5.4.1 Climate change, agricultural systems more broadly (including crop production), 
food and livelihood security, and implications for conflict among social 
groups 
The negative impact of climate change on crop productivity and yields – both already being observed 
and projected – is covered in the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (IPCC, 2019b). 
Furthermore, the IPCC reports with high scientific confidence that ‘Land degradation and climate 
change, both individually and in combination, have profound implications for natural resource-based 
livelihood systems and societal groups’ (ibid: 53). 
The IPCC finds that land degradation and climate change: 
… act as threat multipliers for already precarious livelihoods (very high 
confidence), leaving them highly sensitive to extreme climatic events, with 
consequences such as poverty and food insecurity (high confidence) and, in some 
cases, migration, conflict and loss of cultural heritage (low confidence). Changes 
in vegetation cover and distribution due to climate change increase the risk of land 
degradation in some areas (medium confidence). Climate change will have 
detrimental effects on livelihoods, habitats and infrastructure through increased 
Box 8  How did climate impacts on natural resources affect the incidence of violent 
conflict in Darfur, Sudan? 
 
‘This particularly violent conflict has a long history and various roots, with the environment likely 
playing only a secondary role. Traditionally, differences between farmers and herders were resolved 
in the region by negotiation among tribal leaders, but the government’s attempt to establish new 
administrative structures weakened the established tribal system (International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur 2005). Inter-tribal conflict was further aggravated by access to weapons, partly 
fuelled by oil revenues. The decision of the government to arm the Janjaweed militia against the 
rebels has escalated to a full-scale civil war which remained unsolved, despite the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ICG 2004). A study by Sandia Research Labs assesses the role of 
climate factors in this conflict (Boslough et al. 2004). An empirical analysis, based on O’Brien 
(2002), shows statistical correlations between conflict instability and different indicators, such as 
income and calories per capita, life expectancy, youth bulge, infant mortality rate, and trade 
openness, ethnic composition of the population, political freedom and democratic rights. While some 
of these factors tend to worsen the conflict constellation, a clear overall message was not provided. 
The Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment (UNEP 2007), based on an extensive expert 
assessment, came to the conclusion that critical environmental issues, including land degradation, 
deforestation and the impacts of climate change, threaten the Sudanese people’s prospects for long-
term peace, food security and sustainable development. Darfur is considered a ‘‘tragic example of 
the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse’’ (ibid). After publication of the report, 
regional experts did not refute the environmental contribution to the conflict but warned of the 
‘‘danger of oversimplifying Darfur’’ (Butler 2007).’ 





rates of land degradation (high confidence) and from new degradation patterns (low 
evidence, high agreement). (ibid.) 
The IPCC (2019b: 275) notes that there is growing evidence that changes in drought can increase the 
likelihood of sustained conflict for particularly vulnerable nations or groups, owing to the dependence 
of their livelihood on agriculture, though it acknowledges inconsistent evidence,  weak relationships 
and significant disagreement among scientists. At the same time, it points out that insufficient 
consideration of the multiple drivers of conflict often leads to inconsistent associations being reported 
between climate change and conflict (ibid.). The evidence base on increasing desertification and 
salinisation/saline intrusion of coastal lands, species movement, and disruption to agricultural and 
aquaculture systems through the combined impacts of human-induced ecosystem degradation, natural 
resource mismanagement and climate change is particularly germane to FCAC. 
5.4.2 Climate change, pastoralist systems, changed transhumance patterns (human 
and livestock movement), food and livelihood security, and implications 
for conflict among social groups 
The most recent grey literature (including multilateral agency briefings) and academic scholarship – 
identified via the BRACED Resilience Scans and subsequently – highlights intersections among human 
movement in pastoralist systems in the Sahel region of Africa, natural resource scarcity and conflict. 
Peters and Mayhew (2019) cite the following recent, significant studies: 
• The early warning action report of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) (2018) ranks the Sahel as a high-risk region, identifying as a prominent cause the increase 
in migration to forage-rich areas – such as Mauritania, Mali, Senegal and coastal countries – 
contributing to the deterioration of local agro-pastoral lands. The work highlights that livestock 
overgrazing has led to increasing tensions between pastoralists and host communities. The impact 
of climate change on stability within Mali is a cause of concern in a recent UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution on the security situation in the country. UNSC Resolution 2423 calls for the 
Government of Mali and the UN to recognise the adverse effects of climate change, ecological 
changes and natural hazard-related disasters on the stability of Mali and to take these into account 
when preparing country activities, programmes and strategies (UNSC, 2018). Examining these 
issues in more depth, a report published by the Clingendael Institute (Ursu, 2018) provides a study 
of Mopti region in Mali’s Inner Niger Delta, where in recent years poor resource management has 
exacerbated conflict over access to natural resources. 
• The Food Security Information Network (FSIN) (2018) and FAO (2018) both refer to the high rate 
of migration by pastoralists towards coastal countries in the Sahel as a result of changing climate 
conditions (cited in Peters and Mayhew, 2019: 21). 
• Mbih et al. (2018) investigate farmer–pastoralist conflicts in the Western Highlands of Cameroon. 
They  find that over three decades, pastoralists have switched from nomadic to a primarily sedentary 
lifestyles in adaptation to external pressures. This has had both up-sides and down-sides: there are 
positive relations with farming communities, thanks to improved agro-pastoral production and 
community development. However, there is also increased competition over land. An increase in 
climate variability is resulting in ‘confusion’ (ibid: 791) between farming periods and use of land 
by pastoralists for their livestock. The authors suggest that efforts to clarify the land tenure system 
and improve weather forecasting could resolve local tensions (cited in Peters and Mayhew,  
2019: 40). 
5.4.3 Impacts of climate factors on water scarcity and relation to conflict 
A widely quoted 1995 speech by Ismail Serageldin, then Vice President of the World Bank, predicted 
that while the inter-state wars of the 20th century were fought over oil, the wars of the 21st century 
would be fought over fresh water, due to its increasing scarcity. In 1995, he cited population pressure, 
increasing consumption and pollution as the primary drivers for water scarcity; subsequent articles and 
interviews cited the increasing threat of climate change-related water scarcity  




For some time in the 1990s and 2000s, this warning about ‘water wars’ was echoed more widely in 
policy debates. This created a ‘securitisation’ of climate and water issues – an explicit implication that 
water scarcity may require military responses. However, scholarly attempts to research whether water 
scarcity in transboundary river basins led to war between nations demonstrated that, in fact, cooperation 
was the more likely outcome. River disputes were, in the majority of cases, addressed by cooperative 
agreements (Swain, 2001) and nations have not gone to war over water until now (Barnaby, 2009) 
although commentators refused to rule out inter-state wars in their predictions for the future (Serageldin, 
2009a; 2009b). If we keep focused on evidence of past and current conflict, the incidence of violence is 
most evident in cross-border skirmishes among smaller groups, and water scarcity related to climate 
change is one contributor to violent conflict, among other conflict drivers.  
Recent literature on the intersection of water scarcity, food insecurity, displacement and conflict in 
FCAC reveals a range of findings: 
• A recent analysis of links between regional stability and climate factors in Central Asia for 
UNESCAP refers to the link between climate change and water security. Suleimenova (2018) warns 
that ‘variations in water stocks and flows may intensify competition and tensions over water 
resources. The study highlights that tensions in the region, such as the unresolved conflict in the 
Nagorno–Karabakh basin, continue to obstruct collective efforts to address water security’ (Peters 
and Mayhew, 2019: 21). 
• Von Lossow (2018) calls for greater attention to political realities and their links with water security 
challenges in Iraq (Peters and Mayhew, 2019). 
• The Planetary Security Initiative (PSI) (2018) explores ‘how EU External Action Service policies 
in Iraq (and Mali) are considering the climate–security nexus. The authors find that the policies on 
Iraq pay only limited attention to the impacts of climate change on water security and development, 
and that there is a need to strengthen climate change adaptation measures’ (ibid: 20). 
 
Water security is one of the areas in the natural resources scarcity–climate–conflict nexus that is ahead 
of the others in terms of its maturity as a topic, having attracted a range of leading-edge, transdisciplinary 
scientific investigation over the past 20 years. It is in the water resources arena that we see teams of 
climatologists, hydrologists, agronomists, water and sanitation specialists, political scientists and 
sociologists cooperating to: 
• not only analyse historical trends in water availability and use in river basins and territories, but also 
generate future scenarios for precipitation and flows (including, groundwater recharge) under 
different climate futures; 
• assess current management regimes and their suitability for future ‘climate-proofing’;  
• present future scenarios and incipient trade-offs for the allocation and use of water for the use of 
different stakeholder groups, some of which arise as ‘water-energy-food’ (WEF) nexus trade-offs, 
particularly where agriculture – the world’s largest water-user – demands irrigation. 
 
This type of transdisciplinary, directly decision-relevant research comes together in projects such as the 
Future Climate for Africa’s Integrating Hydro-Climate Science into Policy Decisions for Climate-
Resilient Infrastructure and Livelihoods in East Africa (HyCRISTAL) (see Box 13). Another example 
is the detailed future climate and hydrological modelling of the Cumbaza Micro-Basin in Peru by Global 
Canopy Programme and partners, funded by CDKN and IDRC (see Sabogal et al., 2018), which has fed 
future climate and water allocation scenarios directly to a multi-stakeholder river basin advisory 
committee. Initiatives of this type intend to pinpoint the climate- and management-related risks of water 







5.5 Climate change, migration and conflict 
 
5.5.1 Untangling the drivers of migration and role of climate factors 
Do climatic factors (whether sudden- or slow-onset events, including those influenced by climate 
change) cause migration? Even if climatic factors contribute to a decision to migrate, is there necessarily 
conflict – either conflict driving migration from the point of origin, or conflict at the migrants’ 
destination? Causal chains such as these are frequently cited in the grey literature, policy and national 
security arenas and the media, often leading to alarmist headlines. However, the empirical evidence 
points to a complex confluence of factors, and does not support clear causal chains of this type.  
It is difficult to attribute human mobility to climatic factors with precision. Opitz-Stapleton et al. (2017: 
7) note that ‘people move for a wide variety of reasons, and even where [climatic] hazards contribute to 
this decision, it is the underlying socioeconomic, cultural, political and environmental processes that 
either enable or constrain people’s ability to cope where they are or result in their moving’.  
The current literature investigates the degree to which migration is influenced by natural resource 
scarcity (which may be influenced by one or more climatic factors, sudden- or slow-onset) and its 
intersection with power, governance and control or access to natural resources (the political, 
socioeconomic and cultural factors). Such natural resource scarcity may be temporary or longer term, 
reversible or irreversible – beyond a tipping point. All of these aspects can have a bearing on the type 
of migration response that individuals and households choose. For instance, where ecosystem services 
in a given environment are seasonally variable, this can create seasonal or periodic resource poverty and 
so drive seasonal or cyclical human migration (Adger and Fortnam, 2018). 
It is also important to recognise that ecosystem goods and services in any location do not exist in a 
closed system, but are subject to in-flows and out-flows (not least among them, aid and trade). Pascual 
et al. refer to ‘off-site and out-of-scope issues’ that affect these flows. These are ‘systemic and affect 
multiple ecosystem properties beyond the realm of any single resource or sector (e.g. carbon, fisheries); 
[and are] more difficult to identify … and more uncertain due to diffuse and cumulative cross-scale 
impacts’ (Pascual et al., 2017: 2). This point is immediately relevant to the nexus of natural resource 
scarcity, migration and conflict, because in-flows and out-flows of natural resources (or ‘ecosystem 
goods and services’) can affect people’s relative deprivation or well-being where they live, and influence 
their choice to move as a result.  
Meanwhile, socioeconomic and political factors are key determinants of people’s vulnerability, which 
condition their options to respond to climate-related shocks and slower-onset events such as floods, 
droughts, land degradation, sea level rise and related damages, and their ability to adapt. For example, 
people’s ability to access and use new crop varieties, as well as non-agricultural activities, such as 
‘consumption smoothing’ through access to credit, insurance and social safety nets (Waldinger and 
Fankhauser, 2015) have a deep bearing on their ability to cope with climate-related scarcity and stresses, 
particularly where dominant livelihoods depend on natural resources. Gender-related opportunity and 
discrimination as well as intersecting issues of class, education/literacy, age, ethnicity and other social-
political factors influence access to these services (IPCC, 2019c). Studying the causes and consequences 
of migration for women from the coastal district of Odisha (India), Patel and Giri (2019) observe that 
the decision to emigrate is determined by a variety of factors, including environmental challenges, and 
the decision is usually taken by the male head of household. Migration can compromise safety and 
security due to fear of eviction and prevalence of low-paying unskilled jobs. 
Several authors have reviewed existing studies on the effects of climate and socioeconomic and political 
indicators on migration and conflict, finding that they were either not able to isolate the effect of climate 
variables from socioeconomic and political ones: Koubi (2018) found this to be the case in agriculture-
dependent regions. Owain and Maslin (2018) cannot separate the effect of economic performance, 
population growth and political stability from climate elements in relation to displacement of people in 




flows data analysed, where droughts had an effect on forced migration. This window of time coincided 
with the Arab Spring and conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that other forces may be at play. 
Riosmena et al. (2018) find socioeconomic conditions to be stronger determinants than climatic 
conditions in reviewing Mexico outmigration flows to the United States. 
The more nuanced role of environmental factors, and specifically climate-related factors, in people’s 
decisions to move is illustrated by key findings from the Deltas, Vulnerability and Climate Change: 
Migration and Adaptation (DECCMA) project, a research project of the Collaborative Adaptation 
Research Initiative in Africa and Asia (CARIAA), which investigated human mobility dynamics in the 
Volta Delta of Ghana, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta of India-Bangladesh, and the Mahanadi 
Delta of India. In these locations, researchers found that fewer than 3% of respondents singled out an 
environmental cause as the main reason for migrating. However, one-third of all households with 
migrants perceived that there was an increased exposure to environmental hazards, and between 40% 
and 80% of respondents across the deltas associated environmental factors with more insecure 
livelihoods (DECCMA, 2018). The authors conclude that: ‘rather than having a direct effect, climate 
and environment affect migration because they affect people’s ability to earn a living, particularly for 
slow-onset environmental hazards such as drought and coastal erosion’ (DECCMA, 2018: 23). 
DECCMA research found, for instance, that in the Volta Delta, there is a strong positive association 
between perceived impact of droughts on economic security of livelihoods, and migration.  
A recent (November 2019) endeavour to estimate the proportion of internal and international migration 
driven by climatic factors is incomplete and relies on figures for involuntary displacement rather than 
the combined total of voluntary migration (permanent and cyclical) and forced displacement/relocation 
(McLeman, 2019). McLeman calculates a current global stock of migrants of approximately 760 million 
internal migrants and 258 million international migrants as conservative estimates, against which the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) finds the number of people directly and involuntarily 
displaced by climate-related hazards as approximately 16 million, primarily in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa 
and the United States (2018): 5.4 million people displaced by floods, 9.3 million displaced by extreme 
storms, 764,000 displaced by droughts and 424,000 displaced by wildfires.  
Ionesco et al. (2017), in their definitive Atlas of Environmental Migration, and based on 20 years of 
data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), contend that it is ‘impossible’ to estimate 
the number of environmental migrants globally as a whole (including climate change-related migrants) 
given current data deficiencies. They note that the average number of people displaced every year 
globally due to natural disasters is 24.5 million – one every second. This incorporates people displaced 
by earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, tsunamis, etc. as well as those disasters which have a climatic 
cause (e.g. flooding, drought, wildfire); but the number would need to be augmented with information 
on those displaced by slow-onset events such as sea level rise. Furthermore, researchers have noted that 
there is very little tracking by governments or international agencies of how long people are displaced 
by particular hazards, particularly when displacement turns into longer-term or permanent migration. 
Trying to estimate the future magnitude of environmental migrants (or specifically, climate migrants) 
is impossible, and efforts to do so have not been based on any scientifically robust methodology (ibid.).  
5.5.2 Migration as an adaptation strategy 
While the links between climate change, the natural resource base, and migration remain complex and 
highly conditioned by social, economic, political and cultural influences, there is accumulating evidence 
that migration in its many forms can be a coping mechanism where climate-related resource  
scarcity exists. 
In other words, it is valid to ask the question: does climate-related resource scarcity compel people to 
migrate and does the migration exacerbate conflict, and if so, where, among whom, and why? But it is 
also important to ask, as many scholars do: does climate-related resource scarcity compel people to 
migrate and, does that migration (whether cyclical/seasonal or more permanent), actually act as a form 





Evidence of migration as an adaptation strategy has become more prominent in the past decade. A 
significant moment was the inclusion of migration in the Cancun Adaptation Framework of the 
UNFCCC in 2010, where Parties were invited to enhance action on adaptation by undertaking 
‘Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change 
induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional 
and international levels’ (UNFCCC, 2010, Article 14, paragraph (f), cited in Ionesco et al., 2017). 
Populations with strong adaptive capacity at the household and institutional levels are better able to 
cope with and adjust to climate hazards with minimal amounts of displacement and migration 
(McLeman, 2019; UK Government, 2011; Black et al., 2011). The UK government’s Foresight report 
(2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change concludes that migration in the face of global 
environmental change ‘may not be just part of the “problem” but can also be part of the solution’. In 
particular, ‘planned and facilitated approaches to human migration can ease people out of situations of 
vulnerability’ and they can address ‘trapped’ populations in poor and vulnerable circumstances (Black 
et al., 2011: 449; UK Government, 2011). A review by Adger and Fortnam (2018) concluded that human 
mobility is a key social response for dealing with spatial and temporal variability in ecosystem services, 
income and consumption.  
CARIAA researchers (2018) assessed and synthesised findings on migration from four research 
consortia and 15 countries, concluding that migration is used by populations vulnerable to climate 
change as an adaptation strategy. As to whether migration provides the resilience that migrants seek, 
the study found that:  
Migration can increase resilience under certain conditions, mainly when the 
availability of services in receiving and sending areas allows migrants to profit from 
their skills, and enables household members left behind to invest remittances 
productively. In the absence of such support services, migration can lead to the 
transfer of vulnerability across different groups and communities. (ibid: 1)  
 
It is often the poorest people who do not have the assets or wherewithal to migrate – temporarily or 
more permanently – to improve their life chances. It is important to disaggregate to understand the most 
vulnerable and affected people within households and communities. A key finding from the World Bank 
(2018), backed by significant multi-country evidence from across the CARIAA research projects, is that 
vulnerable people ‘have the least opportunity to move away from risk’ and the most vulnerable lack the 
resources to move and ‘are trapped’ (World Bank, 2018b: xxi). Ionesco et al. (2017) distinguish people’s 
‘original vulnerability’ as a result of economic, demographic and political stresses, and slow- and/or 
sudden-onset environmental stress. If people have a desire or need to migrate but are unable to do so as 
a result of various health, social or economic ‘trapping factors’ (illness, gender-related factors, deep 
poverty, etc.), this can lead to ‘aggravated vulnerability’ for the trapped population (ibid.). See also 
‘mixed outcomes’ reported in the IPCC assessment of out-migration from mountain environments 
(IPCC, 2019c; and Box 9). 
There is contested and contradictory evidence as to whether migration improves environmental 
conditions (specifically, provision of different types of ecosystem service) in the source and destination 
areas. The dynamics are very specific to each case. For example, migration may involve rural–rural 
migration from areas of resource scarcity to areas of resource abundance such as forest frontier areas, 
where the migrants contribute to heavier resource degradation at their destination (and low levels of 
conflict); alternatively, migration may be rural–urban and may lead to either environmental regeneration 
or destitution at the source destination, depending on the capability and labour force roles of the people 





Box 9  An assessment of climate change as one factor in human displacement and 
migration: evidence from the IPCC’s Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere 
in a Changing Climate (2019c) 
 
Pressures on coastal environments  
Marine flooding is already affecting deltas around South Asia and the world and subsequently 
impacting coastal communities. Marine flooding can come about from a mixture of human factors, 
climate variability and the effects of climate change, including more frequent extreme weather 
events. Human activity upstream, such as land-use changes and damming rivers, interferes with 
natural sediment flows into deltas. This causes subsidence in deltas and relative sea level rise. This 
is compounded by sea level rise, including storm surges, driven by climate change. Intrusion of sea 
water into coastal lands can have far-reaching effects. It can affect agriculture, making some crops 
no longer viable. Farmers have already stopped growing oilseed, sugarcane and jute in coastal 
Bangladesh, due to high salinity levels. Dry-season crops are predicted to decline over the next 15 
to 45 years, especially in the southwest of the country. Meanwhile, drinking water supplies and 
human health are also at risk. Increased salt levels in water are associated with more abundant, toxic 
cholera vibrio (vibrio cholerae) as shown by studies in the Ganges Delta. In the coming years, 
‘significantly higher risks of human displacement’ may be expected in low-income, low-lying 
islands and coasts as a result of multiple environmental changes such as these.  
Pressures on mountain environments  
Meanwhile, migration from high mountain areas of South Asia, documented in the IPCC Special 
Report, is associated with changes in the cryosphere environment. One form of seasonal migration 
(‘transhumance pastoralism’) is an age-old practice whereby high mountain residents move with 
their livestock between winter and summer pastures. This practice is now declining for a range of 
reasons, including the melting of glaciers and snow. Herders say that poor winter snowfall is 
associated with poor pasture quality in Nepal, and less, lower-quality vegetation in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, water sources along migration routes are depleted in Nepal, and 
increasingly large glacier lakes on the Tibetan plateau are flooding traditional pasture areas. There 
are some benefits from warming, namely that seasonal migration to summer pastures now lasts 
longer in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. People in the region who migrate to seek wage labour 
tend to be suffering from livelihood stress at home. Climate change impacts agricultural productivity, 
which affects livelihoods, which drives people to move for the short-term, the long-term, or 
permanently, and domestically or even internationally, in search of better lives. 
Migrating away can have mixed outcomes: it can both increase and decrease people’s vulnerability 
in different ways, depending on the circumstances. There is often an age element to it: in northern 
Pakistan, it is the young people who move away from the mountain communities to seek wage labour 
elsewhere. This has left less labour available to tend the fields, orchards and irrigation infrastructure 
– and so has reduced farming livelihoods overall. 
The IPCC concludes that there is increasing evidence that ‘people are rarely moving exclusively due 
to changes in ocean- and cryosphere-based conditions, and that migration as a result of disasters and 
increasing hazards strongly interact with other drivers, especially economic and political motivations 
(high confidence).’ However, cases are beginning to emerge of communities in the high mountain 
regions becoming permanently displaced and resettling completely because of changes in the 
cryosphere. In Nepal, several villages moved after springs dried up and decreasing snowfall reduced 
the flows of stream water they relied upon for agriculture and pastoralism.  





5.5.3 Climate, migration and conflict – how strong are the historic links, and what 
does the future hold? 
Turning now to the relation between climate and migration to conflict, there are two questions that are 
investigated in the academic literature and carried into the grey literature and policy realm: 
• Is natural resource-based conflict (in which climate plays a role) in migrants’ original location a 
driver of migration? That is, can resource scarcity lead to conflict lead to migration? 
• Alternatively, is natural resource-driven migration (in which climate plays a role) a driver of conflict 
once the migrants reach their destination? 
 
Several reviews of existing studies on this causal link have found that it was either not possible to isolate 
the effect of climate variables from socioeconomic and political factors on migration and conflict, or 
that contextual factors were stronger determinants of conflict than climate variability and change. 
Overall, our review concurs with Brzoska and Fröhlich’s conclusion (2015: 190) that ‘it has become 
clear that the links between climate change, migration and conflict are complex and defy simple and 
sensationalist conclusions’. 
Reuveny (2007) reviewed 36 cases of environmental migration in developing countries, with a focus on 
sudden- and slow-onset climate-related or influenced events such as flooding and drought, or water 
scarcity and land degradation. He found conflict in the migrants’ destination in 19 of these cases; and 
attributed the conflict to: competition for the economic and resource base of the receiving area; ethnic 
tension; distrust; socioeconomic ‘fault lines’ among migrant and existing groups; and ‘auxiliary 
conditions’ such as political instability and civil strife. 
There is evidence that understanding of popular cases of climate-related migration and conflict may not 
be as complete as previously thought. Ide (2018) reviews the literature on the drought in Syria between 
2006 and 2009, which is believed to have led to the civil war. The common understanding is that the 
climate change-induced drought affected agriculture-based livelihoods, which then led to mass 
migrations from rural to urban areas, aggravating social services provision and resource availability and 
leading to conflict. Yet Ide points out that whether or how migrants may have contributed to protests or 
the civil war is not well understood. Selby et al. (2017) find strongly that ‘there is no clear and reliable 
evidence that drought-related migration was a contributory factor in civil war onset’. Their more robust 
climate analysis indicated that drought was not universal throughout the country nor unprecedented in 
the historical record (i.e. within natural variability) and long-term drying trends are also spatially mixed. 
They further concluded, ‘there is no good evidence to conclude that global climate change-related 
drought in Syria was a contributory causal factor in the country's civil war’. (See also Box 4 in chapter 
4 examining climate analysis in various studies attempting to link climate change, disasters  
and conflict.) 
Such unclear and contested incidences should be viewed against the broader context of large-scale 
human mobility, both within and across national borders, that may have an environmental component – 
but neither induce conflict at the destination, nor are driven by overt conflict at the source. Burrows and 
Kinney (2016) cite examples of migration in response to climate-related stresses from the literature that 
have not led to conflict: drought/soil degradation in Kenya in 2004 and 2007, which increased temporary 
labour migration with decreasing soil quality (Gray, 2011); and heat stress in Pakistan, which increased 
the long-term migration of men (Mueller et al., 2014).  
The Atlas of Environmental Migration provides a more expansive view: based on 20 years of work by 
the IOM into the environmental causes and consequences of migration (Ionesco et al., 2017), it lays out 
the great magnitude of human mobility in which environmental factors are thought to play a contributing 
part (hundreds of millions of people over two decades). The Atlas’ data and analysis indicates that in 
proportion to the scale of human mobility, the incidence of violent conflict involving migrants at either 
source or destination is very small, as well as difficult to attribute to natural resource scarcity. Claims 
linking climate change, migration and conflict must be considered with ‘caution’ the authors say: ‘while 




displacement or longer-term migration, it would be incorrect to assume that these phenomena 
automatically result in insecurity and violence: resource scarcity can be managed peacefully and 
disasters can incite solidarity’ (ibid: 82). 
Moving into the policy space, and what should be done to support current and potential migrants, policy 
prescription has, in some regards, leapt ahead of firm evidence, by creating anticipatory 
recommendations and frameworks.  
A global study by the Center for American Progress (Werz and Conley, 2012), focused explicitly on the 
historic and future implications of climate change and migration for American national security, 
acknowledges that there is ‘major disagreement among experts about how to identify climate as a causal 
factor in internal and international migration’. The authors suggest, nonetheless, that given the future 
prospect of increased frequency and intensity of climate-related hazards and their impacts (such as 
intense storms and flooding), governments must be prepared for the policy impacts of potentially 
increased human movement. Their synthesis study compiles the findings of country and regional reports 
from North Africa, India–Bangladesh, the Andean region and China.  
It is between such assessments of historic experience of climate-related impacts and vulnerability and 
their relation to migration, and a future in which climate-related hazards, exposure and vulnerability are 
projected to increase, where academics and policy-makers have made a leap. They have opted to 
advocate for a precautionary approach (Reuveny, 2007; Werz and Conley, 2012) where it is assumed 
that policy-makers must be ready for climate-influenced migration, whereby they must address the 
needs both of potential migrants in resource-stressed situations, and migrants en route and in host 
destinations, in order to avert new forms of social, political and environmental pressure and conflict. 
The World Bank (2018b) proposes several interventions along the lifetime of climate-related mobility 
(see Figure 8 and Box 10). 










Arguably the most important contribution to be made by further research – as regards such anticipatory 
action – is whether such proposed actions are ‘no regrets’ or whether they have the potential to be ill-
designed and accidentally maladaptive, and if so, how to avoid this (see section 5.6).  
The Global Compact on Migration (2018) is the culmination of years of intensive negotiations by the 
international community and prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, to lay the policy 
framework covering ‘all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner’. 
The Global Compact was adopted by the UK government under Theresa May’s leadership in December 
2018 and by numerous other European states such as France and Germany; however, several major 
refugee- and migrant-receiving nations such as the United States of America and Australia have declined 
to adopt it to date. 
The Global Compact notably includes a section on ‘natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate 
change, and environmental degradation’, which recognises the importance of support for potential 
migrants in their originating location, and once they have moved. The first of the commitments is to 
Box 10  Anticipating climate-related resource scarcity as a driver of migration and 
conflict in the future 
 
One of the most significant scenario-based studies in recent years is the World Bank’s Groundswell 
report (2018b), which examines internal migration as a result of climate change, and develops three 
principal scenarios. The work is based on modelling whereby increased ‘distress’ caused by climate 
change impacts (crop failure due to drought; flooding and salinisation due to rising sea levels; water 
scarcity) increases the likelihood of ‘migration under distress’. The three scenarios are: 
• pessimistic (high levels of emissions, unequal development – the reference scenario) 
• inclusive (high level of emissions and with ‘improved’ development pathways) 
• climate-friendly (lower levels of emissions but with unequal development). 
The report’s key messages are as follows: 
• The scale of internal migration will ramp up to 2050 unless concerted action is taken on 
climate and development.  
• By 2050, in the three regions studied of Asia, Africa and Latin America, climate change could 
cause more than 143 million people to migrate within their countries.  
• Countries can expect to see hotspots of climate-induced internal in- and out-migration. This 
has significant implications for countries and for development planning. 
• Migration can be a sensible climate change adaptation strategy if managed carefully and 
supported by good development policies and targeted investments. 
• Internal climate migration ‘may be a reality but doesn’t have to be a crisis’. 
• Policy recommendations include: investment in human capital, better information for 
potential migrants, supportive policies (e.g. labour market policies for internal migrants), 
making social protection portable and scalable.  
 





improved data-gathering, analysis and sharing in order ‘to better map, understand, predict and address 
migration movements, such as those that may result from sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, 
the adverse effects of climate change, environmental degradation, as well as other precarious situations’.  
Anticipating the need for integrated policy responses, the Global Compact continues with a call to: 
• ‘Develop adaptation and resilience strategies to sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, the 
adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation, such as desertification, land 
degradation, drought and sea level rise, taking into account the potential implications on migration, 
while recognizing that adaptation in the country of origin is a priority [emphasis added]. 
• Integrate displacement considerations into disaster preparedness strategies and promote cooperation 
with neighbouring and other relevant countries to prepare for early warning, contingency planning, 
stockpiling, coordination mechanisms, evacuation planning, reception and assistance arrangements, 
and public information.  
• Harmonize and develop approaches and mechanisms at sub-regional and regional levels to address 
the vulnerabilities of persons affected by sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, by ensuring 
they have access to humanitarian assistance that meets their essential needs with full respect for 
their rights wherever they are, and by promoting sustainable outcomes that increase resilience and 
self-reliance, taking into account the capacities of all countries involved.  
• Develop coherent approaches to address the challenges of migration movements in the context of 
sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, including by taking into consideration relevant 
recommendations from State-led consultative processes, such as the Agenda for the Protection of 
Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, and the Platform 
on Disaster Displacement’ (UN, 2018: 9).  
The emphasis (which we have added) on investment in adaptation to keep migrants in their country of 
origin speaks to the Compact’s emphasis on international migration and displacement, and perhaps 
signals the security fears of national governments.  
 
5.6 Filling the evidence gaps: directions for further research at the 
natural resources–conflict interface 
 
The weakness of the current evidence base on the nexus of climatic factors, resource scarcity, poverty 
and conflict arises particularly from: 
• conceptual laxness or simply lack of investigation of the contribution of anthropogenic climate 
change to resource scarcity and consequent poverty and vulnerability; and 
• lack of consistency and thus comparability in terms of the definitions of conflict and violence used. 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that further research – which would support decision-making and 
any kind of future insight work – should strive to: 
• establish far greater rigour on the contribution of anthropogenic climate change to resource scarcity 
and poverty  
• investigate the contribution of these interrelated phenomena to conflict and violence using 
consistent, comparable metrics of conflict/violence across cases (as noted also in chapters 3 and 4) 
• introduce further comparability between case study sites by undertaking more studies in the same 
or similar eco-regions or agro-ecological zones so that there is shared learning on comparable, 
locally appropriate technologies and related institutions, processes, knowledge transfer, and 
potential for shared and peer-to-peer learning. 
Furthermore, previous studies have not sufficiently untangled the climatic drivers from the other drivers 




Disentangling the climatic from the other human drivers of resource degradation and scarcity is 
important for understanding which measures may be available to restore and regenerate the natural 
environment (and with it people’s dependent livelihoods and well-being), and which measures of natural 
resource management risk becoming redundant or ineffective because of larger (not locally controllable) 
processes of climate change and its impacts on ecosystems. In other words, the ‘limits to adaptation’ 
concerning natural resource management are poorly investigated and understood – in developing 
country contexts generally and in FCAC in particular.  
The IPCC finds that:  
Even with adequate implementation of measures to avoid, reduce and reverse land 
degradation, there will be residual degradation in some situations (high 
confidence). Limits to adaptation are dynamic, site specific and determined through 
the interaction of biophysical changes with social and institutional conditions. 
Exceeding the limits of adaptation will trigger escalating losses or result in 
undesirable changes, such as forced migration, conflicts, or poverty. Examples of 
potential limits to adaptation due to climate-change-induced land degradation are 
coastal erosion (where land disappears, collapsing infrastructure and livelihoods 
due to thawing of permafrost), and extreme forms of soil erosion. (IPCC, 2019b: 
348) 
Future research agendas could investigate, broaden stakeholders’ understanding and equip stakeholders 
from local to regional levels with improved conceptual frameworks, data and tools to: 
• quantify the potential of, and limits to, climate change adaptation and resilience in natural resource 
based socio-economic systems and 
• investigate and test the contribution of climate change adaptation and mitigation interventions in 
these settings to peace and stability. 
However, given the urgency of climate- and security-related risks and natural resource degradation and 
scarcity in FCAC, it is important that research should not become bogged down in describing the 
difficult, interconnected social-political-cultural-environmental-economic systems with such 
complexity that the policy relevance is lost. Research is desperately needed that underpins a bold aid 
investment agenda and plan. To advance thinking, it is proposed that DFID’s Building Stability 
Framework (DFID 2016) is explicitly broadened and linked to a series of proactive, policy-relevant 
research questions concerning the climate–natural resources–conflict nexus as the basis for establishing 
what is known, and investigating crucial knowledge gaps. 
5.6.1 Entry points for policy-orientated research to address the climate–natural 
resources–conflict nexus  
DFID’s Building Stability Framework provides a robust and well-evidenced set of entry points for both 
research commissioning on the climate–natural resources–conflict nexus as well as for programming of 
aid implementation budgets. It lays out five building blocks to guide DFID as it programmes 50% of 
the UK’s aid budget to FCASs. ‘Informed by evidence and experience of what works’, the five building 
blocks are as follows:  
• Fair power structures that broaden inclusion, accountability and transparency over time, while 
managing tensions to prevent violence in the short term.  
• Inclusive economic development which creates widespread benefits, reduces incentives for conflict 
and curbs illicit economies. 
• Conflict resolution mechanisms, both formal and informal, that help manage conflict, help people 
cope with the legacies of violent conflict and strengthen women’s role.  
• Effective and legitimate institutions, both state and non-state, that build trust with those they govern, 




• A supportive regional environment that enables communities to be more resilient to transnational 
stresses and shocks, including organised crime and violent extremist ideologies.  
There is a major opportunity to build a stronger and more useful evidence base – partly through primary 
field-based investigation but also through broader, deeper transdisciplinary synthesis of the material 
already available – to elucidate how all of the above building blocks apply in FCAC that are highly 
natural resource-dependent, exposed to climate-related hazards and vulnerable to climatic impacts. 
We would therefore suggest that it is instructive to phrase each of the DFID Building Stability 
Framework’s ‘building blocks’ of conflict avoidance in terms of the climate and natural resource 
interface, as a way of taking stock and identifying where major evidence gaps and opportunities for 
policy-relevant research lie, as follows. 
Governance structures and effective, legitimate institutions: 
• How can power structures for governance and management of natural resources use climate-related 
information and future scenario analysis to create fair conditions to manage current and incipient 
resource competition and associated tensions? 
• How can effective and legitimate institutions for natural resource management and associated 
climate risks, both state and non-state, build trust with those they govern and grow in effectiveness 
over time? 
Economic opportunities: 
• How can inclusive economic development that is climate-compatible and natural resource-based 
reduce the incentive for conflict and curb illicit economies? 
Conflict resolution mechanisms: 
• How can conflict resolution mechanisms help manage conflict over climate-stressed natural 
resources, helping people cope with the legacies of violent conflict and strengthening women’s roles 
to permit more equal natural resource access and control (with men)? 
Supportive regional environments: 
• How can supportive regional environments enable communities to be more resilient to transnational 
stresses and shocks, including organised crime and violent extremist ideologies? 
 
5.7 Stock-take of research needs by entry point 
 
5.7.1 Governance structures and effective, legitimate institutions and processes: 
overview 
There is increasing awareness of the need for integrated climate-fragility risk assessments to guide 
decision-making and investment strategies.  
In Africa, the need for a clearer understanding of the relationship between climate change and conflict, 
leading to better climate risk assessment and management strategies, was raised at the African Union 
Peace and Security Council session in May (Amani Africa, 2018). This was also a focus for the president 
of the UN Office for West Africa statement in June (Vivekananda and Born, 2018). Within UNSC 
Resolution 2423 on the situation in Mali, the Government of Mali and the UN were called upon to invest 
in adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies (UNSC, 2018). Within the African region, 
Nagarajan et al. (2018) provide an example of a risk assessment in practice. As part of a wider climate-
fragility risk assessment, the authors highlight that the next step of the process is the collection of further 
primary data on the links between climate and fragility in Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Similarly, UN 




current state of environmental change, providing benchmarks for assessments, inventories, mapping and 
valuation of the country’s natural resources. UNEP indicates that the information generated will be used 
for future planning and management of natural resources and environmental protection. (Peters and 
Mayhew, 2019: 24) 
New indices are being developed in the academic literature that could be directly decision-relevant for 
policy-makers.  
Liu et al. (2018) construct a new measurement for state fragility – the Fragile States 
Metric System (FSMS) – which, in addition to traditional indexes used within the 
Fragile States Index – such as economic, political, social and cohesion – includes 
an adapted Climate Change Metric System, which incorporates a Climate Change 
Performance Index. By including climate indexes, the authors argue the FSMS 
makes it possible to understand the bearing climatic factors have on those indexes 
traditionally associated with the Fragile States Index. (Peters and Mayhew, 2019: 
26) 
New theoretical frameworks may also help unpack complex drivers of conflict and 
interactions with human systems. Navas et al. (2018) examine the diverse drivers of 
environmental conflicts and consider how multidimensional types of environmental 
violence – direct, cultural, structural and ecological – overlap across historical, 
political and economic contexts. This approach allows us not only to see visible 
forms of violence but also to consider ‘slow’ violence, which may occur over a 
longer period of time before the effects are felt. The authors argue that, while slow 
violence may be less evident, it still poses a threat to both human and natural 
systems, and livelihoods. (Peters and Mayhew, 2019: 27) 
 
The BRACED Resilience Scan (Peters and Mayhew, 2019) notes that there is an emerging trend in 
climate-fragility assessment toward empowering local people in assessments in such environments. Two 
examples in the literature from 2018 are as follows: 
Oswald-Spring (2018)’s Human, Gender and Environmental (HUGE) security 
framework offers a deepened and widened understanding of security. The 
framework places people in vulnerable situations at the centre of science and policy 
agendas and emphasises the need for empowerment from below. Through this 
approach, climate mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk management become 
methods of tackling threats from patriarchal systems and of enabling resilience-
building. (Peters and Mayhew, 2019: 28) 
Azpíroz Manero (2018) considers how climate change and security are perceived, 
interpreted and communicated by social actors, such as indigenous populations, 
religious organisations, women and youth. Such perspectives may deepen 
understanding on the risks, needs and expectations of different social actors. (ibid.) 
 
This accords with a broader trend away from expert-only assessments and mapping exercises toward 
more co-generated and people-centred approaches to climate risk assessment in all developing countries 
and including fragile contexts, as described and supported by various case studies in Dupar (2019b) for 
CDKN. Importantly, people-centred indices of well-being were also tested in several ESPA research 
projects, which sought to: 
• measure links between people’s well-being and a shifting natural resource base influenced by a suite 
of drivers, including management regimes and climate variability and change  




• or measure changes in people’s well-being as a consequence of design and implementation of 
climate change mitigation strategies such as reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries (REDD+) (e.g. Rakotonarivo et al., 2017). 
Both of these were multidimensional methods for measuring well-being in addition to being ‘people-
centred’. In addition, the indices were characterised by the participatory way in which they  
were composed. 
The methods and findings of these studies all provide important building blocks for a new generation 
of research in which such people-centred approaches to climate–natural resources–vulnerability 
assessments have the potential to be adapted and applied more broadly in fragile contexts: 
The need for enhanced climate risk information to inform effective and timely 
responses has been determined as a key area for development, with improvements 
to primary data collection identified as necessary to provide benchmarks for 
assessments, inventories, mapping and valuation of countries’ natural resources. 
(Peters and Mayhew, 2019: 24) 
 
On policy options assessment, the most up-to-date, authoritative assessment comes in the IPCC’s 
(2019b) Special Report on Climate Change and Land, chapter 6, on ‘Interlinkages between 
desertification, land degradation, food security and greenhouse gas fluxes: synergies, trade-offs and 
integrated response options’ (Smith et al., in IPCC, 2019b). 
The above ideas speak to the ‘information needs and assessments’ piece. A critical, complementary 
piece is needed around accountability mechanisms of government and other decision-making 
authorities. Here, it can be helpful to look at some of the insights by sector as well as at the  
landscape level. 
5.7.2 How effective forest governance and institutions can contribute to climate 
change adaptation, mitigation, inclusive and just human development, 
and peace and stability 
Decades of research and practice on halting deforestation, strengthening and enforcing forest-related 
rights and laws, and investigating the justice and livelihood implications have yielded strongly 
evidenced strategies on ‘what works’ in forest conservation and restoration and what the major obstacles 
to such strategies are. This evidence base is directly relevant to the nexus of natural resource 
management-conflict (and peacebuilding) and climate adaptation and mitigation. However, it still 
remains the case that the most robust evidence comes from stable, secure contexts (countries such as 
Sweden and Costa Rica) and not the most fragile contexts (countries such as Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)). There is, however, a major opportunity to fund applied research 
in fragile contexts, perhaps related to the new generation of donor-funded initiatives (e.g. FAO, 
European Union (EU)) in such contexts and including for investments that are ‘pre-REDD+ ready’ in 
their maturity, due to the lack of domestic institutions and processes to support REDD+ readiness. 
The Food and Land Use Coalition’s work, including its flagship Growing Better report and contributing 
working papers (such as Public Sector Measures to Conserve and Restore Forests by Chaturvedi et al., 
2019), synthesises important country and sub-national case study findings on how to develop effective, 
legitimate institutions and processes to overcome natural resource-related conflicts and progress climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in natural resource sectors (see Figure 9 and Box 11).  
Literature on the ‘resource curse’ is helpful in illuminating measures to curb elite capture, ecosystem 
degradation, and further poverty and inequality. Of major relevance to climate adaptation and mitigation 
is the literature around illegal logging, which is ‘captured’ and driven by political and social elites, and 
subsequently undermines carbon stocks and livelihood potential for the poorest people. However, such 




methodological difficulties of gathering information and the risks to researchers of doing so. There are 
decades of investigative work of this type in FCAC by NGOs such as Global Witness – too extensive 
to cite here. An impressive recent investigative report by the Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL, 2019) tracks illegal timber flows and attributes them to specific offices and high-level 
personnel in Peru. The geographic focus of the research is Peru’s Amazon region, and it relies on 
scrutiny of timber permits, which is possible in this territory despite fragility and elements of 
lawlessness; however, such methods are unlikely to be feasible in many other FCAC described in this 
literature review.   
Figure 9: Strategies for overcoming fragile forest governance and supporting climate-
smart, pro-poor outcomes  
 
 
Source: Chaturvedi et al., 2019. 
 
A sub-set of the literature on legitimate, effective governance and institutions for forest conservation 
concerns REDD+ specifically, as a potential carbon-linked mechanism for unlocking international 
finance streams to developing countries. A critical mass of literature has built up on the institutional, 
procedural, political and social conditions for ‘REDD+ ready’ or REDD-type projects and programmes 
to build trust, grow in effectiveness and thus contribute simultaneously to local security and stability, 
well-distributed development benefits and well-being, and regional and global climate outcomes. 
Explicit links with conflict and fragility, however, remain the least-explored vein of this literature. 
CIFOR (the Center for International Forestry Research, which, since January 2019, has been merged 
with the World Agroforestry Centre) has been an international leader in evaluating countries’ REDD+ 
readiness during the 2010s. This has been an important exercise in laying the knowledge basis for 
development of a fully fledged REDD+ mechanism via the UNFCCC, even though such a mechanism 
– like negotiations around operationalising carbon markets under the Paris Agreement – remains 







CIFOR’s multi-country study, the Global Comparative Study (GCS) of REDD+, has published dozens 
of case studies on the readiness of different countries for verifiable land-based greenhouse gas reporting 
and REDD+ funding, as well as multiple synthesis reports and academic papers. The Global 
Box 11  Case study: Strategies for overcoming fragile forest governance and 
supporting climate-smart, pro-poor outcomes 
 
Chaturvedi et al. (2019) describe the key strategies for conserving and restoring forests as:  
‘Reduce supply of land available for deforestation: 1. Do not make public land available for 
conversions; 2. Place moratoria on forest conversion; 3. Establish protected areas; 4. Secure tenure 
and protect indigenous territories; 5. Build climate-smart roads. Increase risk associated with 
deforestation: 6. Enforce the law; 7. Develop conversion-free supply chains; 8. Improve 
transparency. Reduce demand for alternative use of (once) forested land: 9. Sustainably intensify 
agricultural production; 10. Decrease agricultural commodity demand; 11. Increase relative financial 
attractiveness of trees vs no trees; 12. Strengthen decentralised resource management. 
 
The six barriers to implementing these good practices are: 
1) Patronage and power. Forests are often treated as a source of political patronage to be used to 
get and keep political power and support. An extreme example took place two decades ago, when 
then-Liberian President Charles Taylor routinely rewarded political loyalists with lucrative logging 
concessions. 
2) Worth more dead than alive. Trees are often seen as obstacles to economic growth, while so-
called development is seen as first extracting value from standing forests in the form of timber or 
biomass energy and then offering supposedly longer-term value of the land under the trees, either 
for grazing cattle, raising agricultural crops, extracting minerals or speculating on the value of a 
future sale. 
3) Where’s the money? Financing forest conservation and restoration has proved difficult because 
many forest benefits are not monetised. And financial incentives supporting activities that drive 
deforestation or keep trees from coming back often outweigh the incentives for conservation and 
restoration. 
4) Who’s the owner? Communities living in and around forest areas can play a vital role in 
successful conservation and restoration but are too often excluded from decision-making about 
forest policy in part because of unclear and contested land tenure. 
5) Working at cross purposes. In some cases, governance over land that affects forests is not 
aligned, leading to policy paralysis, incoherence or even conflict. The governance of forests is often 
influenced by multiple agencies, operating at different levels, leading to fragmentation of interests, 
priorities and actions along horizontal (e.g., agriculture vs. environment ministries) and vertical (e.g., 
national vs. local government) lines. 
6) Laws on the books but not in practice. Systemic corruption and low levels of law enforcement 
often exacerbate these barriers. Although progressive laws may be on the books to support forest 
conservation and restoration, there is little follow-through and illegalities continue to occur. 




Comparative Study on REDD began in 2009 and has included ‘comparative studies of international, 
national and sub-national REDD+ experiences in 15 tropical forest countries, and the production of 
knowledge products to inform effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ policies and projects’ (Young 
and Bird, 2015: 7). The GCS includes research in FCAC such as DRC; this knowledge base also opens 
the opportunity for follow-up research on the requisite conditions and potential for step-wise progress 
toward REDD+ and attainment of important intermediate benefits (see Box 12). 
Based on nine case studies across four countries in Southeast Asia, Kane et al. show that, although 
REDD+ does carry conflict risks, it also contains ‘transformative potential’ (Kane et al. 2018: 1) in 
terms of conflict resolution: REDD+ has the potential to empower marginalised groups and strengthen 
tenure security. Kane et al. highlight that the evidence from their own study but also other research 
supports ‘the importance of clarifying tenure and rights’ (ibid: 14). In efforts to achieve this, they 
recommend the following ‘governance initiatives’: Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), Forest 
Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade –Voluntary Participation Agreements (FLEGT-VPA) and the 
UN Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure (VGGT). Sunderlin et al. (2018) also explore 
land tenure in relation to REDD+. They argue that, although REDD+ often prioritises land tenure 
security, this is ‘the single most difficult challenge’ (ibid: 377) in its implementation. They identify 
socioeconomic and political conditions, conflict and divergent interests and goals – or ‘business as usual 
interests’ (ibid: 376) – as major obstacles. In addition, national governments often lack interest in 
addressing tenure security, often granting ‘privileged access to economically and politically powerful 
actors’ (ibid: 377).  
Drawing on evidence from Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru and Tanzania, Sunderlin et al. find that, 
while in some areas there are signs of improved land tenure security attributable to REDD+, overall 
there is little evidence in this regard. Given the contextual factors listed, the authors argue that REDD+ 
initiatives are often trying to resolve issues ‘whose origin and scope are far beyond the borders of their 
own site’ (ibid: 378). Hein et al. (2018) also explore difficulties addressing land tenure and impacts on 
implementing REDD+. In an analysis of 162 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 
they highlight that of those that reference REDD+, only 18% reference land and forest governance 
issues, including tenure and indigenous people’s rights, which can be the source of violent 
confrontation. Only 7% of INDCs refer to social and environmental safeguards put in place to ‘ensure 
that indigenous and other local communities fully understand, and agree, with the terms of their 
involvement in REDD+ projects’ (ibid: 9). 
Recent events – and scholarship – have also revealed the implications of democratised access to satellite 
imagery for activism and accountability on forest status and governance, and hence implications for the 
attainment of climate goals. Rothe and Shim (2018) consider how NGOs use satellite-based imagery to 
exercise transparency in environmental governance, through the ‘detection and monitoring of large-
scale environmental changes that would otherwise remain hidden’ (ibid: 417). Through the Global 
Forest Watch project, the World Resources Institute has utilised satellite imagery to shed light on illegal 
deforestation. While Rothe and Shim note that much has been made of the power this hands to NGOs 
in terms of challenging state power, they highlight that certain restrictions – security access, high costs, 
expertise – mean that the power of such tools is concentrated. In particular, non-state actors can fall 
victim to ‘reproduc[ing] a dominant, state driven satellite gaze’ (ibid: 436). However, the authors argue 
that further ‘democratisation of satellite technology’ – such as ‘commercial micro satellites’ (ibid.) – 
may provide more NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) with the means to challenge  
this position. 
Many of the social, political and economic barriers to protecting and restoring forests, as assessed by 
the Food and Land Use Coalition (FOLU), such as elite capture and corruption, are endemic in FCAC. 
Some of the authors’ propositions for overcoming barriers are not immediately feasible or relevant in 
certain conflict situations (e.g. ‘applying voter pressure’ where the state is failed and democratic 
institutions and processes are not functioning). However, other strategies and tactics for unblocking 
hurdles to forest protection are feasible. Further research is needed to build on the important body of 




forest protection and restoration barriers are applicable during times of violent conflict and in immediate 
post-conflict reconstruction periods.  
 
 
Box 12  Insight on forest governance and REDD+ readiness and future prospects 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Have efforts to institutionalise REDD+ ready projects and programmes in DRC moved too far, too 
fast, given the high levels of technical accounting (for forest- and land use-related emissions) 
required for REDD+ financing? Has this placed too great a burden on institutions from national to 
local level – and increased the potential for corruption, i.e. capture of climate finance, by 
intermediary institutions? There is an urgent need for independent research to further assess – based 
on the experiences of countries such as DRC – what minimum enabling conditions may be needed 
in a country’s institutions and what elements of social stability must be in place (and how these could 
be measured) as minimum requirements for establishing REDD+ programmes. This work could be 
both integrative of existing knowledge already compiled by CIFOR, UN-REDD and others, and also 
additive: bringing in new insight from recent developments in DRC and other FCAC. One of the 
enquiry questions must also be: how can Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) of diverse types 
contribute to (and make sure not to undermine) progress toward peaceful, stable, inclusive and 
equitable forest-based economies – i.e. programmes that share the climate mitigation goals of 
REDD+ but require less stringent levels of technical accounting? The CIFOR Global Assessment of 
REDD+ evaluated the suitability of a range of countries for REDD+ development based on the ‘3 
E’ criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, equity. In 2013, its published study for DRC concluded that: 
‘The REDD+ profile in DRC is marred by several shortcomings, and the State 
institutions have some pronounced structural weaknesses: poor governance; 
almost total lack of government authority in certain regions of the country; 
insufficient national capacity to launch sectoral policy reforms compliant with 
REDD+ requirements; and a shortage of autonomous human, material and 
financial resources. Certain members of the international donor community 
share this opinion. The assessment concluded that because of the country’s 
precarious socio‑political environment, it would be difficult, almost impossible 
to implement REDD+ or meet the 3E criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, equity of 
the REDD+ mechanism).’ (Mpoyi et al., 2013: 55) 
 
Notwithstanding this assessment at the end of the DRC’s REDD-readiness phase, REDD+ projects 
and programmes have proceeded regardless; these are summarised in brief (see Yale Global Forest 
Atlas, 2020). Several of these have subsequently been criticised for their blindness to conflict and 
even their harm to local populations. 
Brown (2017) analysed 102 documents from four major REDD+ initiatives in DRC and concluded 
that ‘Concrete approaches to address the reality of civil conflict were not evident’, although 
governance reform figured in REDD+ programmes in the country. Brown argues that it is important 
for external funding institutions to establish how they can be more intentional in harmonising 
approaches to peace-building, climate change mitigation (and adaptation) and development in 











Box 12 (cont.)  Insight on forest governance and REDD+ readiness and future 
prospects in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
A report by the NGO Rights and Resources, entitled Mai-Ndombe: Will REDD+ laboratory benefit 
Indigenous People or Local Communities? (Gauthier, 2018) instigated an important and public 
exchange between the authoring institution and the World Wide Fund for Nature – Democratic 
Republic of Congo (WWF-DRC), which leads implementation of the substantial REDD+ project in 
the Mai-Ndombe region (WWF, 2018). Collectively, these texts signal the need for rigorous, 
independent academic analysis to identify the relationship among international and local power 
structures, resource flows, resource rights and socio-ecological dynamics, and how these affect the 
accrual of benefits to local people and the environment, and incidence of conflict. 
Furthermore, while we emphasise elsewhere in this section the need for future research to interrogate 
the adequacy and application of social safeguards in REDD+ as developed by international public 
funding agencies (UN-REDD partners, the World Bank, FAO, etc.), the DRC experience also 
illuminates the need for research into the adequacy and practical application of voluntary REDD+ 
principles that have been developed by large international NGOs, such as the five guiding REDD+ 
principles of WWF, CARE and Greenpeace:  
• Climate: REDD+ demonstrably contributes to greenhouse gas emission reductions with 
national goals working toward a global objective; 
• Biodiversity: REDD+ maintains and/or enhances forest biodiversity and ecosystem services;  
• Livelihoods: REDD+ contributes to sustainable and equitable development by strengthening 
the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities;  
• Rights: REDD+ recognises and respects the rights of indigenous peoples and local 
communities;  
• Fair and Effective Funding: REDD+ mobilises immediate, adequate and predictable 
resources for action in priority forest areas in an equitable, transparent, participatory and 
coordinated manner. 
Meanwhile, strides have been made in DRC’s legislative framework since the CIFOR REDD+ 
readiness assessments were first made, and the first tranche of REDD+ projects is now underway. 
The government is seeking to reform the country’s land tenure system, including clarifying 
community land rights. Land rights have, since colonial times, been ill-defined; as such, the lack of 
clarity and existence of land ‘grabbing’ by elites have contributed to local conflicts. As legislation 
advances, in parallel, a DFID-led land governance initiative, with UN Habitat, seeks ‘to promote the 
concept of integrated land use planning at community scale to mitigate the risk of land disputes while 
unlocking the potential for increased socioeconomic development’ (UN-Habitat, 2016).  
Stakeholders have highlighted the potential for complementary (legislative, operational) initiatives 
to clarify land and natural resource-based rights, enforce indigenous rights and the application of 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent in order to strengthen the foundations for more robust and resilient 
REDD+ schemes (IUCN, 2016). There is a significant opportunity for relevant, applied research that 





An example of a leading edge, action-research project of this type is the IDRC-sponsored ‘Legal 
empowerment for accountable, just and equitable governance of land and investment in Cameroon’ 
(IDRC, n.d.). In Cameroon, as in DRC (see Box 12), the government has launched a land reform process 
to address the multiplicity of overlapping and conflicting types of land tenure and control, including 
logging and agribusiness concessions – the existence of which deeply affect local people’s livelihood 
opportunities and climate resilience, as well as the country’s land-based greenhouse gas emissions. The 
project will test two sets of interventions: a local-level community-investor dialogue process, supported 
by junior lawyers and local support staff; and a national-level process to facilitate effective public 
participation in land policy and reform debates. More action research of this type is urgently needed 
across FCAC more generally. 
Research questions include the following:  
• What are some of the minimum required conditions for supporting both forest conservation for 
climate goals and local people’s well-being in FCAC?  
• What important, intermediate benefits for livelihoods, personal and societal security, climate and 
environmental sustainability can early interventions make, and how can they lay the ground for 
longer-term, more mature forms of financing and international cooperation such as REDD+?  
• What other mechanisms involving external support (such as differing forms of Payment for 
Environmental/Ecosystem Services) may be more effective than REDD+ in achieving multiple 
climate adaptation, mitigation, peace-building and human development outcomes, particularly  
in FCAC? 
5.7.3 How effective water governance and institutions can contribute to climate 
change adaptation/resilience, inclusive and just human development, and 
peace and stability 
As indicated above, some of the most robust research to date at the interface of climate adaptation, 
development, peace and stability has had water at its heart and has been a transdisciplinary endeavour 
involving physical, biological and social scientists, who are well linked to real-life decision processes. 
In this regard, the Future Climate for Africa programme, and particularly its HyCRISTAL and Future 
Resilience for African Cities and Lands (FRACTAL) projects which inform water resources planning 
and future climate-proofing from city to river basin scale, are good practice examples – although still 
emergent in terms of being able to measure the true impact of the research (see Box 13).  
5.7.4 How effective integrated landscape/ecosystem governance and institutions can 
contribute to climate change adaptation, mitigation, inclusive and just 
human development, and peace and stability  
A significant volume of research has been undertaken in one FCAC, Bangladesh, on the complex 
interlinkages among climate change, ecosystems, natural resource management systems and human 
well-being at landscape scale. Here, broad and deep work in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta, 
involving field studies and modelling linked to policy processes, has evaluated the potential impacts of 
sea-level rise on people and livelihood systems and potential interventions ‘with an explicit aim of 
generating findings relevant for long-term planning and policy processes in the delta’ (Nicholls et al., 
2018: 79). An iterative learning loop process was deployed, which allowed for external expert analysis 
of projected climate impacts and feedback loops on the delta’s socio-ecological systems under a range 
of possible climate futures, integrated with extensive socioeconomic/livelihood options assessment and 







A multidisciplinary, multi-scale/multi-level analysis of socioeconomic and ecological systems and 
development options under a range of future climate scenarios and hitched to concrete government 
planning and investment processes, of the type undertaken in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta, 
raises key questions about further research of this type. Questions include:  
• How can the considerable sunk costs of model development be leveraged to update the findings and 
stakeholder understanding and responses over time?  
• To what degree are the stakeholder partnerships and networks and human capacities now in place 
and able to be sustained in order to coalesce further collective understanding, negotiation of and 
Box 13  Case study: Integrating hydro-climate science into policy decisions for 
climate resilient infrastructure and livelihoods in East Africa 
 
‘Driven by East African priorities, the overarching goal of HyCRISTAL is to develop a new 
understanding of East African climate variability and change, their impacts, and to work with 
regional decision-makers to support effective long-term (5–40 years) decision-making in the face of 
a changing climate. In particular, it is designed to understand, quantify and reduce the uncertainty in 
the regional climate projections, and, in collaboration with a range of stakeholders, co-develop 
climate change coping options that meet the region’s needs in both urban and rural areas through a 
series of pilot demonstration projects, covering urban water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), rural 
livelihoods, water management, tea production, transport and lake levels … HyCRISTAL’s 
overarching goal will be achieved through the following specific objectives: 
1. Quantify the projections of decision-relevant quantities from state-of-the-art climate models, 
and their uncertainties due to model formulation and due to unknown aerosol-emission and 
land-use scenarios. 
2. Determine the processes most relevant to 5-40 year East African predictions, including the 
effects of convection-dynamics coupling missing in all Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project (CMIP) models, and evaluate their role in models, to quantify the trustworthiness of 
their projections. 
3. Generate cross-level interactions to foster engagement of key stakeholders/decision-makers 
throughout the research process, to enable appropriate use of water, sanitation and 
livelihoods planning tools. 
4. Improve critical knowledge of water availability as well as current and future risks from 
high-impact hydrological events based on the new understanding of future climate. 
5. Translate scientific understanding into appropriate water management and livelihood 
planning tools to enable decision-makers to assess the risk to infrastructure and livelihoods 
from climate change and to support the development of adaptation strategies. 
6. Evaluate new tools and integrated governance mechanisms in pilots, developing livelihood 
benefits within targeted urban and rural communities. 
7. Deliver a comprehensive dissemination and knowledge-sharing campaign to share evidence 
and tools with local decision-makers through to national and regional policy-makers.’ 




diffusion of conflicts and action toward negotiated solutions for stable, adaptive, natural resource-
based economies, over the longer term?  
• Notwithstanding the considerable efforts made to garner government and local authority support 
from national to union (local) levels in this initiative, what further insights could be brought to this 
type of future landscape-level work with an ‘intersectionality’ lens, as described earlier in  
this review? 
• How can inclusive economic development that is climate-compatible and natural resource-based 
reduce the incentive for conflict and curb illicit economies? (Or, where conventional natural 
resource-based livelihoods fail as a result of limits to adaptation, what kinds of alternatives exist 






Box 14  Case study: Analysing the future of ecosystem services and human 
livelihoods in coastal Bangladesh 
 
‘Explaining social outcomes of ecosystem service use within the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta 
requires consideration of (i) the magnitude and mobility of ecosystem services and associated 
populations, (ii) seasonality and other short-term temporal dynamics of ecosystems, (iii) social 
structures such as the debt economy, (iv) capital accumulation and reciprocity in economic relations 
and (v) the distribution issues associated with ownership and access to land and resources such as 
fisheries. These mechanisms are persistent and engrained in social-ecological systems and their 
governance. They have been used to explain the continued presence of poverty, social exclusion and 
patterns of uneven development in many contexts … The social mechanisms are manifest in 
measurable outcomes: notably the material well-being and incomes of populations, their nutritional 
status and health outcomes and, in so-called subjective well-being, how people perceive their present 
and futures’ (Nicholls et al., 2018: 78). 
‘This scientific body of evidence further shows that the well-being and health status of populations 
coming from ecosystem services do not depend on individual elements of ecosystems, but rather on 
bundles of ecosystems that collectively produce desirable and socially useful outcomes. The people, 
ecosystems, services and mechanisms used to access these services together combine to create 
distinct social-ecological systems, unique to each bundle of services’ (ibid.). 
Governing and managing ecosystem services at the landscape scale requires significant trade-offs: 
in the GBM Delta, for example, land use intensification over the past 50 years has significantly 
increased provisioning ecosystem services per capita (e.g. shrimp, rice production), but with a 
concurrent decline in natural habitats and regulating services (e.g. sediment, nutrient flows). 
Salinisation of agricultural lands and the water table poses differing threat levels under differing 
climate change and sea-level rise scenarios to 2100. 
In this instance, and thanks to a multi-million pound UK government investment, analysis of 
differing future climate scenarios with socioeconomic and other environmental flows and 




5.7.5 Economic development opportunities: how could inclusive economic 
development that is climate-compatible and natural resource-based 
reduce the incentive for conflict and curb illicit economies? 
There is relatively little documentation of applied conflict-sensitive approaches in ‘climate-compatible 
development’ including climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and programming (as 
detailed in chapter 6, and below). 
However, significant trends in the literature and areas for future exploration involve the interface of 
rights-based approaches to natural resource management and its economic gains. This includes an 
increasing body of literature in the grey as well as academic realm that evaluates the adequacy of social 
safeguard processes in the design, implementation and monitoring of climate-compatible, natural 
resource-based climate policies and programmes. The key messages emerging from this literature are: 
• Although the requirements of international public funding bodies for implementation of rigorous 
social safeguard procedures for natural resource-based climate projects are deemed to be significant 
and difficult for project developers to comply with, the safeguards nonetheless do not guarantee 
inclusive and equitable outcomes. This includes the meaningful attainment of free, prior and 
informed consent by indigenous peoples to use of their land and water resources for  
climate-related programmes. 
• Similarly, the inclusion of indigenous peoples and other minority rights in a country’s constitution 
and laws does not guarantee that the design and implementation of domestic climate policies will 
be undertaken in ways that cultivate peace, shore up social harmony and decrease conflict. 
• Emergent thinking on realising inclusive and conflict-free economic development through climate-
compatible, natural resource-based programmes is foregrounding the importance of: 
• explicitly supporting human rights-based approaches in the context of climate-compatible 
development (CIEL, 2019), which arguably is a successor to the rights-based livelihoods and 
development approaches of the 1980s to 1990s; 
• recognising that social safeguards mandated by international schemes are too often ‘tick-box’ 
exercises at proposal stage that are not followed through fully to implementation; 
• stakeholder mapping and intentional efforts to improve the workings of ‘multi-level 
governance’ that supports coordination of natural resource allocation, management and use 
across and between both ecosystem units (such as river basins or gazetted forest regions) and 
also administrative territories (such as districts, provinces, traditional authorities’ lands)  
(Muller et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, there is increased understanding of the role of indigenous and local knowledge in FCAC 
in enabling people’s climate resilience. Just as there is increasing evidence of the lack of viability of 
complex mechanisms such as REDD+ in conflict and fragile conditions, there is also growing 
recognition of how simple farmer-to-farmer methods of adapting to and mitigating climate change can 
reach tens or hundreds of thousands of practitioners with far simpler forms of external support. Farmer-
managed natural regeneration in the Sahel is an emblematic example of this (Cameron for CDKN, 
2011), as are a range of adapted traditional water-saving methods that are starting to be widely replicated 
in Africa to underpin agricultural systems in drylands (as described in IPCC, 2019b). 
Some of the most interesting material is emerging from Latin America, and here, REDD+ again provides 
another illustration: Wallbott and Florian Rivero (2018), cited in Peters and Mayhew (2019: 47), find 
that REDD+ schemes in Costa Rica are vulnerable to land grabs, exclusion and conflict escalation. The 
authors posit that REDD+ safeguards are developed internationally and so ‘attention needs to be given 
to how these are realised domestically’. In this case, which may provide inspiration for other conflict-
vulnerable contexts and for follow-up research, a dialogue platform was created to facilitate discussions 
between indigenous communities and the state.  
Similarly, at present in Peru (Huertes Campoverde, 2020), a detailed planning process for implementing 




of indigenous peoples’ and women’s concerns and aspirations as regards climate adaptation and 
mitigation activities, with the goal of decreasing conflict potential and realising widespread benefits. 
New research is needed at the applied, decision-scale level in numerous further cases, as detailed in the 
‘emerging areas’ above on how the implementation of safeguards in adaptation and mitigation 
programming can be achieved for fair, inclusive outcomes that reduce conflict. It is also necessary to 
investigate ‘beyond safeguards’ and interrogate more fully the role of more external modes of support 
in strengthening (domestic) institutions, networks and human capacities for climate-compatible 
development. Research is also needed on how modes of multi-level governance can support forms of 
climate-compatible development that are construed as equitable and fair, including providing enabling 
environments for communities’ peer-to-peer climate resilience efforts even in the absence of well-
functioning state institutions. 
The discussion in chapter 6 on partnerships, community and stakeholder engagement strategies 
(mapping, engagement) and inequality and social justice (power dynamics, inclusivity and 
intersectionality, structural violence and gender) are all relevant and carry over into the natural resources 
domain as areas which merit considerable further research, within and across administrative and 
ecosystem boundaries. These stakeholder and power relationships, including around ethnicity and 
gender, are critical elements of the enabling environments that nurture either peace and stability or 
increased conflict over natural resources where multiple stressors (including climate change) come  
to bear. 
5.7.6 Conflict resolution mechanisms: how can conflict resolution mechanisms help 
manage conflict over climate-stressed natural resources, helping people 
cope with the legacies of violent conflict and strengthening women’s 
roles? 
Strong evidence exists in the academic and grey literature and in policy and practice on the pillars of 
just, legitimate conflict resolution mechanisms over natural resources (which apply whether those 
resources are explicitly climate-stressed or not).  
The foundational components of people’s environmental rights, particularly their rights to the natural 
resources on which they depend, are: 
• access to environmental information; 
• access to public participation in environmental decision-making; 
• access to environmental justice. 
 
These rights are embodied in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration (1992). The third of these, concerning 
adjudication and access to meaningful recourse for justice and conflict resolution over natural resources 
and other aspects of environmental quality, links directly to the typology of conflict-sensitive building 
blocks in the DFID Building Stability Framework, explored earlier.  
Fifteen years ago, governments’ unwillingness to apply Principle 10 in practice led to the formation of 
the Access Initiative, an international network of some 150 civil society organisations, to demand these 
rights. Since then, as described on the Access Initiative website (www.accessinitiative.org) and in a rich 
and extensive academic and grey literature, there has been a persistent worldwide movement to demand 
improvement in access to these rights. Tools and frameworks for demanding and applying these rights 
in specific natural resource management contexts are too broad to review here. However, an indicative 
example is provided from the ESPA research programme (see Box 15). 
Noting that the construction of large dams for irrigation, flood control, hydropower production and 
multiple uses has created particular flashpoints for overt violent conflict, forced migration and 
displacement in the past decades, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) worked in 1999–2000 to 
create consensus on principles and procedures for decision-making in the design and management of 





At the time of the WCD’s final report published in 2000, there were roughly 45,000 large dams 
worldwide defined as over 15 metres high or with a reservoir capacity of more than 3 million m3, and a 
displaced population of between 40 million and 80 million people globally. The WCD’s report presents 
three grounding global norms, five core values, five key decision points, seven strategic priorities, 33 
associated policy principles, and 26 guidelines intended to protect populations whose rights and interests 
have historically been marginalised during large water infrastructure development (and indeed, the 
rights of nature and non-human species), while also delivering widespread and inclusive development 
benefits and diffusing actual or potential for conflict. In reappraising the application of the WCD 
framework 10 years on, Moore et al. (2010) edited a special issue of the journal Water Alternatives. Its 
cross-cutting thematic findings included the following: (a) water and energy demands continue to rise 
and drive dam development; (b) climate change is now a greater driver of dam construction (based on 
aspirations for hydropower to provide a low-carbon energy source); and (c) new financiers are changing 
the loci and framework for decision-making processes. In the wake of the WCD report, water industry 
stakeholders forged ahead in developing operational tools for evaluating options for water resources 
infrastructure (including in integrating climate risk), managing and building dams. These include 
Box 15  Applied framework for reducing natural resource-related conflicts – 
insights from ESPA 
 
The DFID-supported Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation (ESPA) programme funded several 
projects that looked at the required conditions for just, fair, credible, legitimate natural resource 
management in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and brought these together in a cross-cutting 
synthesis project. 
The ESPA researchers posited that protected areas are at the core of efforts to conserve biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. It is recognised that environmental conservation has costs as well as benefits, 
and that these costs are often shouldered by the poorest local communities. In view of this, Aichi 
Target 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity calls for PAs to be ‘effectively and equitably 
managed’. Yet understanding of ‘equitable management’ – and how to achieve it in practice – 
remains elusive. Several ESPA projects worked together to develop a framework to support fair, 
equitable management of PAs. The team responded to a clear policy need, and fed into Convention 
on Biological Diversity policy processes (including being directly cited in a Convention on 
Biological Diversity document), as well as the revision of the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) Green List standards. These culminated in the project ‘Developing a framework 
and tools for enhancing equity and justice in protected area management’, led by Kate Schreckenberg 
in 2015–2016. 
The framework emphasised the need to create and strengthen the following institutions and processes 
for natural resource management: 
• Recognition of rights: recognition is about acknowledging and respecting rights, and the 
diversity of identities, knowledge systems, values and institutions of different actors. 
• Procedural rights: procedure is about participation of actors in decision-making, 
transparency, accountability and processes for dispute resolution. 
• Distributional rights: distribution is about the allocation of benefits across the set of actors, 
and how the costs/burdens experienced by some actors are mitigated. 
 




protocols from the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum (HSAF), the Interdisciplinary Dam 
Assessment Model (IDAM) and others.  
While these technical approaches have gained traction and been widely explored by international 
funding agencies and major corporates, countervailing academic work and NGO investigation 
emphasises the urgent need to keep advancing participation of affected communities in decision-making 
and management processes around water infrastructure, compliance, accountability and performance 
(Moore et al., 2010). Analysts have stressed the need for mechanisms to not only support procedural 
justice but also distributional justice – a theme which is also echoed in the parallel but separate literature 
around application of the Rio Principle 10 discussed earlier. The Water Alternatives special edition 
points to multi-stakeholder platforms as a continued mechanism that shows promise ‘for informing and 
shaping negotiated agreements that result in better sharing of the resources, benefits, and costs 
associated with dams’ (ibid.). 
Indications are that there has been a lack of integrated thinking – and a possible new area of synergy 
and linkage to explore – on how local and national approaches to seeking and applying the ‘access 
principles’ to justice in environmental matters could be applied more consistently to the ‘climate 
solutions and conflict’ arena described in this review paper (see Box 12).  
In the water resources arena specifically, key research questions are:  
• How to move beyond purely ‘minimum standards’ and technical tools in large water infrastructure 
development such as HSAF, IDAM, benefit-cost analyses, etc. – even when these are adequately 
accounting for future climate risk – and integrate these with political ecology analysis which 
explores the social and power relationships between actors and supports negotiated access and use 
solutions? (e.g. through multi-stakeholder platforms) 
• What are the fundamental characteristics of such institutions and processes that can be cultivated in 
particularly fragile and conflict-affected contexts and what are the appropriate nested geographic 
scales in which to do so? 
5.7.7 Regional environments and transboundary management: how to create 
supportive regional environments that enable communities to be more 
resilient to transnational stresses and shocks, including organised crime 
and violent extremist ideologies 
The African Union (AU) has recognised the need for regional attention to peace-building agendas that 
explicitly address climate change and natural resource conflict. This nexus came to the fore at the AU 
Peace and Security Council meeting in May 2018. A press statement of the event issued by Amani 
Africa (2018) draws attention to the Council’s concern around the lack of or weakness of shared 
institutions and mechanisms of conflict resolution and management among different national and 
regional groups. Meanwhile, the AU (2018) press statement confirmed the Council’s emphasis on the 
importance of mainstreaming climate change into all activities by the AU Commission, particularly in 
early warning and prevention of climate change-related conflicts. 
At the same time, there remains weak understanding of the degree to which climate-related factors 
contribute to the escalation of violent conflict in border areas – as compared to other risk factors. For 
instance, a recent investigation by McCullough et al. (2019) interviewed people-smugglers, gold-
smugglers and drug-smugglers in the lawless northern Niger border area, to explore the degree to which 
recurring droughts had driven young men out of pastoralist livelihoods and into higher-risk and more 
violent smuggling operations. The authors conclude:  
Our study shows how, rather than climate change being a dominant driving factor 
behind the proliferation of armed networks in one region, global politics interact 
with trading practices and corruptible state officials in northern Niger to produce 
a political economy that incentivises young people to become smugglers. In the near 
future, threats such as global financial instability, market volatility, increasing 




impact on the proliferation of armed groups in northern Niger than climate 
variability and change. A strategic intervention to address insecurity in northern 
Niger would account for global political and economic threats, and identify ways in 
which those threats can be managed to promote sustainable livelihoods that don’t 
need to be armed protection: global financial stability, market volatility and climate 
change intersect and need to be treated as part of a complex system. (ibid: 7)  
Indeed, the research found that over-attention to climate-related factors, including climate change as a 
threat multiplier, shifts focus (and action on accountability) from international criminal gangs and 
Nigerien officials complicit in illegal and dangerous trade. Furthermore, such a misplaced focus may 
divert military security interventions in areas that hamper rather than facilitate local people’s ability to 
pursue climate-resilient development. Taking a broader, risk-informed development approach in 
internal and transboundary contexts is more useful in steering external investment and support (Opitz-
Stapleton et al., 2017). 
 
Box 16  The need to create and test mechanisms to avert conflict in the face of 
rapidly changing coastal-marine and cryosphere risks 
 
In coastal areas, choosing and putting in place measures to respond to sea-level rise presents tough 
governance challenges and potentially difficult social choices. There are uncertainties about the 
degree and impact of sea-level rise beyond 2050, and the impacts could fall unequally on different 
social groups. For example, the economics may favour investing in coastal defences to protect 
densely populated urban centres with concentrated wealth as opposed to less densely populated rural 
areas with more marginalised populations. Investment choices will be highly political and will need 
to be navigated carefully. 
In spite of this, there are methods for developing and analysing options that are designed to deal with 
future uncertainty. These methods emphasise: 
• keeping the ability to be flexible over time 
• using criteria to gauge robustness and to establish the usefulness of investments across a 
range of circumstances 
• adjusting decisions periodically as consequences become known 
• considering social vulnerability and equity  
• creating safe community spaces for public deliberation of options and conflict resolution 
(IPCC, 2019c: chapter 4). 
Participatory scenario-building processes, collaborative landscape planning and co-design of 
ecosystem-based management are all promising, emerging approaches for engaging people on low-
lying islands and coasts, enabling them to work together to develop future adaptation scenarios and 
climate resilience (ibid.). 
With reference both to climate change-related risks in both coastal-marine environments and the 
cryosphere (frozen ecological systems) the IPCC’s Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in 
a Changing Climate finds with high confidence that: ‘the capacity of governance systems to respond 
to climate change impacts has strengthened recently but this development is not sufficiently rapid or 





It is evident that significant climate–natural resource–conflict links (and their multiple feedback loops) 
are of a regional nature: not state-on-state but affecting border areas and competition for scarce resources 
or displacement of peoples on the basis of degraded resources, in sub-national areas between states. The 
potential benefits for improved regional understanding and action are increasingly openly recognised 
by political leaders: particularly in Sahelian Africa, and Central and South Asia. However, much of the 
literature until recently has been based on single-country studies in FCAC. There is a strong need for 




5.7.8 Recommendations for new research on migration 
This chapter has included a dedicated, rapid review of migration issues and suggestions for further 
research as a cross-cutting issue in the natural resources–climate–conflict–fragility space, in response 
to DFID and IDRC’s request. 
How do we progress a research agenda, in light of the contested and unclear evidence base and multiple 
policy agendas concerning climate change and migration? Our review suggests that research agendas 
and research-into-policy and practice could most productively focus on accumulating and testing the 
empirical evidence for adaptation in situ (for potential migrants) and support to migrants in their 
eventual destinations that is appropriate, sustainable (which inherently assumes flexibility) and avoids 
maladaptation. Policy pointers by Waldinger and Fankhauser (2015), for example, provide a 
springboard for further empirical investigation. 
Noting that ‘planned, proactive migration may be a necessary and effective response to climate risks’ 
and that ‘uncoordinated distress migration is a sign of adaptation failure’, policy measures to support 
effective in situ adaptation or out-migration, and which could be tested for their effectiveness over time 
and avoidance of maladaptation include the following (adapted from Waldinger and Fankhauser,  
2015: 7; our further caveats and emphases in italics):  
• Providing sufficient information about the costs and benefits of migrating, including psychological 
and social, along with more clarity about alternative adaptation options.  
• Releasing credit constraints, to offset the up-front costs incurred by potential migrants, particularly 
high in areas with poor transportation infrastructure (and scrutinising and addressing gender- and 
other socially related discriminatory hurdles to overcome).  
Box 17  Emergent good practices in transboundary climate risk management 
 
‘Climate change requires action across national boundaries. Climate risks—both slow-onset and 
more extreme events—are already displacing people both within countries and across borders, and 
require planned relocation efforts. Other transboundary climate issues relate to natural resource use, 
such as watersheds, and trade. Institutional models exist to improve planning, reduce tensions, learn 
from others, and use science and technology in finding solutions. A few examples are: 
(a) the West Africa Coastal Areas Management Program (WACA), a World Bank-financed 
multicountry program that addresses problems with cross-border climate impacts; 
(b) the Seeds without Borders initiative, which supports how neighbouring countries improve 
agricultural productivity and resilience in the face of increasing natural disasters.’ 





• Improving institutional quality to ensure the incentives to migrate are not reduced, in particular in 
the context of land tenure security when people are not able to sell their land or are not confident of 
reclaiming it upon return. 
• Putting in place safeguards against distress migration – for example, in the event of conflict, which 
can force people to choose sub-optimal migration strategies, leading to maladaptation.  
• Supporting the areas affected by outward migration by promoting links between migrants and their 
region of origin; ‘managed retreat’ from severely affected regions may be a last resort if they 
become inhospitable.  
• Supporting the absorptive capacity of the receiving jurisdictions, in particular urban labour markets 
and public services, to manage the socioeconomic implications of the arrival of migrants in a  
new destination.  
• Directing migrants away from environmentally vulnerable areas where they move to for different 
reasons, as is the case in Senegal where more than 40% of new migrant populations are located in 
high-risk flood zones.  
Future policy and practice would be productively informed by action research agendas to illuminate 
how such policies and forms of external support (and internal self-help) are working now. Further, 
transdisciplinary research focused on emergent policy and programme interventions would be helpful, 
even without the need to forensically define the contribution of climate variability or change as a 
standalone factor in migration, but recognising that climate factors, together with resource scarcity or 
abundance, contribute both risks and assets, alongside people’s other risks. Such research could also 
investigate the relevance of gender, age, physical (dis)ability, economic capital, education/literacy and 
skill levels, social networks and relationships to the reasons for people’s mobility or decision to stay in 

















6 Impacts of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation 
programmes on conflict 
 
This chapter reviews and summarises the available information, evidence and gaps on the impact of 
climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and programmes on conflict, exploring:  
• how these programmes and policies can exacerbate conflict  
• how they can be designed to enhance cooperation and collaboration  
• what tools and guidelines (conflict-sensitive and ‘do no harm’ approaches) have been developed to 
assist programme implementers, policy-makers, governments and other decision-makers to make 
appropriate and informed decisions. 
 
6.1 State of the evidence and trends 
 
Over the past 20 years, there have been several parallel discourses related to climate change, adaptation, 
and mitigation in FCAC. In the past 10 years, these have converged around the nexus of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation (CCAM) in FCAC. Before 2008, the main body of literature was largely 
separated by sector, with overlaps and synergies beginning to emerge across the sectors in the discourse 
from 2014 onwards. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a growing acknowledgement that policies and programmes 
in FCAC can exacerbate conflict, particularly around humanitarian and development interventions 
(Africa Peace Forum et al., 2004). The do no harm approach was adapted and developed for 
humanitarian action by Mary Anderson in the 1990s as an approach to working effectively in conflict-
affected situations (Anderson, 1999). It was then extended into development and other sectors and 
evolved into the concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ (Africa Peace Forum et al., 2004). At this stage, most 
conflict-sensitive literature was related to humanitarian, development and livelihood programming 
(Garred, 2007; Haider, 2014). 
Early IPCC reports noted that conflict stresses can increase vulnerability to climate change by reducing 
resilience, as well as reducing adaptive capacity because of resource deployment to competing needs 
(see chapter 5). However, they could not consider how adaptation or mitigation – whether spontaneous 
and taken on an individual level or planned interventions deployed by governments or NGOs – could 
exacerbate conflict, given the limited evidence, or that approaches need to be conflict-sensitive in fragile 
contexts, until the more recent assessments (IPCC, 2007; 2014); the IPCC special report on climate 
change and land (2019b) acknowledges the literature on how ill-conceived and implemented land-based 
mitigation policies can exacerbate conflict (see chapter 5 for more details). 
Since 2010 there has been a growth in awareness that CCAM programming and policies have 
exacerbated (or could) exacerbate conflict if not adapted appropriately (Smith and Vivekananda, 2009; 




has been a growing body of anecdotal evidence and case study examples of where CCAM policies and 
programming have exacerbated conflict (Huesca-Pérez et al., 2018; Schilling et al., 2018a; Wallbott and 
Florian-Rivero, 2018). However, there is also a growing body of evidence of where actors have adapted 
CCAM policies and programmes to be conflict sensitive, ensuring that their work does not exacerbate 
conflict (Smith and Vivekananda, 2015; Peters and Vivekananda, 2014; Cordaid and IIRR, 2011; 
Twining-Ward et al., 2018; Nagarajan et al., 2018). 
Specific guidance for adapting and implementing CCAM policies and programmes in FCAC is limited 
(Smith and Vivekananda, 2015; Peters and Vivekananda, 2014). However, actors working on CCAM 
in FCAC have been able to draw from existing good practices on conflict sensitivity and working in 
FCAC (Peters and Vivekananda, 2014; Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018). Some have drawn on institutional 
approaches to applying conflict sensitivity across diverse sectors – for example, DFID’s Conflict 
Sensitivity Consortium, which brought together 36 humanitarian, development and peace-building 
agencies to apply conflict sensitivity across all sectors of their work (CSC, 2012). 
 
6.2 Evidence of DRR, climate change adaptation and mitigation 
programming and policies exacerbating conflict 
 
This section synthesises selected literature on how CCAM programming has exacerbated conflict (see 
Box 18). Literature related to land use, irrigation, agriculture and other forms of natural resource 
management, including aspects of mitigation (biofuels, forestry) was discussed in chapter 5. 
DRR and linked climate change adaptation strategies and national plans are considered the foundation 
stone of formal governance mechanisms for national government agencies – setting out a plan of action 
and the means through which to achieve it, to protect citizens against current and future disaster risk. 
Such plans also ‘act as an instrument for holding governments to account for their actions (or inactions)’ 
(Peters, 2019a: 21). Despite gaps in the data – suggesting that more investment is required for 
monitoring the current status and effectiveness of disaster-related policies, strategies and legislative 
frameworks in conflict contexts – it is well recognised that conflict and post-conflict contexts are least 
likely to have updated DRR strategies in place, and where they do exist, ‘there is a disconnect between 
people’s lived experiences of intersecting disaster and conflict risk and recognition of the dynamic 
conditions of conflict in policy documents’ (Peters, 2019a: 21). Thus, what has not yet been explored 
are the ways in which conditions of violence, conflict and fragility (such as those described previously) 
shape changing patterns of vulnerability and exposure, and can or should be integrated into the design 
of DRR or linked climate change adaptation – strategies. 
A conflict sensitivity-focused review conducted for USAID found ‘a very limited number of useful and 
reasonably recent case studies that document use, application, and uptake of conflict-sensitivity among 
donors and implementing agencies’ (Goldwyn, 2016: 4). Case study evidence specifically focusing on 
the impact of Climate Change Adaptation programming on conflict is even more limited. Nevertheless, 
there is consensus across the wider literature that all work in FCAC has potential to cause conflict, and 
this will include CCAM programming (Rüttinger et al., 2015; IPCC, 2014; Gilley and Kinsella, 2015). 
Case studies and lessons can be drawn from a wider range of areas of programming where there is more 
literature – for example, livelihoods, humanitarian aid (Zicherman et al., 2011), or on the impact of 
businesses on conflict, particularly in extractives or agri-business (Orsini and Cleland, 2018). 
From a programming perspective, the evidence base on the intersection between CCAM and conflict is 
relatively thin. One exception is a BRACED review (Neaverson et al., 2019), which argues that 
BRACED projects faced the ‘double vulnerability’ of working in countries susceptible to both climate-
related disasters and political instability and violent conflict. The review notes that it is not only a case 
of climate factors amplifying existing vulnerabilities and insecurities; there may also be ‘negative 




stresses due to an increased vulnerability and reduced capacity of both communities and the state to 
effectively deal with climate change’ (Crawford et al., 2015: 5). 
The BRACED review found that projects’ operational realities meant that space for resilience-building 
activities in times of crisis was often reduced, which meant that humanitarian activities had to take 
precedence over longer-term, climate-resilient development activities. In 2016, such conflict over 
natural resources between pastoralists and farmers led to the BRACED Livestock Mobility project 
suspending routine resilience-building activities in one operating area in Burkina Faso, switching 





Box 18  Summary of evidence on climate change adaptation and mitigation that 
exacerbates conflict 
 
There are several discourses in the climate change adaptation and mitigation (CCAM) literature on 
how CCAM can exacerbate conflict: 
• Distribution of resources can change power dynamics in highly political contexts. This can 
reinforce patterns of control and exclusion, worsening inequalities, and can have significant 
impacts on the least visible groups in society. 
• CCAM strategies focusing on natural resource management can lead to increased insecurity 
of land tenure, marginalisation of minority groups, increased environmental degradation and 
loss of biodiversity, and accelerated climate change. These are all underlying points of 
tension that can exacerbate conflict (see chapter 5 on natural resource management  
and conflict). 
• There is a risk that CCAM funding and policies can be exploited or biased by elite groups 
and those in power. 
• Adaptation measures can have transboundary implications that can increase potential for 
conflict over shared resources (see chapter 5). 
Specific studies evidencing CCAM impacts in FCAC include the following: 
• Zhang (2015) found that climate change adaptation strategies favoured the politically 
dominant members of society, increasing inequalities in some Asia-Pacific  
urban environments. 
• In Aceh, Indonesia, a CCAM REDD initiative inadvertently exacerbated recent and 
historical political tensions (Levine et al., 2014). 
• Rüttinger et al. (2015) and Levine et al. (2014) reviewed Uganda and Ethiopia’s CCAM 
policies and found that they would likely increase marginalisation because policies were 
politically driven by those in power. Both policies would have ‘significant consequences 
for people’s ability (or right) to continue current rangeland management strategies, with 
further implications for land rights, cultural identity and relations between citizens and the 
state’ (Levine et al., 2014: 10). 
• Woods (2015) found that CCAM projects and large-scale land deals exacerbated and 





The non-BRACED project, Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts, 
led by Christian Aid, suspended its natural resource management activities in Kenya during the 2016 
drought. Meanwhile, changing rainfall patterns, increasing drought, and resource scarcity, coupled with 
impacts such as migration, food insecurity and market disruption, are thought to have contributed to 
violent conflict involving pastoralists and farmers (Mobjörk et al., 2016: 8). 
CCAM interventions can exacerbate conflict or fragility in various ways. Any assistance distributes 
resources (tangible and intangible) and changes power dynamics (intentionally and unintentionally) and 
as such can never be neutral (UNDP, 2017). By operating in FCAC, ‘donors and investors become 
inherently part of the political marketplace’ (Grawert, 2018: 3; Hoffman, 2014); assumptions that 
businesses can operate as non-political agents in highly political contexts have been proven wrong 
(Ganson and Wennmann, 2015). In developing contexts, interventions may mean that inequalities can 
be worsened or improved; in FCAC, where governance structures and institutions are often weak, 
interventions can worsen conflict or support peace (Sieghart et al., 2018). Stakeholders who are likely 
to experience significant impacts can be the least visible (International Alert, 2019). If development 
assistance is not conflict sensitive, it can reinforce patterns of control and exclusion (UNDP, 2017). 
There is acknowledgement that ‘As climate adaptation and mitigation policies are more broadly 
implemented, the risks of unintended negative effects – particularly in fragile contexts – will also 
increase’ (Rüttinger et al., 2015: 10). 
Unintended consequences of CCAM can include: 
… increased insecurity of land tenure, marginalization of minority groups, 
increased environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity, and accelerated 
climate change. These unforeseen effects often arise due to the lack of cross-sectoral 
coordination and, in the case of fragile and conflict-affected situations, the lack of 
conflict-sensitive implementation of policies and programs. (Rüttinger et al., 2015)  
There are multiple instances in the literature where work that is not inclusive has led to exacerbated 
conflict (UNDP, 2017).  
UNESCAP (2018a) highlights a gap in developing transboundary early warning systems that are 
conflict sensitive. Currently, early warning systems often fail to address conflict and fragility, especially 
in cross-border displacement cases where the systems do not include cross-border migrants. 
A lack of conflict-sensitive approaches is also a problem in post-disaster contexts. Analysing the impact 
of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on Sri Lanka, Kikuta (2019) finds that it was not the destruction of 
houses by the tsunami, but the infusion of post-disaster housing reconstruction and emergency aid that 
have increased conflict. The author suggests that parties may have resorted to violence to either shift 
those funds to accumulate power, or to prevent shifts in existing balances of power from occurring. 
Several studies point to the potential of climate mitigation approaches and new technologies to lead to 
conflict. Analysing deployment of ‘conventional’ renewable energy, Huesca-Pérez et al. (2018) point 
to opposition from communities in Oaxaca, Mexico, for the deployment of wind energy in a perceived 
top-down fashion with little consultation. Similarly, Schilling et al. (2018a) point to tensions between 
communities and wind farm companies and a general lack of wind park development in Africa. Both 
studies highlight the disillusionment of local populations over employment opportunities as the main 
driver of conflict. 
Hunsberger et al. (2018) have explored the dynamics of resource conflicts related to biofuel production 
and water irrigation projects centred on mitigation and adaptation measures in Cambodia. They 
conclude that ‘climate change strategies are now deeply entangled with resource conflicts in the greater 
Aural region’ (ibid: 309). 
Commenting on the promise of solar radiation management technologies to mitigate climate change, 
Mayer (2018) posits that future applications risk mirroring current power dynamics in climate 




more political power. Halstead (2018) points out that the governance of such technology is inadequate 
in the current international system, and highlights a gap in geoengineering research that focuses on 
security rather than environmental aspects, to better understand the risks of tensions between states in 
the use of such technology. 
Analysing REDD+ forestry conservation initiatives for climate mitigation, Duker et al. (2019), 
Sunderlin et al. (2018), Hein et al. (2018), and Froese and Schilling (2019) find that REDD+ has not 
addressed land tenure and indigenous rights adequately if at all, nor have countries done so in their 
INDCs. This has led to conflictual situations and maladaptation, which has impacted already 
marginalised groups in particular (see chapter 5). 
Although there is limited evidence of negative impacts of lack of inclusivity specifically for climate 
change programming, similar evidence is available from livelihood programming. In some Asia-Pacific 
urban environments, climate adaptation strategies related to employment and housing were found to 
favour the politically dominant members of society as they require technical or scientific knowledge, 
thus disadvantaging poorer members of society and further increasing inequalities (Zhang, 2015). 
In Nepal, work supposedly contributing to peace through inclusive livelihoods prioritised vertical 
inclusion (inclusion of the poorest households) and inclusion in terms of gender. However, other 
horizontal areas of inequality or exclusion (ethnicity, religion, caste) were not considered, despite the 
well-known importance of horizontal inequality in driving Nepal’s conflicts:  
Many livelihoods groups were formed by NGOs in ways that actually excluded 
poorer or marginalised community members, or those unable to absorb the 
opportunity costs of taking part, such as mothers of young children. Better-off 
women and members of marginalised groups were more easily able to participate, 
while poorer – i.e. more marginalised – people from the same groups were not. 
Local power hierarchies in communities affected community projects, meaning 
people already marginalised in their communities were less able to participate or 
benefit. In some cases, political interference directed livelihood project 
opportunities towards political allies. (International Alert, 2019: 5)  
This led to increased frustration on the part of community stakeholders, undermining their optimism 
about the future, and reinforcing their sense of grievance.  
In Myanmar, humanitarian assistance was provided overwhelmingly to Muslims in camps for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) following the violence between Muslim and ethnic Rakhine communities in 
2012; this sparked a backlash against international agencies as the dispersal of aid was perceived as 
unjust and biased by the ethnic Rakhine communities, given their own long-standing poverty  
(UNDP, 2017). 
Programming can exacerbate fragility and conflict when there is a lack of consultation. A review of 
livelihood programming in Nepal found that a lack of public consultation and perceived political 
interference and corruption bred resentment, undermining intended impacts ‘by damaging public 
confidence that governance arrangements were working in their interests’ (International Alert, 2019: 5). 
Interventions that oversimplify conflict context and fail to account for both temporal and spatial 
variations, complexity, and changes in conflict and fragility contexts can often result in insensitive 
approaches that can exacerbate conflict. 
Work that does not consider the history of conflict, including changes over time and underlying tensions, 
can exacerbate tensions (CSC, 2012). In Aceh, Indonesia, a ‘failure to understand post-conflict political 
dynamics undermined a climate related initiative and may have inadvertently exacerbated underlying 
political tensions’ (Levine et al., 2014: 5). Disagreements over decision-making, over legal rights and 
over control of finances led to withdrawal of investment and exacerbated tension between different 
government actors, which led to a breakdown in relations between these actors, which became a focal 




A lack of understanding of the spatial differences in conflict situations, including sub-national or local 
variations and transboundary impacts, can oversimplify understanding of the context (CSC, 2012). 
Rüttinger et al. (2015) studied the national climate change adaptation policies in Uganda and Ethiopia, 
noting how political interests can drive particular adaptation policies that can have differential benefits 
on groups who are already politically marginalised. A lack of explicit consideration of the overlap 
between adaptation policies and existing low-level conflict can increase tension and insecurity (ibid.). 
This emphasises the importance of including political interests at the centre of analysis, otherwise a 
climate change adaptation agenda can contribute to conflict. 
Similarly, transboundary impacts on conflict dynamics need to be considered – for example, impacts 
related to transboundary water resource management (see chapter 5): 
Adaptation measures of an up-river community could result in water scarcity in the 
down-river community, increasing chances for conflict over the shared resource. 
Also, interventions to rehabilitate rangeland to adapt to climate change could 
potentially contribute to conflict if there isn’t clarity and buy-in from communities 
and adherence to local laws, customs and social arrangements, about who is able 
to use and benefit from the land. (Sieghart et al., 2018: 4) 
There is some literature that considers how timing, and rushed investment (not allowing enough time 
for careful analysis), can exacerbate conflict. In Myanmar:  
many interviewees shared examples where they felt international donors had 
interpreted Myanmar’s democratic transition or peace process too positively and 
initiated investments and development projects in conflict-affected areas too 
quickly. They found that these efforts were not mindful of the fragility of the 
transition and peace processes, and risked marginalizing local stakeholders and 
communities, and triggering new or increased conflicts, for example over natural 
resources and land. (UNDP, 2017: 21) 
The literature has numerous examples of programming that is peace insensitive, meaning that they were 
missing opportunities to consolidate peace. Conflict-unaware programming often has insufficient 
analysis of or monitoring of conflict to track any of its own negative impacts on conflict. Analysis of 
livelihood programming in Nepal concluded that most was ‘neither explicitly designed to improve 
stability and consolidate peace, nor based on a thorough analysis of contextual power and conflict 
dynamics. As “peace insensitive” initiatives, therefore, they risked having a negative impact on stability’ 
(International Alert, 2019: 5). 
 
6.3 Climate finance for adaptation in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts 
 
Our review did not find significant evidence on the amount, modalities and outcomes of climate 
adaptation finance targeting FCAC. This is likely a reflection of the status of development of climate 
security as a field of study and in international fora. Interviews with experts have highlighted two 
ongoing studies analysing this issue that will be published in early 2020 (see Box 19). Both studies are 
initial contributions to understanding how to improve financial flows to address the challenges at the 






6.4 Finance for disaster risk reduction in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts 
 
Despite current and future trends in hazard-related disaster impacts, financing for DRR is notoriously 
low, and has been for decades – as revealed by a 20-year review of disaster finance (Kellett and 
Caravani, 2013). DRR as part of development assistance has been moderate (Watson et al., 2015). This 
is despite the reality of increasing direct and indirect losses due to disasters, disaster mortality being 
increasingly concentrated in developing countries, and increased frequency of disaster events – a trend 
that is likely to continue (IPCC, 2012). Available funding is just a fraction of overall aid finance and 
largely ex-post, undermining the preventive ambition of risk reduction work (Watson et al., 2015). 
Numerous cost-benefit analyses have been conducted with varying findings, but all showing substantial 
benefits in ex-ante vs ex-post spending. The 2014 World Development Report suggests the benefit is 
Box 19  Climate adaptation financing in fragile and conflict-affected contexts 
 
The Environmental Law Institute is analysing investments in the Global Environment Fund (GEF), 
inquiring whether these have included conflict-sensitive design and implementation and looking at 
correlations with project and programme outcomes. The analysis is carried out at the GEF global 
portfolio level, which includes both climate and other environmental projects. Seven projects 
affected by conflicts are selected for further deep dive analysis, including those in Colombia, 
Lebanon, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mali and two transboundary situations – East Africa and the 
Balkans. The study analyses the barriers and seeks to understand how conflict-sensitive 
considerations can be better incorporated in GEF projects.  
Early findings identified four categories of projects based on their level of conflict sensitivity: (1) 
projects that are aware of the conflict context but do not incorporate it in design; (2) those avoiding 
the conflict (for instance, by programming in a different part of the country); (3) those actively 
managing conflict risks through local ownership; and (4) those that provide opportunities to bring 
different actors for risk management together (for instance, for conflict involving water  
or livelihoods). 
Mercy Corps is analysing OECD DAC bilateral and multilateral (climate funds and development 
banks) official development assistance (ODA) flows for climate adaptation purposes to countries 
that are highly fragile and exposed to climate hazards as per USAID’s definition (see Moran et al., 
2018). Some of the themes the research is seeking to explore includes: 
• understanding how much climate adaptation funding is reaching the most fragile and 
climate-exposed countries 
• the pace of commitment and disbursement 
• whether the amount of finance is adequate to meet countries’ needs 
• whether these financial flows are going into risky projects and areas, or if they are just 
targeting ‘low-hanging fruits’ 
• the barriers to access these funds. 




between 4 and 36 times greater than the cost for early warning systems alone (World Bank, 2014). ODI 
conducted a number of quantitative analyses on DRR financing in the early 2010s but this data and 
analysis requires updating.   
Furthermore, sources of DRR finance are varied, which adds further complexity, as international aid 
finance can be channelled through a range of sectors or parts of the risk management cycle, as can 
domestic and private finance. Of the data that exists on international aid finance, we know that ‘more is 
done to support preparedness and recovery than to understand the underlying vulnerabilities that lead to 
disasters’ (Watson et al., 2015: 3). This may partly explain why evidence on the role of climate and 
conflict in disaster vulnerability and exposure has been lacking, and requires substantive  
further research. 
More recent analysis finds that 58% of disaster deaths took place in the world’s 30 most fragile states 
between 2004 and 2014, and figures of people affected are often unreported or vastly under-reported, 
suggesting that the real impacts are much greater (Peters and Budimir, 2016: 5). In a quantitative study 
at the global level, Marktanner et al. (2015) found disaster deaths to be 40% higher in locations with a 
history of armed conflict, compared to locations without. The reasons are varied, relating to conflict 
conditions increasing exposure and vulnerability to natural hazards – including displacement, reducing 
coping capacity, disrupted social networks, and insufficient state disaster risk management capacities – 
owing in part to limited financial and technical resources. It has been well documented that high-impact 
disaster events are devastating for those affected and costly for the international community – between 
2005 and 2010, for every $100 spent on humanitarian response in fragile states, only $1.30 was spent 
on DRR (Peters and Budimir, 2016: 12). Analysis of climate-related disasters shows a similar story, 
with 55% of climate-related disaster deaths in Asia between 1997 and 2016 occurring in the region’s 
four most fragile countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh) (Peters, 2018: 7). 
Much of the literature on DRR finance around the beginning of the 2010s calls for or anticipates that 
climate adaptation funds will help address the shortfall. Given the similarities between some aspects of 
climate change adaptation and DRR, this is common sense. Indeed, in 2014, 42% of adaptation funding 
was found to include a DRR component (Nakhooda et al., 2014, in Watson et al., 2015: 8). However, 
the eligibility criteria of some climate funds are dissuading access and use by governments in contexts 
affected by fragility and conflict; ‘An added challenge is that many countries do not have the systems 
set up to absorb and effectively utilise climate finance; as the GAIN [Global Adaptation Initiative] 
Readiness index shows, those countries are largely fragile and conflict affected’ (Peters and Budimir, 
2016: 14). Though somewhat dated, figures suggest that 28% of adaptation finance is allocated to FCAC 
(when tracked multilateral adaptation finance totalled $751 million), a proportion of which is likely to 
be spent on DRR-related activities (ibid.). More detailed and up-to-date analysis is required of the 
figures, and impact.  
Perception of inappropriate use of funding can drive conflict, either linked to inequality in targeting or 
to exploitation by elite groups (Levine et al., 2014). There are also risks that climate change funds may 
encourage elite groups to exploit funding for their own benefit (Peters and Vivekananda, 2014). For 
example, in Mali, there are reports of embezzlement of drought relief funds by some government 
officials, contributing to grievances between the central government and the Tuareg community 
(Benjaminsen, 2008). 
It must be noted that reviewed data are limited in their capacity to provide information for climate 
security analysis in their present form. Apart from ongoing challenges of quality and consistency 
between these sources, no internationally agreed methodology exists to define, track and report ‘climate 
security activities’ akin to the Rio Markers developed by the OECD DAC to ‘tag’ mitigation and 
adaptation activities in climate finance flows. This means that the data reporting systems of institutions 
providing climate finance data are not designed to track and report this information (either at all or in a 





There is also a wider, ongoing discussion as to what climate security finance is. As noted by Born et al. 
(2019: 4):  
The systemic nature of climate-related security risks makes financing challenging. 
Funding is often siloed, which hinders integrated responses. ‘Climate security’ is 
not a budget line item and responses take other, often multiple, labels such as 
resilience, climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, peacebuilding and 
development.  
Speaking of the multilateral climate funds, an interviewed expert noted that their funding flows (around 
$2 billion per year) are insufficient to address climate issues, let alone conflict, and therefore caution is 
needed when stressing the importance of these financial flows to address conflict. Three interviewees 
agreed that developing dedicated climate security finance streams would not be helpful, as ‘proper 
development work’ would address the root causes of conflict in development, suggesting mainstreaming 
conflict sensitivity and climate security in existing funding mechanisms from the climate, humanitarian, 
DRR, peace-building, trade and investment, and development sectors. 
 
6.5 Gaps in the climate change adaptation and mitigation evidence 
base and priority research questions 
 
Overall, the literature emphasises the shortage of case studies or evidence on CCAM being applied with 
conflict sensitivity in FCAC as there are only a small number of publications in the literature specifically 
on CCAM in FCAC (Peters and Vivekananda, 2014;  Zhang, 2015; UNDP, 2017).  
The majority of CCAM case studies in FCAC are in East Asia and Africa, with a few summary 
publications in MENA and the Arab states. More research is needed to widen both the geographical 
scope and the depth of evidence for applied conflict-sensitive approaches to CCAM in FCAC. 
Key priorities to address include: improved consideration of conflict dynamics within CCAM 
programmes; improved familiarity with conflict-sensitivity concepts and tools by DRR and climate 
change adaptation actors; donor leadership in mandating and enabling conflict sensitivity in 
programmes and institutions (Peters and Vivekananda, 2015); and increased recording of evidence of 
instances where conflict-insensitive programming has negative outcomes (Zhang, 2015). 
Given existing consensus on the importance of conflict sensitivity across all actions in FCAC, more 
emphasis can be placed on evidence of CCAM programmes applying conflict sensitivity, flashpoints 
where conflict and CCAM are most likely to overlap, and case studies of programme adaptations based 
on conflict sensitivity. This process can learn from case studies of programme adaptations (CSC, n.d.) 
as well as from efforts to monitor and evaluate conflict sensitivity (Goldwyn and Chigas, 2013). Focused 
CCAM conflict-sensitivity case studies can provide detail and nuance in understanding the climate–
conflict relationship in specific countries or regions, as well as helping donors and practitioners better 
understand where CCAM programmes need to give particular attention to conflict. Research can also 
assess the integration of conflict-sensitive thinking and practice within organisations, identifying how 
best this can be strengthened at an institutional level (UNDP, 2017) in organisations focusing on  
CCAM programming. 
Research gap: gender, inequality and structural violence impacts on climate change adaptation 
and mitigation  
The literature recognises the need to better understand gender, structural violence and marginalisation 
when applying conflict sensitivity to CCAM projects. This would be a valuable lesson to take into future 
research and implementation work for CCAM in FCAC. Priority areas for gathering evidence include: 
the drivers of sub-national conflict and marginalisation in new and evolving contexts; the ways in which 




to design gender-sensitive peace-building interventions that address the specific needs of women. There 
is also a need to enhance the understanding of gender to be more nuanced, and to consider gendered 
perspectives on the experiences of men and boys in conflict (International Alert et al., 2019; Saferworld, 
2019; Seng Lawn and Naujaks, 2018).  
Research can also analyse the ways in which policy options – for example, relating to natural resource 
management, impacts on CCAM and peace-building – need further analysis (Peters and Vivekananda, 
2014). Additional research is also needed to improve the understanding of the complex interaction of 
social and ecological domains and the spill-over effects caused by land-based climate change adaptation 
projects, such as biofuel production, forest conservation, or hydroelectric projects, and their potential 
implications for increasing conflict susceptibility (Hunsberger and Ponte, 2015) as well as further 
research on the adequacy of existing social and environmental safeguarding systems in internationally, 
publicly funded projects (see chapter 5 for more detail). 
Peters and Vivekananda (2014: 25) also suggest a need for further research to delineate ‘main areas and 
investments that can mitigate conflict linked to climate change, such as: 
• Institutions and natural resource management governance: clarification of land rights and 
tenure, dispute resolution processes and harmonization of laws; 
• Sustainable livelihoods: diversification, insurance, support for mitigation and mobility,  
early warning; 
• Rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems and improved management: to improve/increase the 
supply of natural resources through management, more efficient use of natural resources and 
rehabilitation of degraded areas.’  
 
6.6 Priority questions around financing climate change adaptation 
and mitigation and climate security in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts  
 
Synthesising our findings on the current evidence on climate security finance has led to some critical 
questions that need to be addressed. 
How do we define climate security finance? 
• How do we assess if a project or programme activity addresses climate security? 
• What challenges would institutions face to track this information, and how can we overcome  
those challenges? 
What are the volumes and dynamics of current financial flows addressing climate security in 
fragile and conflict-affected contexts? 
• How much climate adaptation finance is reaching the most fragile and climate-exposed countries? 
• How much of the other financial flows (i.e. humanitarian, DRR, peace-building, trade and 
investment, development) is reaching the most fragile and climate-exposed countries? 
• Which countries are actively targeting the most fragile and conflict-affected countries? How? 
• What is the pace of commitment and disbursement of this funding? 
• Are the flows adequate to the needs of targeted countries? 
• Are these financing flows consistent over time, predictable and reliable? (How can we make 
humanitarian finance address longer time frames than is usual?) 
• What kind of assistance or activities (e.g. capacity-building, readiness support, infrastructure) is this 





What are the barriers to increasing climate security financing targeting fragile and conflict-
affected countries? 
• What are the barriers that fragile and conflict-affected countries face in accessing these financing 
mechanisms? (e.g. Are fiduciary requirements too high for governments?) 
• Which and how many entities from fragile and conflict-affected countries are accredited to access 
these funding mechanisms? Is there a trend? 
• How should lending instruments (e.g. debt vs grants) be deployed based on the level of country risk 
and project risk? 
• How do we increase the risk appetite of existing funding mechanisms to target more fragile and 
conflict-affected countries? Do internal mechanisms exist in these institutions to channel funding 
to those countries? 
What are the outcomes and effectiveness of this funding? 
• Are these financial flows targeting risky projects and areas? 
• Is this funding reaching individuals and institutions at the local level? 
 
6.7  Recommendations for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation in fragile and conflict-affected contexts 
 
Climate change adaptation interventions ideally should be conflict sensitive, ensuring that they do no 
harm and where, appropriate, positively contribute to peace (see Box 20). However, as discussed earlier, 
the capacities, resources and objectives of implementing groups influence the conflict sensitivity and 




There is limited guidance on how to conflict-proof climate adaptation programmes (see Boxes 21 and 
22) (Rüttinger et al., 2015). However, Peters and Vivekananda (2014) argue that a new toolkit for 
conflict sensitivity CCAM is not needed: instead, donors, policy-makers and practitioners need to 
commit to applying existing political economy and conflict-sensitive approaches. CCAM programmes 
Box 20  Case study: Integrating conflict sensitivity into adaptation in Africa 
 
A workshop on integrating conflict sensitivity into adaptation programming in Africa provided the 
following recommendations:  
• ‘Countries should consider conducting a full conflict assessment that explicitly examines 
conflict dynamics around natural resources, the environment and climate change. The 
principles underlying the DNH framework should be incorporated in those analyses, 
including NAP processes. The analysis should be cross-sectoral. 
• Conflict analysis should take account of how climate change might influence three factors: 
the context, institutional performance, and key actors’ interests, resources, and strategies.’ 
 




need to build on lessons learned from other sectors such as livelihood programming and development 




Bringing conflict sensitivity into programming and other interventions requires the following: 
• Good practice conflict-sensitive concepts to be applied across all stages of the intervention, from 
stakeholder engagement, analysis, and intervention design to implementation and monitoring. These 
good practice concepts require that conflict–climate-sensitive interventions be treated as processes 
that: are consultative and build trust; enhance and capitalise on existing relationships; build in 
monitoring for continuous learning and adaptive iteration; and are sensitive to context, including 
intersectional vulnerabilities, exposures and structural inequalities. 
• Tools to facilitate the integration and application of conflict-sensitive concepts in intervention 
stages, such as conflict analysis, conflict trees, ‘positions, interests and needs’ analysis, 
intersectional analysis, and M&E systems. 
• Support, capacity-building and resources within implementing institutions to ensure 
commitment and ability to follow through on conflict sensitivity in interventions. 
 
Box 21  Summary of conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation and mitigation 
 
Zhang (2015) emphasises that conflict-sensitive adaptation and mitigation programming needs  
to consider:  
• horizontal coordination between various government departments  
• vertical coordination among different levels of government 
• collaboration with non-state actors 
• inclusivity of the needs of the poor.  
Case studies where CCAM projects have taken a conflict-sensitive approach include the following: 
• ‘Both the Climate Fragility Risk Assessment of Lake Chad (Nagarajan et al., 2018) and the 
Expert Working Group on Climate-Related Security Risk’s Climate-related Security Risk 
Assessment (Vivekananda and Born, 2018)...publications aim to support practitioners 
working in Lake Chad to understand the interplay between climate and security risks and to 
plan, design, implement and evaluate programmes to respond positively to these’ (Peters 
and Mayhew, 2018) (see Box 3 in chapter 4). 
• Conflict-sensitive CCAM sub-projects in Iraq (see Box 22, a case study of conflict-sensitive 
CCAM in Iraq) (Sieghart et al., 2018). 
• ‘The Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Assessment (MHDRA) conducted by DFID Tanzania in 
March 2014 provides an example of an assessment which takes a holistic approach to risk 
and vulnerability. The MHDRA actively encompasses a wide range of issues, including 









6.8 Approaches to ensuring that programming and policies in 




Any person, entity or intervention operating in a conflict-affected context will inevitably impact on 
conflict and peace, and may cause harm (Orsini and Cleland, 2018; HMG Stabilisation Unit, 2016). 
Interventions in FCAC need to be designed, managed, implemented and monitored in a conflict-
sensitive manner (UNDP, 2017). 
The three key tenets of conflict sensitivity are: to understand the context in which you operate; to 
understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and to act on this understanding, 
in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts (Africa Peace Forum et al., 2004). 
The work of the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium revised the final tenet to add ‘within an organisation’s 
given priorities/objectives (mandate)’ (Brown et al., 2009). This recognised a consensus within the 
consortium that an organisation’s mandate and objectives will shape how it engages in and on conflict. 
Organisations need to consider their skill set, priorities and mandate, recognising that not all 
organisations need to include (or are effective at including) peace-building as a key objective (which 
requires a substantial understanding of, skills in and commitment to addressing conflict), but all 
organisations can and should have a positive impact on peace within their existing objectives or mandate 
(CSC, 2012). 
UNDP notes that: 
… while there is potential for local and community development programming to be 
peace supportive by tackling conflict causes and drivers and contribute to peace, it 
is important to note that not all programmes are mandated or equipped to do so. 
The potential to move (towards peacebuilding) must be carefully assessed against 
Box 22  Case study: Conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation and mitigation in 
Iraq 
 
‘The Iraq Social Fund for Development, approved in February 2018, will finance community level 
subprojects which incorporate climate adaptation into their design, including the rehabilitation and 
maintenance of irrigation canals, drainage structures and roads, and the construction of small scale 
water supply and reservoirs. These subprojects are expected to contribute to increased agricultural 
productivity, enhanced infrastructure resilience to extreme weather events such as more intense and 
frequent storms and increase the quality and quantity of water resources. Overall, the $300 million 
project expects to benefit 1.5 million households and create over 10 million employment days, 
leading to improved, sustainable access to basic services and increased social cohesion.  
Inclusive community engagement is a crucial element to prioritizing and then implementing sub-
projects in an effective, and conflict-sensitive manner. Local representatives, with a strong showing 
from women, have already participated in planning and decision-making discussions.’ 
 




the context, organizational mandates, stakeholder views, planning and 
implementation timeframes and capacities. (UNDP, 2017: 31) 
 
It is important to be realistic about what CCAM programmes can achieve within their immediate 
operating environments and those dynamics that are beyond their control (Wallis and Buckle, 2016; 
CSC, 2012). 
It is also, however, noted that ‘the enhanced understanding of conflict that stems from conflict sensitivity 
may lead some agencies to explicitly adopt peacebuilding priorities or activities. This may be considered 
a peacebuilding side-effect of adopting a conflict sensitive approach’ (Brown et al., 2009). 
Conflict sensitivity:  
1. ‘Applies to all contexts, regardless of the severity or frequency of violence, even in situations 
where underlying tensions have not recently resulted in violence.  
2. Applies across and throughout all areas of our work and should be applied as an institutional 
approach (beyond tools).  
3. Applies to all types of work, to encompass humanitarian, development and peacebuilding, also 
including, where appropriate, work conducted by local civil society, government or private  
sector partners.  
4. Does not require changing mandates/priorities/objectives, and does not entail an explicit 
commitment to peacebuilding as a priority (can be mainstreamed across any priority / mandate)’ 
(ibid.: 19). 
 
Conflict sensitivity does not require changing mandates/priorities/objectives as it does not entail an 
explicit commitment to peacebuilding as a priority – it can be mainstreamed across any 
priority/mandate. 
The literature emphasises the importance of a multidimensional understanding of peace and conflict; 
‘where development actors make efforts to be more conflict sensitive, they tend to focus solely on ethnic 
conflicts or on their work in conflict-affected areas, as if conflict is not a problem elsewhere’ (UNDP, 
2017: 21). Conflict sensitivity cannot be limited to ‘conflict areas’ as this risks missing the interactions 
between development activities and the different layers and levels of conflict that exist throughout a 
country or region, including multiple fault-lines around ethnicity, religion, language, class and poverty, 
gender, and age (UNDP, 2017). 
It is also important to note that being conflict sensitive does not mean avoiding conflict, particularly 
where conflict is inherent in social change and redressing structural injustice. When desired changes are 
likely to lead to resistance or conflict (e.g. incorporating gender equality), more careful planning is 
required to understand the context and to minimise undesirable repercussions. A project in Afghanistan 
led to a situation where a local religious leader became agitated about the project’s impact on gender 
norms and gender equality – in this case, conflict sensitivity did not mean avoiding this potential 
conflict, but identifying it, understanding it, and taking action to reduce risk through dialogue 
(International Alert, 2019). 
The Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding 
Resource Pack (Africa Peace Forum et al., 2004) provides the following guiding principles for 
implementing a conflict-sensitive approach: participatory processes; inclusiveness of actors, issues and 
perceptions; impartiality in relation to actors and issues; transparency; respect for people’s ownership 
of the conflict and their suffering; accountability for one’s own actions; partnership and coordination; 
complementarity and coherence; and timeliness. The Commission for Research Partnerships with 
Developing Countries is developing guidelines for conflict-sensitive research (see Box 23). These issues 








6.9 Recommendations for applying conflict sensitivity 
 
 
This section draws on lessons from wider programming, providing recommendations on applying 
conflict sensitivity to CCAM and DRR programming.  
Take a holistic, integrated approach 
Alongside conflict sensitivity, many authors recommend taking a holistic and integrated approach 
across sectors and institutions to tackle complex interconnected challenges like climate change and 
disasters in FCAC (Wolfmeier et al., 2019; Peters and Vivekananda, 2014; International Alert, 2019; 
Goddard and Annaraj, 2017). Divisions between sectors limit the possibilities for proactive, coordinated 
Box 23  Conflict-sensitive approach to research 
 
The Commission for Research Partnerships with Developing Countries (KFPE) is developing 
guidelines on conflict-sensitive research, based on a recent publication, which summarised the 
following issues. 
Conflict sensitivity: Conflict sensitivity is both about what we do and how we do it. For 
researchers this means it is both about the content of research and about the way research is being 
conceived and implemented (theory and methodology). 
Research and local context: The researcher and his / her research are always part of the local 
context, regardless of subject and methodology of the research. 
Security: A conflict sensitive approach is relevant both for the impact of the research on the 
context and for the security of the persons involved in the research.  
Communication of results: The perception of research results as "critical" is not only dependent 
on their content but mainly on the way these results are being communicated and on  
their addressees.  
Flexibility: A conflict sensitive approach draws heavily on the capacity of researchers to adapt 
their behaviour, their activities and their communication about what they are doing to changing 
research environments.  
Political sensitivity: Conflict sensitivity makes researchers aware of their political position within 
the context of their research. This context includes both the “North” and the “South”.  
Trade-offs: Being aware of and adapting to a particular (conflict) context entails contingencies and 
limitations for research. Researchers must decide what kinds of concessions or trade-offs they want 
to make. 
 
The guidelines will be designed for researchers who work on and in conflict and will be of use to a 
variety of disciplines. The guidelines will be informed by researchers of different disciplines, 
experiences from field research, funding institutions, etc. 
 





co-benefits, and create false compartmentalisation between issues, which can result in action taken to 
advance one cause at the expense of another (Peters and Vivekananda, 2014). 
Smith and Vivekananda (2009 emphasise the importance of coordinated, complementary and coherent 
efforts – connecting up development sectors with environment, trade, peace-building and post-conflict 
sectors. They highlight that DRR and climate change adaptation are expanding to look at a range of 
risks – i.e. disaster and climate-related, but rarely expand to include conflict. They emphasise that a shift 
in policy and practice is needed to move to integrated approaches. For example, climate change risk 
assessments can be expanded to consider the interactions between policies, actions and the ethical 
implications of interventions (Mayhew et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2019b). Coordination across sectors 
also can result in win-win opportunities for enhancing resilience and reducing fragility  
(Moran et al., 2018). 
Evidence from existing programming and research suggests the following general entry points for 
integrating peace-building and climate resilience programming: strengthening social cohesion within 
and between groups; supporting sustainable livelihoods and an enabling environment; working on 
multiple governance levels; and addressing exclusion and marginalisation (Vivekananda et al.,2014). 
Conflict sensitivity can also be combined with other approaches. International Alert’s Conflict Sensitive 
Business Practices guidance (Orsini and Cleland, 2018) combines conflict sensitivity with a human 
rights approach. This includes a commitment to redressing power imbalances in favour of risk 
governance approaches centred on poor people (Mayhew et al., 2019). 
Some agencies have integrated conflict sensitivity with disaster or climate risk management (see Boxes 
24 and 25). However, a review for USAID found that this can ‘undermine conflict sensitivity if there is 
confusion about the particularities and differences between risk management and conflict sensitivity’ 




Box 24  United Nations Environment Programme Post-Conflict and Disaster 
Management Branch (PCDMB) 
 
Natural hazards, land degradation, and damage and destruction to natural resources are only some 
examples of the many environmental challenges facing fragile and conflict-affected states, which 
not only pose a threat to human security and peace-building, health and livelihoods, but also hamper 
long-term development. To better understand and address this challenge, UNEP linked its branches 
on post-conflict work and disaster management to form a Post-Conflict and Disaster Management 
Branch (PCDMB). Since 1999, it has responded to 40 crises in countries including Afghanistan, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Sudan. 
Alongside technical support to the countries in their peace-building and peacekeeping efforts, the 
PCDMB fosters collaboration between organisations working on DRR, climate change adaptation 
and the environment. The PCDMB has successfully managed to increase awareness about the link 
between conflict, natural resources and disasters through strong and wide-reaching partnerships  
and advocacy. 








Conduct conflict analysis 
Conducting a structured conflict analysis, and regularly updating it throughout all stages of the project 
cycle to inform how interventions are designed, implemented and monitored, is the cornerstone of 
conflict sensitivity (UNDP, 2017). Conflict analysis needs to consider different categories of conflict 
(armed conflict, armed violence, post-conflict and social unrest), recognising that in many FCAC, an 
absence of armed conflict is only an illusion of peace. ‘Under the surface, less visible social, political 
and economic tensions manifest in social unrest or cycles of violence that can destabilise development’ 
(Orsini and Cleland, 2018: 10). 
Aid should not be spent in FCAC without first doing a thorough conflict analysis (Peters and Levine, 
2014). This will help to identify areas of a proposed intervention that may overlap with, and interact 
with, conflict issues (Melander et al., 2004). Such an analysis will increase the implementing agency’s 
understanding of the drivers, causes and consequences of conflict, and help to identify most of the 
relevant stakeholders involved, their perspectives, and how they relate to each other. It will also increase 
understanding of levers that could help in managing or preventing conflict, and resilience factors – i.e. 
factors that can help communities prevent or manage conflicts in a peaceful manner, or can help those 
affected to better withstand the effects of the identified grievances (CSC, 2012). 
Conflict analysis needs to be consultative, iterative, sensitive, monitored, and continuous throughout 
and beyond project implementation (see Box 26). It should be referred to as ‘context analysis’ where 
the sensitivity of a situation makes this more appropriate (UNDP, 2017). 
Use other analysis tools 
International Alert emphasises that ‘special attention must be paid to flashpoints that are likely to drive 
conflict, such as access to land, distribution of benefits, employment opportunities or security 
arrangements’ (Orsini and Cleland, 2018: 4). Tools can also look at grievances and resilience factors 
(as used in USAID’s Conflict Assessment), and dividers (such as inequality in access to resources or 
power), or linguistic and cultural barriers, and connectors (such as shared harvest or memories of 
peaceful coexistence) (Orsini and Cleland, 2018). 
One such tool is ‘positions, interests, needs’, which can be used to unpack people’s positions (what 
people say they want), interests (what people want to have), and needs (basic elements that are usually 
Box 25  An integrated approach in Kenya 
 
‘Because of the multiple drivers for vulnerability to drought and conflict in Kenya, there is a growing 
understanding that disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies, especially 
drought management, need to go along with participatory conflict management. Bottom-up 
pastoralist resources management leading to binding agreements between pastoralist groups, has 
proven to reduce the risk of conflict and has the potential to increase resilience and reduce poverty.’  
 
‘Drought risk reduction strategies targeting pastoralist communities need to be conflict-sensitive and 
follow a concerted effort between neighbouring countries. In order to increase the resilience of 
pastoralists to drought and conflict not only key aspects of drought and conflict need to be recognized 
as important ingredients of pastoral development policies, also community-based conflict resolution 
mechanisms need to be strengthened. This requires resources and improved local capacities on 
natural resource management, drought early warning monitoring and conflict resolution.’  
 






non-negotiable). This information can shed light on the difference between root causes of conflict, and 
proximate ones (those that feed or perpetuate conflict rather than create it) (CDA, 2016a; 2016b). Other 
tools include conflict trees to enable consideration of root causes of conflict, problems (e.g. tensions) 
emerging from this, and manifestations/effects of the problems. This acknowledges that action focusing 
only on manifestations, leaving root causes unaddressed, is unlikely to be successful (Orsini and 





It is important not only to identify and understand impacts through regular assessment, but also to be 
prepared to act on them (Orsini and Cleland, 2018). Ensuring that programmes have the scope to adapt 
and respond to context and decentralising project decision-making to enable this agility is integral to 
conflict sensitivity (UNDP, 2017). Robust, accessible, and confidential beneficiary feedback 
mechanisms should be set up to alert organisations to any harm or emerging risks (ibid.). Donors can 
support this (see section 6.12), enabling flexibility to changes in project strategies and implementation 
(and related project extensions and budget revisions) where overlaps with conflict are found, or where 
additional conflict analysis or stakeholder engagement is required. 
Take an institutional approach 
Conflict sensitivity needs to be approached at an institutional and strategic rather than project level 
(CSC, 2012; Woodrow and Jean, 2019). Organisations working in FCAC need to ensure they adopt a 
conflict-sensitive approach. It is ineffective to aim for conflict sensitivity at project level without a wider 
organisational framework and institutional culture that is conflict sensitive. Conflict sensitivity must 
influence ‘how development organizations design their country programme frameworks, how they 
prioritize and sequence their interventions, how they put in place operational policies and procedures, 
and how they invest in strengthening an organizational culture for conflict sensitivity’  
(UNDP, 2017: 10). 
In a review of local and community development practices in Myanmar, institutional set-up was 
recognised as key for effective conflict sensitivity; however, there are challenges related to a lack of 
internal conflict capacity in governance. Conflict sensitivity is found to be the responsibility of 
designated staff members who ‘must invest considerable energy to advocate for it with managers and 
other staff’, and must often ‘swim against the tide of institutional culture and time pressure’ (UNDP, 
2017: 33).  
Box 26  Conflict-sensitive approaches to multi-sectoral programming in  
Burkina Faso 
 
‘… a conflict-sensitive approach requires that agencies re-assess their work on a constant basis, draw 
lessons from these assessments, and act upon them ... The situation in the country is very fluid, as is 
always the case in a situation of conflict. In order to ensure that conflict dynamics are taken into 
account in their operations, both peacebuilding and humanitarian agencies need to put enough human 
and financial resources into conflict monitoring. For example, a theory of change could be valid at 
the beginning of an intervention, and then could lose its value six months later. Aid agencies should 
constantly monitor conflict dynamics and adapt their interventions accordingly, to ensure that they 
be conflict sensitive.’ 






Address technical capacity 
The availability of technical expertise on conflict is a critical factor in FCAC. Implementation of 
programmes should be supported by a Do No Harm advisor or officer; promising staffing models 
include the placement of part-time Do No Harm focal points in each geographic zone, supported by full-
time conflict sensitivity advisors (Garred, 2007). Idris et al. (2013) advise partnering with a specialist 
peace-building agency or ensuring that specialist peace-building/conflict transformation technical 
assistance is embedded in programming for FCAC. 
A review for USAID found that ‘Several donors and implementing agencies assert that staff know Do 
No Harm or that a “do no harm principle” influences everything they do, but do not back this up with 
guidance, training or assessments to determine actual staff capacity’ (Goldwyn, 2016: 4) (see also Box 
27). The same review recommended the value of specialist roles supporting countries in applying 











Select project team 
 
The skills and experience within a team carrying out research or implementing projects on CCAM 
within FCAC need to be interdisciplinary, ensuring coverage across themes, sectors and institution types 
(see also Box 28). At least one conflict advisor and a gender and marginalisation expert should be 
integrated within the team (UNDP, 2017). 
 
 
Box 28  Myanmar conflict expertise 
 
‘The Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund and the Millennium Development Goals health 
facility, established in 2009 and 2012 respectively, have increasingly systemized conflict 
sensitivity into their project management cycles and have also drawn on dedicated conflict experts 
and expertise. Two more recent multi-donor mechanisms, the Peace Support Fund and the Joint 
Peace Fund, also have a strong focus on conflict sensitivity, which is an explicit criterion for 
assessing potential projects and partners.’ 
Source: UNDP, 2017: 21. 
 
Box 27  Conflict capacity challenges in Myanmar 
 
‘Government departments consulted do not have dedicated internal conflict advisory capacity. Many 
of the bigger international development organizations interviewed do tend to have conflict advisors, 
though some noted the challenges associated with the project-based, short-term or advisory nature 
of their work means that their sphere of influence, especially at the strategic and organizational level, 
is limited. The scoping did not identify any conflict advisors based in the field full-time. Several 
people noted the tendency to recruit conflict advisors to projects after they have been designed, 
greatly limiting the scope for these individuals to influence the project. In interviews with these 
advisors, they shared that they were spread very thin across several projects. Though rare in practice, 
ideally each project needs a dedicated conflict advisor to fully integrate conflict sensitivity, including 
training, mentoring and advising other staff and partners.’ 






Where programming teams are inexperienced in conflict sensitivity (which is likely to be the case in 
CCAM programming – an area with limited emphasis on conflict sensitivity previously), collective 
efforts can enable joint analysis, peer review of project plans from a conflict sensitivity angle, and 
capacity-building. Lessons can be learnt from areas where a collective approach to improving conflict 





Be inclusive and local 
In fragile situations, a community and locally based approach may be preferred over ‘outsider’ help, 
which may have negative effects on development and aid equity between people affected by natural 
hazard-related disasters and conflicts (Zeccola, 2011). International humanitarian action should be 
driven by the concept of subsidiarity, by supporting local systems and decisions, rather than supplanting 
them (World Humanitarian Summit, 2015). Continuous and sustainable measures for strengthening the 
capacities of staff and partners for learning and sharing experiences should be integrated into 
programming (UNDP, 2017). 
  
6.10 Recommendations for partnerships, community and 
stakeholder engagement strategies 
 
Alongside and as part of conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive programmes need to develop a thorough 
analysis of the power relationships in communities, to enable conflict-sensitive programme design and 
implementation (International Alert, 2019) (see also Box 30). 
 
Conduct stakeholder mapping 
Another theme highlighted in the literature is the importance of paying particular attention to the politics 
of who is involved, when and how (UNDP, 2017; Zicherman et al., 2011). Meaningful stakeholder 
consultations should be informed by an understanding of conflict dynamics and actors (UNDP, 2017). 
Stakeholder mapping needs to be effective and focus on: (1) who has power or who is affected from a 
conflict perspective (see chapter 3 for more details); (2) how actors related to the conflict (ex-
combatants, victims, refugees, human rights defenders, illegal armed groups) can/should be involved; 
(3) identifying which stakeholders are not formally organised, including those excluded from political, 
social or economic life, those discriminated against, those likely to be scared to speak up, and those not 
Box 29  Conflict-sensitive assistance to Libya Forum 
 
‘In Libya a Conflict-Sensitive Assistance to Libya (CSA) Forum facilitates collective conflict 
analysis, regularly updated, with consideration and discussion on conflict sensitivity consideration 
of varying topics/interventions/themes. A process to increase the conflict sensitivity of international 
assistance to Libya started in 2012, with two formal mechanisms to promote conflict sensitivity: 
Participatory Conflict Analysis Forum; and Voluntary Peer Reviews. 
These enable collective (regularly updated) conflict analysis, alongside opportunities for 
organisations to gain peer support in assessing and understanding the potential conflict issues of a 
particular programme or sector, providing recommendations on adaptations for conflict sensitivity.’ 





represented (International Alert, 2019; Zicherman et al., 2011). Programming needs to enhance 
understanding of intra- and inter-community conflict (Orsini and Cleland, 2018).  
Accountability, transparency, and responsibility of government officials at all levels 
are needed in the development and implementation of adaptation actions. Points of 
unity and divisiveness among stakeholders potentially affected by adaptation need 
to be identified to strengthen the effectiveness of adaptation actions. (Tadesse and 






Practice stakeholder engagement 
Effective community engagement and collaboration strategies are critical when working in FCAC 
(International Alert, 2019). It is good practice to consult widely, including asking existing stakeholders 
who else you need to consider. Consultations should consider vulnerable groups in the area (indigenous 
peoples, women and children, victims of conflict, ex-combatants, sexual minorities, human rights 
defenders, refugees or internally displaced people) who could be affected by a project, even when they 
are not the intended project participants (Orsini and Cleland, 2018). 
It is important to understand the barriers to stakeholder engagement in FCAC, where vulnerable groups 
may not be visible or may be afraid to speak out – for example, women and girls who have experienced 
sexual violence by armed or criminal groups (ibid.). Additional consideration, careful analysis and clear 
stakeholder engagement strategies are needed to ascertain how to engage (or not engage) with (for 
example) illegal armed groups present in operational areas. 
Trust borne out of constant communication and transparency is emphasised (Zicherman et al., 2011). 
Building trust takes significant time (UNDP, 2017), which can be a challenge for traditional project 
structures, with relatively short-term, time-bound, pre-designed and rigid initiatives. It takes 
considerable time to build relationships with and consult stakeholders (ibid.). 
Where desired project outcomes are in tension with local context, some projects have advised against 
highlighting the boldest changes first or adopting adversarial stances that can result in increased conflict 
(including increased risk to those a project is supposed to benefit). 
Box 30  A conflict sensitivity review of World Vision’s programming across 12 
countries 
 
‘There were two types of programmatic decisions that emerged as important in examining the 
conflict sensitivity impacts of World Vision’s programs: how goods, services, time, attention, jobs 
and other WV benefits were distributed, and which key actors WV engaged. Who receives benefits 
from a program or project is determined by criteria, most often not set at the field level. These 
criteria are meant to ensure that the resources brought into a community generate the maximum 
programmatic impact, by addressing the greatest need and directing aid toward the most vulnerable 
or poorest. However, when selection, hiring, or program participation criteria run parallel to lines 
of conflict in a context, it can deepen existing lines of division and contribute to tension. In WV 
programs, the effect of how resources were distributed led to increased tensions, perverse 
incentives, and negative perceptions of WV and its staff.’ 





Targeting strategies are highlighted in the literature on conflict sensitivity (Zicherman et al., 2011). 
UNDP (2017) emphasises dilemmas that can occur when vulnerability-based targeting may clash (in 
reality or perception) with considerations of equity or fairness, especially when this runs along the lines 
of conflict. Targeting should emphasise equity rather than rigid formulas, and be transparent and well-
communicated, incorporating feedback to avoid issues of perceived bias or unfairness (UNDP, 2017) 





Teams should collaborate with in-country experts and trusted, appropriate stakeholders within the 
project area as equal project partners to build on existing expertise within the region, inform approaches, 
research questions and ensure conflict sensitivity in project scope and design. In FCAC, it is likely that 
progress in research and projects will not be as straightforward or as fast as non-FCAC projects; it is 
therefore important to re-orient the perception of a ‘successful’ project in these cases. The value of 
building understanding and relationships in FCAC through projects and research should be recognised 
and celebrated as a success. 
There is a body of literature on conflict-sensitive employment (and procurement) policies, addressing 
how it can reduce local tensions and armed conflict (Grawert et al., 2017; Grawert, 2018;  UNDP, 2017). 
This also extends to consideration of risks across a project’s supply chain (e.g. whether workers in the 
supply chain are exposed to conflict risks such as extortion and kidnapping in contexts with illegal 
armed or criminal groups, threats).  
Address inequality and social justice 
It should not be assumed that any development interventions will help the poorest people without a 
concerted effort to ensure that outcome (Peters and Levine, 2014). Targeted stakeholders should be 
approached in a way which is intersectional, inclusive, and ensures that all voices are heard, so that 
analysis is thorough and representative, and can support peace-sensitive programme design and 
implementation (Seng Lawn and Naujoks, 2018; International Alert, 2019). 
Horizontal inequality and exclusion (i.e. exclusion linked to ethnic, religious, caste and gender identity) 
are at the heart of conflict, with income inequality widening during years of conflict and unrest 
(International Alert, 2019). When working in FCAC, existing inequalities and power relations must be 
thoroughly considered in programme and research design to avoid interventions causing unequal or 
unintended impacts (International Alert, 2019; International Alert et al., 2019). Any intervention, project 
or strategy must be shaped not just by the understanding of the specific system being addressed (e.g. 
climate change), but also by systems of power and equity. Without bearing these implications in mind, 
Box 31  Conflict -sensitivity analysis in Myanmar 
 
‘This initiative has involved strengthening the capacities and confidence of civil society and 
community-based organisations (CBOs) to undertake their own conflict sensitivity analysis and to 
engage in dialogue with international actors. Strategies were developed by civil society following a 
process of conflict sensitivity assessment and advocacy ... This entailed developing systematic 
analyses of how international interventions interact with the issues and dynamics that affect local 
peace and security. Dialogues were then organised that enabled local civil society actors to engage 
with international actors about the impacts of their interventions, and how to mitigate the conflict 
risks identified.’  





a scheme could, depending on its details, exacerbate conflict in a fragile state (Smith and  
Vivekananda, 2015).  
Understand power dynamics 
While conducting an iterative and thorough analysis of the context and adapting activities in response 
to findings, it is important to understand complex localised and sub-national drivers of conflict, and 
their link to experiences of marginalisation (International Alert et al., 2019). 
Building an inclusive, sustainable, positive peace in societies affected by violent conflict requires 
analysing and addressing gendered power dynamics as well as gender roles and expectations 
(Myrtinnen, 2018). Preventing violence requires considering structural privileges, ensuring that actions 
are accountable to women, girls and minorities, and also do not lead to a stabilisation or strengthening 
of patriarchal power (ibid.). Programmes should be monitored and adjusted, using gender-sensitive 
indicators (International Alert, 2019).  
Adopt an inclusive and intersectional approach 
There is increasing awareness that gender is important in governance, in understanding conflict and 
building peace. Since women are often missing in formal settings, programming on ‘gender’ has 
frequently translated into a focus on ‘women and girls’, usually as victims contrasted with men as 
perpetrators of violence (Orsini and Cleland, 2018). Being inclusive should go beyond focusing on 
‘women and girls’ to actively include experiences of marginalised groups, including (for example) 
people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, people of different religious affiliations, different castes, 
LGBTQI communities, men and boys, to ensure that their voices are heard. 
Programmes should adopt an intersectional approach to targeting to ensure that all voices are heard, 
taking account of gender and other forms of horizontal exclusion, and of people in extreme poverty 
(International Alert et al., 2019; Saferworld, 2019). International Alert (Orsini and Cleland, 2018) 
adopts a ‘gender-relational approach’. This means understanding how gender roles are constructed 
through societal relations between and among men and women in any given conflict context, and how 
those roles relate to other factors such as age, social class, ethnicity, sexual orientation and geography. 
This also allows for an improved understanding of gender roles in conflict, beyond simplistic 
understandings such as those of men as perpetrators and women as victims.  
 
6.11 General recommendations 
 
Climate resilience-building (including both adaptation and mitigation interventions) and DRR in FCAC 
needs to be treated as a process, rather than an end point. As a process, it should ideally adhere to a 
number of good practice principles that research and practice from climate change adaptation, disaster 
risk management and other areas of practice have learned through experience:  
Inclusive and transparent – Grounded in participation and co-learning with a variety of stakeholders, 
including vulnerable groups, government at a variety of administrative scales, NGOs and donors in 
order to deliver on intervention Theory of Change or objectives at short-, medium- and long-term 
timescales. The research questions and tools for analysis risks, including conflict risks and the 
appropriateness of climate interventions in FCAC, must be answered in an integrated, multidisciplinary 
manner that is conflict sensitive.  
Stepped and iterative – Developing conflict-sensitive climate resilience interventions in FCAC might 
better be done through a stepped and iterative manner, in which outcomes and lessons from one step 
support the subsequent steps. New knowledge at a later step, such as that arising from the co-
development of an intervention with a wide range of stakeholders, might require revisiting prior steps 




Flexible and adaptable – Teams have to modify their approach and research questions, and adopt 
methodologies in a manner that is responsive to the different development contexts in each of the case 
study countries, and that reflect the dynamic priorities and concerns of a diverse array of stakeholders 
and actors. Multidisciplinary intervention teams should ideally reflect on and review information 
emerging from each step, in order to adjust the research questions, methods, participation and 
engagement, and team collaboration mechanisms.  
Continuous learning and evaluation – The learning and interventions must constantly evolve because 
development conditions, risk priorities and preferences, and threats are constantly changing. 
Intervention programmes must implement M&E systems from project outset, which can continue after 
the project’s end, in order to learn from past programmes about what worked and is still working – and 
where the gaps and challenges lie – in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes.  
All chapters discuss the need for a greater evidence base. Generating this evidence base requires a multi-
pronged approach, as follows:  
• Capacity and training of intervention implementors to:  
• understand risk and conflict–climate–natural resource management risks, intersectional 
vulnerability, exposure and capacity drivers of risk and how these vary and evolve in FCAC;  
• appropriately use various risk assessment and risk perceptions tools, including ensuring that 
conflict-sensitive and intersectional considerations are included in analysis of the context, 
scenarios of how conflict risks might evolve in the future under various climate, governance 
and demographics scenarios, and of the potential of various interventions to reduce conflict risk, 
build climate resilience and exacerbate tensions among particular groups. There are always 
trade-offs and these need to be acknowledged and understood; people-centred risk assessments 
and co-developed interventions might be better placed to address some of these challenges than 
traditional ‘expert-driven’ assessments.  
• Ensuring that a dedicated conflict expert is included in the interventions.  
• Ensuring institutional support for such interventions.  
• Consistent definitions and concept framing adopted among intervention participants in order to 
facilitate assessments, pick appropriate tools and guide interventions.  
• Providing appropriate resources for M&E from project inception until a few years after a project 
has ended. Results and outcomes (good, bad and mixed) are often not apparent until some time after 
a project has ended and unintended consequences that arise as contexts change will also only 
become apparent with time. Such evidence is needed to help address current knowledge gaps and 
feed into subsequent interventions.  
• Evolve existing tools and frameworks and develop new ones to account for the different realities in 
FCAC. In particular, priorities, perceptions and power dynamics need to be accounted for more 
strongly and evidence gaps around how these shape structural inequalities and conflict–climate risks 
and options for managing these are needed.  
• On-the-ground evidence collected through individual intervention research and M&E and databases 
allowing for cross-intervention data-sharing is needed to avoid replication, close gaps, and allow 









6.12 Recommendations for the funding, design and delivery of 
programmes 
 
Funding for CCAM in FCAC needs to be designed by donors to require and support programming that 
is conflict sensitive, longer term, with a built-in inception phase, allowing lead-time for conflict analysis 
and consultative project adaptation (Midgley et al., 2012; UNDP, 2017). 
Programming for uncertainty (in relation to both conflict dynamics and climate change) should be built 
into the funding set-up, allowing for adaptability and flexibility in response to change (Peters and 
Vivekananda, 2014; UNDP, 2017) This requires a move away from inflexible structures grounded in 
sectoral silos, counterproductive incentive systems that advance large-scale fund disbursements, patchy 
knowledge bases, and inadequate consideration of governance in any meaningful sense (Bell, 2008). 
Climate financing must also be adapted to ensure that it does not contribute to the disconnect between 
institutional plans and local peace and development priorities (Levine et al., 2014). 
Donors can also explore innovative approaches to funding that provide non-project-based funds for 
technical advice on conflict sensitivity and space for cross-project and cross-organisational learning that 
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Annex 1  Mapping institutions, 
models and financing for 
disasters, climate change 
adaptation and mitigation 
We reviewed the following types of DRR and CCAM research and funding initiatives in support of the 
evidence bases provided in the report chapters. In particular, we examined the following:  
• the volume of funds currently being spent on climate change adaptation in FCAC 
• which multilateral and bilateral agencies, research institutions, think tanks, foundations and NGOs 
are currently developing support for research on conflict and climate change, including details on 
the form and focus of current and planned work  
• the current state of development and use of predictive and decision support models for climate 
change and conflict, including a review of current technologies, methods and innovation.  
 
Introduction 
This annex reviews the state of evidence, debates and trends in three areas of knowledge at the 
intersection of climate change and conflict: (1) the institutions supporting research, policy and 
programming for climate security; (2) existing predictive and decision support models for climate 
security, and any gaps; and (3) evidence on climate adaptation finance tackling climate security 
challenges in FCAC. It is intended as a mapping of the evidence and, therefore, does not produce 
primary research or analysis on these issues. 
This mapping draws principally from ODI’s series of climate change, conflict and security scans 
published in 2018 and 2019 (Peters and Mayhew, 2019; Mayhew et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2020), which 
provide an extensive review of the latest academic, grey and policy literature on climate and conflict. 
As such, we consider this a non-exhaustive, but up-to-date mapping of knowledge and trends in the 
three areas of climate security mentioned above. Additionally, we have complemented this information 
with ad hoc online searches and by interviewing climate finance and security experts. 
Support for research on conflict and climate change 
Multilateral and bilateral agencies, research institutions, think tanks, foundations and NGOs are 
currently developing and supporting work on research, policy and programming for climate security. 
This section provides an overview of what each category of actors is focusing on, and their plans for 
future work on this topic. We identified relevant organisations and have grouped the reviewed 
institutions into: (1) international initiatives; (2) national agencies, (3) multilateral organisations; (4) 






(1) International initiatives 
There is an ongoing debate on the merits of including climate security issues in the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) and what role the latter should and could play in tackling climate security 
issues. Those against inclusion have argued that the UNSC’s principal task is to react rapidly to menaces 
to international peace and security, and that the inclusion of climate change would be counterproductive 
(France 24, 2019). Arguments have also considered the interference that the inclusion would have with 
other areas of the UN system and UNSC’s ability to respond to issues requiring a ‘system-wide 
response’, though others have contended that its function would be complementary and would not 
encroach on the mandate of other UN agencies. Nevertheless, issues remain regarding the current state 
of research focused on the role that climate change plays in relation to conflict (see chapter 4).  
Despite these ongoing discussions, progress has been made in terms of policy and practice. There are 
increasing international initiatives set up to address climate security and elevate it onto the international 
and UN political agendas, as follows: 
• The Group of Friends on Climate Security was set up in summer 2018 by Germany and the 
Pacific state of Nauru. It includes more than 40 member states with the aim of cooperating to 
develop solutions for the impact of climate change on security policy, to raise public awareness and 
boost the involvement of the UN (Federal Foreign Office, 2018).  
• The Planetary Security Initiative launched in 2015 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
held four Planetary Security conferences to advance the state of knowledge and practice on climate 
security. This culminated in the Hague Declaration of Action on Climate Security in 2017, which 
sets out a six-point action plan to concretely deal with climate security. 
• The Stockholm Climate Security Hub is an initiative of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
launched in 2018 that builds on cooperation between four Stockholm-based think tanks. The Hub 
is focused on research and analysis on climate security and promoting policy dialogue with  
policy-makers. 
• The Expert Working Group on Climate-Related Security Risks initiated during Sweden’s 
membership of the UN Security Council (2017–18), which is focusing on climate security risks and 
has performed risk assessments in four regions: Lake Chad, Iraq, Mali and Somalia (SIPRI, n.d.). 
These initiatives have been met by a shift within the UNSC, where discussions are starting to move 
away from generalised statements to include discussions of ‘tangible assessments ‘in both conflict and 
post-conflict environments. The creation of the Climate Security Mechanism by UNDP, UNEP and the 
UN Secretariat’s Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) to strengthen the evidence 
base and guide the design of risk assessments and risk prevention and management strategies is another 
sign of this shift. In addition, there have been calls from different quarters for a Special Representative 
on Climate Security under the office of the UN Secretary-General, which could help combat objections 
concerned with the extension of the UNSC mandate (Conca, 2019). 
 
(2) National agencies 
This section reviews how climate change fits within national security strategies and how national 
agencies are working towards the inclusion of climate security in the international security agenda. 
• Australia: The military is increasingly accepting that it will need to include climate change within 
its planning, though it has been reluctant to openly discuss this until recently due to government 
opposition and the political climate (McDonald, 2018b). In May 2018, the Australian Senate 
Committee held an inquiry at which climate change was presented as a threat not only to national 
security but also to wider stability within the Asia-Pacific region. Its recommendations included: 
calls for increased foreign aid targeting CCAM within the region; a White Paper on climate security 
to guide a coordinated government-wide response to climate change risks; emissions targets for the 




Affairs (Doherty, 2018). Inclusion of climate change both within ‘defence and security’ planning 
and also in wider ‘public debate and climate policy orientations’ provides an opportunity for change 
(McDonald, 2018b). 
• Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA): A document produced by 
CDEMA (2018) summarising the outcomes of a consultation on climate and security in the 
Caribbean shows that stakeholders agreed on: strengthening regional coordination; improving 
capacity (including financial mechanisms) and enhancing knowledge on climate and security; 
advancing food and water security and renewable energy transition; and advocating for stronger 
political support. 
• Germany: Besides launching the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, Germany is making 
climate security a priority during its time as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2019–2020 
(UN News, 2018c). 
• Netherlands: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created an Integrated International Security 
Strategy 2018–2022, which aims to put in place a long-term, preventive approach. It looks at the 
root causes of terrorism – including climate change and poverty – while making clear links to the 
ambition to achieve the SDGs. 
• New Zealand: Recognises climate change as one of the ‘greatest security challenges for New 
Zealand defence in the coming decades’ (Ministry of Defence, 2018: 3) by heightening security 
challenges across the wider Pacific region and testing communities’ resilience. The reports finds 
that more humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and stability operations will be required in future, 
which will create more frequent and concurrent operational commitments for the New Zealand 
Defence Force, testing its capacity to respond. 
• UK: The government has recently announced £60 million worth of financial aid to assist Somalia 
in supporting those affected by both conflict and climate change, hoping to ease tensions over access 
to natural resources and contributing to stability in the longer term (Africa News, 2018). The Office 
of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has also undertaken a broad assessment of the nexus 
between modern slavery, environmental destruction and climate change (Boyd et al., 2018). 
• US: The US Department of Defense (2019) released the Report on effects of a changing climate to 
the Department of Defense, which highlights the high vulnerability of US military installations 
within the US to the impacts of climate change. It acknowledges that ‘the effects of a changing 
climate are a national security issue with potential impacts to Department of Defense … missions, 
operational plans, and installations’ (ibid: 2). Despite reservations from the Trump administration, 
the John McCain National Defense Authorization Act was passed in 2018 showing the serious 
commitment of the US military to tackling climate risks. The new legislation requires all military 
bases to include a master plan examination of energy security and resilience to future risks, such as 
tidal floods (Schewe, 2018). In 2019, the US Senate also published the Climate Security Act, which 
establishes new climate-security related posts within US executive branches and responsibilities: 
(1) a Climate Security Envoy within the State Department that will oversee the development of a 
climate-security policy; (2) the President will periodically conduct evaluations of disruptions to the 
global climate system and make them available to public; and (3) creation of a Special 
Representative for the Arctic designated by the Secretary of State to formulate the US response to 
international conflicts in the Arctic. 
The United States is the country with perhaps the greatest debate and discord between different parts of 
the government over climate change and security. There does seem consensus as to the purpose of the 
now cancelled Presidential Committee on Climate Security, which was set up to provide ‘adversarial’ 
scientific peer review to the national security implications of climate change. Melton (2019) and Revkin 
(2019) agree that the purpose was to undermine the US military’s position on climate change, as 
adversarial review seeks to primarily undermine arguments and not uncover truths. 
Besides the military and the Department of State, other US agencies are also engaged with climate 




change as a potential driver of global migration, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
(2019) argued that the Department of State’s decision to omit guidance to its country missions on 
including climate change risks as part of their country strategies means that it may fail to identify a 
climate change–migration nexus. In response, the Department of State is now allowing country missions 
to report such data on a voluntary basis. 
The Fourth National Climate Assessment Report, authored by the US Global Change Research 
Programme involving 13 federal agencies, finds that US interests in trade, international development, 
humanitarian assistance, national security and transboundary resources will be affected by climate 
change and may lead to large-scale alterations in the global availability and prices of a wide range of 
goods (Smith et al., 2018). Lastly, USAID is funding the PEACE III Cooperative Agreement 
programme, designed to address challenges arising in areas along the borders between Kenya and its 
neighbours that are affected by conflict between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities (Stark et 
al., 2018).  
• Vanuatu: The Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office’s (2018) National Policy on Climate 
Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement is mainstreaming displacement, mobility and conflict 
considerations into key areas of the government. 
(3) Multilateral organisations 
Multilateral organisations are often at the forefront of work at the climate change–conflict nexus, 
implementing programmes and projects on the ground. This section summarises current and future 
programming, as well as lessons learnt from past programmes, of multilateral organisations operating 
within the climate security space. 
• Asian Development Bank (ADB): The ADB considers FCAC and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) as priorities in its activities. It will design interventions to be context-specific and ensures 
they are fragility and conflict-sensitive (Ravelo, 2018). 
• African Union (AU): The AU emphasises the importance of mainstreaming climate change into 
all activities by the AU Commission, particularly in early warning and prevention of climate 
change-related conflicts (AU Commission, 2018). 
• Caribbean Development Bank: The bank considers DRR as a critical priority and has contributed 
$3 million to Haiti’s parametric insurance coverage. This insurance can provide financial support 
for humanitarian relief. 
• European Union (EU): The EU has been leading work on climate diplomacy, culminating in the 
2018 EU Foreign Affairs Council’s adoption of its latest conclusions on climate diplomacy, 
including: (1) further mainstreaming of the climate change–security nexus in policy dialogue; (2) 
conflict prevention; (3) development and humanitarian action; and (4) disaster risk strategies. In 
2015, it launched the Climate Change and Security initiative jointly with UNEP, financed by the 
European External Action’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace to address global and 
trans-regional effects of climate change that have a potentially destabilising effect on fragile states 
(EU, 2015). 
Externally, it has pledged ongoing support to G5 Sahel countries’ stabilisation of the food and nutrition 
crisis, caused by environmental degradation and continued dry weather conditions (EU, 2018). It has 
also committed to addressing vulnerability and fragility risks in the East African region. 
• Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): The FAO has done 
considerable work in the area of food and water security, often in conjunction with other 
multilaterals. It ranks the Sahel as a high-risk region due to the high climate-induced migration of 
pastoralists towards forage-rich areas in coastal countries, which contributes to livestock 
overgrazing and has increased tensions between pastoralists and host communities (FAO, 2018). It 
has also looked at the drivers of food insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin countries, finding that 




Somalia). The FAO and World Food Programme (WFP) (2018) have also looked more specifically 
at the interaction between climate and water security and their negative effects on food security. 
• OECD: The OECD is now including environmental factors in its measurement of fragility. 
• UNDP: UNDP has published lessons learnt from its adaptation work addressing the compound 
challenges of rising levels of conflict, displacement, water scarcity and food insecurity in Mashreq, 
Maghreb, the Arab Gulf and the Horn of Africa (Twining-Ward et al., 2018). 
• UN Environment: In partnership with the EU and think tank adelphi, has launched a four-year 
programme to translate the theory on climate change and security into practice. It will be piloted in 
Sudan and Nepal, and will adopt a nexus approach between sustainable livelihoods, climate change, 
security and peace-building to build resilience against climate-fragility risks. 
• UNESCAP: UNESCAP has looked into conflicts over climate-impacted water resources in Central 
Asia, such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh basin (Suleimenova, 2018). 
• UN Secretary-General: Authored the UN Framework for Action in 2019 to identify entry points 
to integrate land in conflict analysis, planning and processes. The framework recognises that land 
is relevant across the three pillars of the UN (UNSG, 2019): 
• peace and security combined, as a factor in conflict and resilience-building 
• human rights, through land-related human rights abuses 
• development, as land management during the process is recognised as a preventive measure for 
conflict relapse. 
• World Bank: The Bank has planned to double its financing for fragile and conflict-affected 
countries, from $7 billion to $14 billion over the next three years. It has carried out conflict-sensitive 
initiatives on climate change in the MENA region (Lia Carol et al., 2018). And it will focus on 
culture in city reconstruction and recovery through the use of the CURE framework, which it plans 
to use in the reconstruction of Mosul, Iraq (World Bank, 2018a). 
(4) Research institutes and think tanks 
As already illustrated, research institutes and think tanks have been part of many international initiatives 
to promote climate security on the international agenda. Below we list the most prolific and active think 
tanks in terms of producing climate security research and fostering policy dialogues and actions, as per 
our mapping of the literature. 
• Overseas Development Institute: ODI has led knowledge, learning and evidence-gathering 
exercises on climate change adaptation and resilience in FCAC as part of the BRACED programme, 
and led the development of policy-oriented research on climate-related disasters in FCAC through 
its When disasters and conflict collide initiative. Furthermore, ODI established the climate, conflict 
and security scans – a four-monthly review of evidence on the intersection of climate change, 
conflict and security issues. Together with the ICRC and IFRC, ODI convened a series of global 
policy-making roundtables on climate change and conflict, and their humanitarian implications, 
throughout 2018, with roundtables hosted in every region of the world. Finally, ODI has undertaken 
original research on climate variability and change and armed groups and insecurity in Niger.  
• Adelphi: This think tank has focused on developing solutions to support practitioners in 
understanding the interplay between climate and security risks, and how to plan, design, implement 
and evaluate programmes to respond to these. It has carried out climate security risk assessments of 
the Lake Chad region (Nagarajan et al., 2018; Vivekananda and Born, 2018), and will be partnering 
with UNEP to pilot climate security interventions in Sudan and Nepal over the next four years. 
• Centre for Climate and Security: The Centre has analysed climate change and security risks of 
SIDS in the Caribbean, identifying pathways through which climate change acts as a threat 
multiplier for security risks. Some of its researchers advocate for integration of climate security into 
existing efforts instead of creating dedicated institutions to address the risk nexus (Fetzek and 
Barrett, 2019). To do this across EU foreign policy and security institutions, Fetzek and van Schaik 




produce this data, and climate security early warning systems must include clear ‘triggers’ for 
emergency action that can be acted on with the appropriate levels of urgency. 
• Clingendael Institute: The Institute has studied the dynamics between climate change, water 
security and development in Iraq (von Lossow, 2018), and has focused on researching the nexus of 
climate and conflict in cities. Rademaker et al. (2018) analysed the efforts of three cities – Bamako 
(Mali), Maiduguri (Nigeria, Lake Chad Region) and Baghdad (Iraq) – to build resilience, concluding 
that: (1) conflicts significantly lower urban resilience to climate-related impacts; (2) very dense 
urban areas are particularly vulnerable to climate disasters; and (3) large sprawling cities have poor 
capacity to maintain resilience. 
• E3G: This is part of the steering group for the Expert Working Group on Climate-Related Security 
Risks and has worked to put the climate security issue onto the UNSC agenda through climate 
diplomacy. It has also participated in the four risk assessments produced for Lake Chad, Iraq, 
Somalia and Central Asia. 
• Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: SIPRI hosts the Expert Working Group on 
Climate-Related Security Risks. It has analysed regional climate security risks in Asia and Africa 
to understand how regional intergovernmental organisations are developing capacities to deal with 
them. Specifically, it has looked at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation, the Economic Community of West African States and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Krampe et al., 2018). 
• Toda Peace Institute: The Institute is responding to the perception that approaches to climate 
security are currently dominated by a western-based, state-centric approach. It has led the creation 
of an agenda for research focused on Asia-Pacific, which aims to: address climate change in a 
conflict-sensitive manner; coordinate activities at church, civil society and community levels with 
policy-makers through climate change action that is both bottom-up and top-down; integrate 
indigenous and traditional knowledge with western and scientific knowledge; and decolonise 
climate change language (Toda Peace Institute, 2018). It has studied the climate security challenges 
of the Solomon Islands, stressing its acute vulnerability to the impacts of climate change as it is both 
a SIDS and a post-conflict state (Higgins and Maesua, 2019), as well as those of Vanuatu, which 
has a growing population and is already faced with relocation challenges (Davies, 2019). 
(5) Civil society 
Among CSOs, a few NGOs have delivered projects seeking to address challenges at the climate change–
security nexus. Here we report on a few found in the literature. 
• Amnesty International: Amnesty International (2018) has looked at tactics of the Islamic State in 
rural Iraq to win support by destroying means of rural livelihoods, such as irrigation wells, orchards 
and electricity lines. This has created joblessness and insecurity that will be exacerbated by extreme 
weather events and slow-onset climate stresses, which the country is highly exposed to. These will 
be key priorities to be addressed during reconstruction. 
• Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC) for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development: This 
organisation has monitored land conflicts in six Asian countries (Indonesia, India, Nepal, the 
Philippines, Bangladesh and Cambodia), recognising that climate change adds pressure on 
inadequate land tenure systems in these countries, and generates resource conflicts (ANGOC, 2019) 
• Displacement Solutions: Displacement Solutions (2018) has looked at the climate displacement 
potential in Ayeyarwady and Mon states in Myanmar, and how the Myanmar National Climate Land 
Bank is identifying land plots for relocation of coastal communities that have agreed to be relocated. 
• Mercy Corps: Mercy Corps (2018b) has supported natural resource-sharing initiatives and shock-
absorbing activities such as agriculture practices change and banking services access, between 
communities in the Kenya-Uganda border region of Karamoja, where changing precipitation 
patterns are feeding ethnic tensions. 
• Wetlands International: This organisation has analysed increasing water conflicts within Indian 
cities driven by degradation of wetlands, and has argued for more attention to them within a context 
of climate change (Kaul and Kumar, 2018)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
